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cmx NIX BUNDLE-0-STIX: A FEMINIST 
CRITIQUE OF THE DISAGGREGATION 
OF PROPERTY 
Jeanne L. Schroeder* 
Property was dead: to begin with. There is no doubt whatever 
about that. The register of its burial was signed by the clergyman, the 
clerk, the undertaker, and the chief mourner. Hohfeld signed it: and 
Hohfeld's name was good ... for anything he chose to put his hand to. 
Old Property was as dead as a door-nail. 
Mind! I don't mean to say that I know, of my own knowledge, 
what there is particularly dead about a door-nail. I might have been 
inclined, myself, to regard a coffin-nail as the deadest piece of iron-
mongery in the trade. But the wisdom of our ancestors is in the sim-
ile; and my unhallowed hands shall not disturb it, or the Country's 
done for. You will therefore permit me to repeat, emphatically, that 
Property was as dead as a door-nail. 
The mention of Property's funeral brings me back to the point I 
started from. There is no doubt that Property was dead. This must be 
distinctly understood, or nothing wonderful can come of the story I 
am going to relate. If we were not perfectly convinced that Hamlet's 
Father died before the play began, there would be nothing more re-
markable in his taking a stroll at night, in an easterly wind, upon his 
own ramparts, than there would be in any other middle-aged gen-
tleman rashly turning out after dark in a breezy spot - say Saint 
Paul's Churchyard for instance - literally to astonish his son's weak 
mind.1 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DEATH OF PROPERTY 
Property was dead, to begin with. The coroner, Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld, revealed that the unity, tangibility, and objectivity 
of property perceived by our ancestors was a phantom. Property is, 
in fact, merely a "bundle of sticks."2 When conceptualized as a col-
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. A.B. 
1975, Williams College; J.D. 1978, Stanford Law School. - Ed. I thank David Gray Carlson, 
Arthur Jacobson, and Marty Slaughter for their insightful comments. 
1. My apologies to the memory of Charles Dickens. See CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRIST· 
MAS CAROL 1-3 (Columbia Univ. Press 1956) (1843). 
2. 
After all, in contemporary legal discourse the most common conception of property is 
the bundle of legally protected interests, held together by competing and conflicting pol-
icy goals. The removal of one or more sticks from the bundle should have no particular 
implications for the legally protected interests that remain. 
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lection of rights, property loses its distinctive qualities and its es-
sence. It therefore does not, or at least should not, exist.3 Without 
unity and physicality, property loses its objectivity and can only be a 
myth.4 The rabble might still believe in the old gods of property, 
but the educated "specialists" now know that this was vulgar super-
stition. Once the populace is reeducated, property will cease to be 
worshiped.s 
James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider 
Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1413 1512 (1992). This view is designed to contrast with the sup-
posedly classical view of "title." 
To the extent that there was a replacement for this Blackstonian conception it was the 
familiar "bundle of rights" notion of modern property law, a vulgarization of Hohfeld's 
analytic scheme of jural correlates and opposites, loosely justified by a rough-and-ready 
utilitarianism and applied in widely varying ways to legal interest of every kind. 
Id. at 1459. 
One of the earliest uses of this metaphor is by Benjamin N. Cardozo: "The bundle of 
power and privileges to which we give the name of ownership is not constant through the 
ages. The faggots must be put together and rebound from time to time." BENJAMIN N. CAR· 
DOZO, THE p ARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928). Cardozo's conception does not use 
the "bundle of sticks" metaphor to argue either that any individual stick can separately be 
characterized as property or that just any bundle of sticks can be characterized as property. 
Rather, he argued that somewhat different bundles have been recognized as complete prop-
erty interests at different times. 
3. Among the writings attacking the viability of property are Thomas C. Grey, The Disin-. 
tegration of Property, in XXll NoMos, PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chap-
man eds., 1980); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer 
and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305 
(1990); James Stevens Rogers, Negotiability, Property, Identity, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 471 
(1990); Joseph K. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REv. 
481 (1983); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV, 611 
(1988); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Develop-
ment of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 325 (1980). 
4. See, for example, Jennifer Nedelsky's characterization of the commonly held Ameri-
can view of property in her excellent account of the significance of property to the Framers of 
the U.S. Constitution. 
How can "the tradition" be characterized by both coherence and endurance and by an 
apparently unlimited mutability in the purported core of the structure? The paradox 
itself suggests the answers: it is the myth of property - its rhetorical P.OWer combined 
with the illusory nature of the image of property - that has been crucial to our system. 
And it is this mythic quality that current changes [i.e., disaggregation] in the concept 
may threaten. 
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL· 
ISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 224 (1990). 
5. According to Thomas Grey, "specialists" such as lawyers and economists already rec-
ognize the disintegrating nature of property, although lay people naively cling to the unitary, 
objective, physicalist ideal. As lay people eventually accept the specialist view, property will 
lose its traditional inspirational role. Grey, supra note 3, at 69, 76-79; bllt see infra section 
IV.A. 
Bruce Ackerman similarly contrasts the theory of property of the Scientific Policymaker 
to that of the Ordinary Observer. BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CoNSTI· 
TUTION 26-29, 97-100 (1977). 
Other members of the legal priesthood who identify the death of "traditional" property 
seek to employ a technique successfully used by the early Church - harnessing the spiritual 
power of the discredited religion by accepting pagan ritual but changing the object of wor-
ship. That is, in order to win over the devotees of the old dead gods, the new God usurps the 
titles of His defeated predecessors so that He might be worshiped in a familiar form. Thus, 
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But if mythic unitary property of our ancestors is dead, it contin-
ues to haunt us with ghostly persistence. As Sir John Frazer illus-
trates, the murder of the mythic hero - whether it be Osiris, 
Tammuz, Adonis, Jesus, or Superman - is only a precursor to his 
resurrection.6 And so, certain theorists have recently insisted that 
property exists after all - but only a version of property that em-
phasizes tangibility and immediate relations with physical, real 
objects. 
In this article I argue that property is alive and well. But prop-
erty is also in the grip, so to speak, of a specific metaphor - an 
image of property as the sensuous grasping of a tangible thing. 
While most contemporary legal commentators dutifully intone 
the insight - typically attributed to Hohfeld7 - that property is 
neither a thing nor the rights of an individual over a thing but 
rather a legal relationship between legal subjects, few of them suc-
cessfully or consistently resist the temptation of identifying prop-
erty with the owned object.8 I argue that property as both thing 
and right is described, not in terms of just any physicalist imagery, 
but in terms of phallic imagery. That is, property is metaphorically 
identified with seeing, holding, and wielding the male organ or con-
trolling, protecting, and entering the female body. Our very termi-
nology for nonphysical things - intangible or noncorporeal 
property - presumes that tangibility and corporeality are the 
norm. I further argue that this physicalist concept of property -
what I call the phallic metaphor - is related to a more general 
certain self-styled progressives do not want the memory of discredited property to wither 
away entirely. Rather, they wish to preserve but redirect the powerful inspirational rhetoric 
of property away from its traditional conservative and reactionary roles. 
For example, Margaret Jane Radin argues that constitutionally protected property should 
be redefined as whatever furthers "human flourishing." See Margaret Jane Radin, The Lib-
eral Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Taking, SS CoLUM. L. 
R.E.v. 1667, 16S7-SS (19SS). I critique Radin's theory of property extensively in Jeanne l:· 
Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Theory of Personal Property as the Inviolate 
Feminine Body, 19 MINN. L. R.E.v. 55 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder, Virgin Territory]. 
Joseph William Singer and Jack M. Beermann similarly argue that once one accepts the 
proposition that property is socially constructed, one is free to redefine property in terms of 
what is good for human beings. Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social 
Origins of Property, 6 CANADIAN J.L. & JurusPRUDENCE 217, 241 (1993). As will become 
obvious in this article, I believe that Singer and Beermann's argument is a non sequitur. 
6. See SIR JAMES GEORGE FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BouGH: A STUDY IN MAGIC AND 
RELIGION 283-397 (Theodor H. Gaster ed., abr. ed. 1951). 
7. E.g., Vandevelde, supra note 3, at 359-61. 
S. Probably the most extreme and consistent identification of property and thing in con-
temporary jurisprudence can be found in the work of Margaret Radin. See, e.g., Margaret 
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. R.E.v. 957 (19S2). 
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psychoanalytic tendency of humans to conflate legal-linguistic con-
cepts with the physical world.9 
My analysis presents the physicalist paradigm in property theory 
in two versions: the affirmative and the negative. Representing the 
affirmative physical property theory is Jeremy Waldron. Waldron 
agrees that contemporary neo-Hohfeldian analysis makes the task 
of defining property difficult, but he argues that it can be done by 
applying a Wittgensteinian family-resemblance analy~is starting 
with the archetype of ownership of physical objects.10 Waldron rep-
resents the revival of property theory against the twenty-year as-
sault that property has undergone from both the critical legal 
studies and law and economics movements. 
The alternate variation of the physicalist conception of property 
is its negation - denial. This version reduces property to a bundle 
of sticks. I argue that this attempt to disaggregate the unity of 
property places primacy on the sensuous grasp of tangible objects. 
Thomas Grey is probably the most prominent among those who 
argue that property cannot be conceived as a unitary right with re-
spect to tangible things and therefore must lose its meaning as a 
legal category. Because property cannot have this meaning, it does 
not exist.11 But this thesis depends on the proposition that property 
only has meaning if conceptualized as the sensuous grasp of physi-
cal things by a single human being. 
These denials of the phallic physicalist concept of property co-
vertly reinstate it, as. reflected in the very imagery of the "bundle of 
sticks" - a metaphor of the sensuous, possessory, and tangible. 
Sticks and bundles are physical things that one can, and stereotypi-
9. In Virgin Territory: Radin's Theory of Personal Property as the Inviolate Female Body, 
I explore Radin's identification of personal property literally with the female body, which 
must be chastely preserved from unwanted market intercourse. See Schroeder, Virgin Terri· 
tory, supra note 5. To Radin, alienation of personal property - that is, of those objects of 
property she thinks are worthy of special solicitation - is violation and loss of feminine 
selfhood. See Radin, supra note 8, at 958-60. In other articles I explore the persistence of the 
masculine phallic metaphor of the sensuous grasp of physical objects in commercial law doc-
trine - the private law of personal property. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Liquid Property: The 
Myth That the U.C.C. Disaggregated Property 37-50 (1994) [hereinafter Schroeder, Liquid 
Property] (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Perfection as 
Possession: The Critique of Ostensible Ownership and Rehabilitation of Benedict v. Ratner 
(1994) [hereinafter Schroeder, Perfection as Possession] (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). 
In this article I concentrate on masculine phallic imagery in scholarship concerning prop-
erty theory - the public law of property. This phallic imagery will, of course, be most appar-
ent in those theorists who epitomize property relations as sensuous grasping. But, as we will 
see, this imagery repeats itself in those who try to negate the physicality of property. In 
psychoanalytic theory, denial is merely recognition. 
10. See infra Part III. 
11. I flesh out this argument infra in section IV.A. 
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cally does, see and sensuously grasp in one's hand. Moreover, the 
"bundle of sticks" analysis does not solve the metaphysical 
problems these scholars purport to identify in the unitary, posses-
sory, tangible concept of property. It merely postpones, and 
thereby replicates, the unitary theory and its problems. This bundle 
consists of separate little phallic sticks, each a separate little unity 
with its own metaphysical problems. Of course, these scholars ad-
dress such problems by supposing that each "stick" is itself a sepa-
rate bundle of smaller little sticks, ad infinitum. This is the classic 
bad infinity of "turtles all the way down."12 That is, although its 
proponents usually present the "bundle of sticks" metaphor as an 
alternative to the "property as thing" metaphor,13 the former is in. 
fact merely a variation of the latter. 
The "bundle of sticks" marks a key psychoanalytic moment in 
recent property theory. Progressives plotted the murder of prop-
erty. In order to make sure it stayed dead, they disaggregated prop-
erty, in the same way that the evil god Set dismembered the corpse 
of the murdered god Osiris.14 But, like Osiris's, property's disag-
gregation not only did not prevent its resurrection but enabled the 
resurrected god to fill the entire universe.15 Thanks to "bundle of 
12. There are many versions of the turtle story. I discuss these variations in Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces: Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis, 
16 CARDOZO L. REv. {forthcoming Dec. 1994) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Vestal and the 
Fasces]. 
My favorite version involves the seeker 0£ wisdom who travels to the far ends of the earth 
to consult a famous holy man about the meaning of life. "The world," the sage said, "lies on 
four columns which are supported by four enormous elephants." "What do the elephants 
stand on?" asked the student. "The elephants," the sage continued, "stand on the back of the 
great cosmic turtle." The conversation continued: "But on what does the cosmic turtle 
stand?" "The turtle stands on the back of an even greater turtle." "And on what does the 
greater turtle stand?" "On the back of a yet greater turtle." "And on what does that turtle 
stand?" "On the back of an even greater turtle." "And on what ... " "Listen buster, it's 
turtles all the way down!" 
13. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 3, at 81. 
14. According to Egyptian mythology, Set murdered his twin brother Osiris, the corn 
god. First, Set tried hiding the corpse. Isis, Osiris's widow and sister, found the body and 
conceived the child-god Horus from her dead husband. Set, determined not to be defeated 
twice, again killed Osiris and tore him into fourteen parts, which he strew throughout Egypt. 
NEW LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MYmOLOGY 18-19 (new ed. 1968); see also JOSEPH 
CAMPBELL, THE MYTiilC IMAGE 27 (1974). 
15. The grieving Isis once again set out in search of her husband's body. Paradoxically, 
the myths say both that she buried each body part where she found it and that she brought all 
the pieces together, reconstituted the body, invented embalming, made Osiris into the first 
mummy, and then raised him from the dead. Either way, the resurrected Osiris now reigns as 
the god of death and resurrection. Although variants of the myth give different explanations 
for this apparent paradox - f~r example, Isis only buried facsimiles of the body parts, the 
body parts miraculously multiplied, and so on - they agree on the point that the dismember-
ment and multiple burials of Osiris enabled Isis to spread his divine presence and worship 
throughout Egypt. NEW LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MYmOLOGY, supra note 14, at 18-
19. 
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sticks" imagery, property threatens to permeate all legal relations, 
making all government actions into takings.16 
As this article maintains that phallic metaphor in physicalist the-
ories of property has a psychoanalytic basis, I begin with a brief 
outline of Hegel's theory of property and Lacan's closely related 
theory of sexuality. A grounding in these ideas will help illustrate 
why the metaphor of the grasped object so dominates property the-
ory today. 
II. THAT OBSCURE OBJECT OF DESIRE 
Why do phallic metaphors haunt property discourse? These 
metaphors are an abduction17 that comes so easily to us as to seem 
natural.18 Both property, according to Hegelian philosophy, and 
the Phallus, according to Lacanian psychoanalysis, serve as the de-
fining objects of desire that enable us to create ourselves as acting 
subjects through the creation of law. The parallel roles reserved for 
property and for the Phallus in the political and psychoanalytic phi-
losophies of Hegel and Lacan are the reason these metaphors so 
frequently recur in discourse about property law. A brief exegesis 
of these complex and frequently obscure theories of subjectivity 
follows.19 
Particularly interestingly for the purposes of this article, the only part of Osiris's body that 
Isis could not find was his phallus - apparently a fish or a crab ate it - so the divine Phallus 
remains forever lost in the world. Id.; FRAZER, supra note 6, at 424-25. Indeed, Lacan uses 
precisely the metaphor of Osiris's lost phallus to describe his concept of the Phallus as the 
lost object. JACQUES LACAN, The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power, in 
EcRITS 226, 265 (Alain Sheridan trans., 1977) (1966). 
16. According to Singer and Beermann: 
In other words, by conceiving of ownership of property as a bundle of sticks, with each 
stick representing a distinct incident of ownership, it is possible to portray the elimina-
tion, through regulation, of one stick, or several sticks together, as a deprivation of a 
distinct interest rather than a mere restriction of an otherwise intact property interest. 
In applying conceptual severance, the Court identifies the strand or strands taken 
from the bundle of rights that may characterize property ownership and therr simply 
defines that right or set of rights as a separable property interest. 
Singer & Beermann, supra note 5, at 222-23. 
17. Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12. 
18. For a discussion of the logical process of abduction, see infra text accompanying notes 
49-58; see also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies 
and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEXAS L. REv. 109 (1991) [hereinafter Schroeder, Abduc-
tion from the Seraglio]. 
19. A complete analysis of Lacan's theories is beyond the scope of any law review article. 
I set forth a more complete exegesis of these theories in two of the companion pieces to this 
article. See Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, 
supra note 5. 
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A. Hegelian Philosophic Theory 
In his Philosophy of Right,20 Hegel traces the dialectic of human 
freedom from a starting point of the most abstract concept of per-
sonality through the creation of the individual as citizen of a highly 
developed state. Property plays an early and crucial role in this dia-
lectic.21 The Hegelian concept of the object does not refer to physi-
cal things but includes everything other than the most primitive and 
abstract concept of personality, that is, self-consciousness.22 Hege-
lian abstract personality as self-consciousness can only be defined in 
terms of what it is not and, therefore, is pure negativity. Conse-
quently, the Hegelian concept of object includes not merely con-
ventional tangibles and intangibles, such as so-called intellectual 
property, but also all individuating characteristics that a person can 
acquire, such as personality traits, talents, beliefs, and.our own bod-
ies.23 In order to obtain the subjectivity that will eventually enable 
the person to develop into an individual and actualize his freedom, 
the abstract person needs to objectify himself. 
According to Hegelian philosophy, subjectivity is intersubjectiv-
ity mediated through objectivity: one can achieve subjectivity if 
and only if one is recognized as a subject by another person whom 
one recognizes as a subject. Human beings are driven by an erotic 
desire for mutual recognition.24 "Property is ... a moment in man's 
struggle for recognition."25 The abstract personality has no positive 
individuating characteristics and, therefore, cannot be recognized 
by others in this state. Only through the possession and enjoyment 
of objects does the abstract person become individualized and 
20. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGIIT (H.B. Nisbet trans. & 
Allen W. Wood ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821). 
21. That is, the dialectic of the Philosophy of Right is the logic of the development of 
personality from the most abstract, primitive notion of the abstract person, to the individual 
in the modern state. The first stage is Abstract Right, and the first stage of Abstract Right is 
property. HEGEL, supra note 20, §§ 41-71. 
22. I explore the Hegelian concept of objectivity extensively in Schroeder, Virgin Terri-
tory, supra note 5. See also infra section IV.B.5. Hegel's starting place for discussion seems 
to be modeled on the Kantian construct. See SHLOMO A VINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF TIIE 
MODERN STATE 137 (1972). It is incorrect to conclude from this, as Radin does, that Hegel 
agreed with Kant. See Radin, supra note 8, at 971-72. Rather, although Hegel recognized a 
true moment in Kant's concept, he presents the logic of the Philosophy of Right as a demon-
stration that the Kantian construct is inadequate and destined to go under by the force of its 
own internal logic and to be superseded by more complex forms of personhood. Property is 
the first stage in this development. 
23. See infra sections IIl.B-D.1. 
24. See Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of Contract, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 
1199, 1220-21 (1989); see also Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12; Schroeder, 
Virgin Territory, supra note 5. 
25. AvINERI, supra note 22, at 89. 
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thereby recognizable as a subject. Through the exchange of objects 
with another person - that is, through contract - one person can 
recognize another person as an acting subject deserving rights. And 
through recognition by that other person, the first person can rec-
ognize herself as a subject capable of bearing rights. 
This legal regime with respect to the posses~ion, enjoyment, and 
exchange of the object of desire is property.26 Therefore, the mo-
ment of the creation of full property, to Hegel, is simultaneously 
also both the moment of creation of subjectivity as intersubjectivity 
and the moment of the creation of law as Abstract Right.27 Subjec-
tivity, property, and law are mutually constituting. 
B. Lacanian Theory 
In Lacanian psychoanalytic terminology, the Phallus is the con-
cept of the unqbtainable object of desire - the Other as radical 
alterity. According to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, human sub-
jects exist in three distinct, yet interdependent and overlapping, or-
ders of experience. In one of Lacan's last seminars, he uses the 
metaphor of a "Borromean Knot" to describe the relationship be-
tween these realms. Thi& "knot" consists of three rings that are not 
interlinked but held together through overlapping. The metaphor 
points out that although each ring and each realm is distinct and 
26. Note that Hegel speaks at the highest level of abstraction and generality. He claims 
that his dialectic demonstrated the logical necessity for some regime of possession, enjoy-
ment, and alienation of objects. The specific parameters of any given regime cannot be logi-
cally determined. Societies must define them on a case-by-case basis through pragmatic 
reasoning and adopt them into positive law (Gesetz). Consequently, while Hegel tries to 
justify the existence of some form of property regime, unlike Locke and other property theo-
rists, he does not make any argument for any specific property regime, let alone for the 
specific property rights of any specific individual. See Richard Hyland, Hegel: A User's Man-
ua~ 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1735, 1741 (1989). 
27. See Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12. Abstraci Right, to Hegel, is 
the most primitive form of human relationship. It leads to the cold, heartless regime of 
laissez-faire capitalism that Hegel called civil society. Hegel describes his concept of civil 
society in HEGEL, supra note 20, §§ 182-256, at 220-74. As summarized by Allen Wood: 
Civil society is the realm in which individuals exist as persons and subjects, as owners 
and disposers of private property, and as choosers of their own life-activity in the light of 
their contingent and subjective needs and interests. In civil society, people's ends are in 
the first instance purely private, particular and contingent, not communal ends shared 
with others through feeling (as in the family) or through reason (as in the state). 
In other words, civil society is the realm of the market economy. 
Allen W. Wood, Editor's Introduction to HEGEL, supra note 20, at vii, xvii (citation omitted). 
Although Hegel argues that Abstract Right constitutes an essential building block of human 
freedom as self-actualization, logic necessitates that the more developed and adequate rela-
tionships of morality and ethical life supplement Abstract Right and that the family and the 
state supplement civil society. Similarly, the legal subject created with Abstract Right -
with his close family resemblance to the autonomous individual posited by liberal philosophy 
- is a true but inadequate moment in the development of the more rich and complex con-
cept of the individual. 
November 1994] Chix Nix Bundle-0-Stix 247 
does not interpenetrate another, the whole of the knot and the 
psyche depends on the interrelationship between the three; remove 
one, and the whole system collapses. The metaphor of the inter-
locking rings is also designed to counteract the tendency to hier-
archize the three regimes - placing the Symbolic realm above the 
Imaginary, and the Imaginary above the Real. Another advantage 
of the metaphor of rings is that it offers an alternative to the com-
mon internal-external metaphors for human experience. That is, a 
point within a ring can be described as either external to the ring, or 
internal to it. Finally, because the three rings overlap, the meta-
phor illustrates how the same "object" can simultaneously serve 
parallel functions in the different orders. An Imaginary object of 
desire - or objet petit a in Lacan's terminology - can stand in for 
the Symbolic Phallus and the Real Thing.28 
Lacan describes each of the orders of experience represented in 
the metaphor of the Borromean Knot. First comes the realm of 
"the Real," or that which is beyond interpretation. Lacan's concept 
of the Real is subtle and paradoxical. It includes everything that 
cannot be captured in language and is prior to' law. For now, it 
suffices to say that for some purposes, the Real functions as the 
28. Lacan provided a visual representation of the "Borromean Knot:" 
STUART SCHNEIDERMAN, JACQUES LACAN: THE DEATH OF AN INTELLECI1JAL HERO 33 
{1983). See Steven L. Wmter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cog-
nitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989) for a discussion of the persistent use of 
the internal-external and other common metaphors. For brief descriptions vof the metaphor 
of the Borromean knot, see SCHNEIDERMAN, supra, at 33, and SLA vo1 ZIZEK, LooKING 
AWRY: AN INTRODUCDON TO JACQUES LACAN THROUGH POPULAR CuLTURE 5, 143 
{1992). 
According to Jacqueline Rose: 
Lacan termed the order of language the symbolic, that of the ego and its identifications, 
the imaginary {the stress, therefore, is quite deliberately on symbol and image, the idea 
of something which "stands in"). Tue real was then his term for the moment of impossi-
bility onto which both are grafted, the point of that moment's endless return. 
Jacqueline Rose, Introduction II to JACQUES LACAN, FEMININE SEXUALITY 27, 31 (Juliet 
Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds. & Jacqueline Rose trans., 1982) (1966-75). 
For an excellent, albeit somewhat simplistic, introduction to Lacan's concepts of realms, 
see ELIZABETH GRosz, JACQUES LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRoDucnoN {1990). 
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physical world - as "reality," in the colloquial sense of the word.29 
Standing for the biological or natural, the Real includes the realm 
of the infant before it30 develops consciousness. Next, in the "mir-
ror stage," the child enters the order of the "Imaginary." Although 
this is the child's first awareness of self, at this stage it can only 
experience itself as that which it is not. It is not the "Other" -
Lacan's term for radical alterity, which is identified with the role of 
the Mother, the unconscious, and the Symbolic order. Conse-
quently, the infant during the mirror stage, existing only in the Real 
and the Imaginary, resembles the Hegelian abstract personality -
pure negativity. 
To Lacan, the subject is the subject of language.31 In order to 
become a speaking subject, the infant, like the Hegelian abstract 
person, must become recognizable and recognized by another 
speaking subject. To do this, during the Oedipal stage, the child 
29. Lacan continually refined his complex and subtle concepts of psychic orders through-
out his life, originally emphasizing the contrast between the Imaginary and Symbolic orders 
and concentrating at the end of his career on the relationship between the Real and the 
Symbolic. Compare, for example, 1 JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN 
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & John Forrester trans., 1988) (1953-54) with Lacan's twentieth 
seminar, "Encore," two classes of which have been translated into English and reprinted as 
JACQUES LACAN, God and the Jouissance of :i:lte Woman, in FEMININE SEXUALITY, supra 
note 28, at 137, and JACQUES LACAN, A Love Letter (Une Lettre d'Amour), in FEMININE 
SEXUALITY, supra note 28, at 149 [hereinafter LACAN, A Love Letter]. This article, which is 
influenced most strongly by Lacan's late theories of feminine sexuality, reflects this change in 
emphasis. 
A full discussion of these concepts is far beyond the scope of a law review article. I 
believe, however, that a fairly simplistic description is adequate for the level of generality of 
this discussion. 
The Real is an order of the human psyche, so it is not equivalent to the physical world 
that "really" exists outside of human experience: The Real is that which cannot be reduced 
to images, language, law, and sexuality, and includes everything that serves as a limitation or 
barrier to human experience. This means that the Real is the impossible. It includes all 
limiting concepts such as God and death. As adult human subjects, we do not have immedi-
ate access to the external world; our experience is always mediated through our unconscious 
and conscious interpretations in the orders of the Imaginary and the Symbolic. Conse-
quently, what functions as most Real to us is not necessarily identical to the physical world 
unmediated by human thought. 
30. I use the neuter pronoun because in Lacanian theory sexuality is not a Real biological 
fact but a linguistic position in the Symbolic realm of the adult subject. The essays that 
discuss this most expressly are JACQUES LACAN, The agency of the letter in the unconscious or 
reason since Freud, in ECRrrs, supra note 15, at 146 [hereinafter LACAN, The agency of the 
letter], and JACQUES LACAN, The signification of the phallus, in ECRrrs, supra note 15, at 281. 
The latter essay also appears in a different translation as JACQUES LACAN, The Meaning of 
the Phallus, in FEMININE SEXUALITY, supra note 28, at 74. 
31. See JACQUES LACAN, Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father Seminar, in TELEVISION 
81, 82 (Joan Copjec ed. & Dennis Hollier et al. trans., 1990) (1974) ("I have long established 
in the structure of the subject, defined as the subject that speaks ..• "); see also Rose, supra 
note 28, at 31 ("For Lacan the subject is constituted through language . • • • The subject is the 
subject of speech (Lacan's 'parle-etre'), and subject to that order."); Juliet Mitchell, Introduc-
tion I to FEMININE SEXUALITY, supra note 28, at 1, 5. 
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enters the order of the "Symbolic," where either he32 takes on the 
role of having and exchanging the Phallus, or she takes on the role 
of being (and enjoying) the Phallus. 33 It is only from these sexu-
ated positions that we can be recognized by others, and thereby by 
ourselves, as subjects who use symbols and speak. 
According to Lacanian psychoanalysis, subjectivity is intersub-
jectivity mediated through objectivity - just as in Hegelian philos-
ophy. Human beings are driven by an erotic desire for mutual 
recognition; one can achieve subjectivity if and only if one is desired 
as a subject by another person who one recognizes and desires as a 
subject.34 The infant in the mirror stage has no positive individuat-
ing characteristics and, therefore, cannot be recognized by others as 
a speaking subject. Through the possession and enjoyment of the 
Phallus as the Symbolic object of desire, the infant becomes recog-
nizable as a subject. Through the Symbolic exchange of the Phallus 
as object of desire with another person - that is, language and the 
law as prohibition - the person can desire the other person as a 
speaking and desiring subject. And through recognition by that 
other person, the first person can recognize himself as a speaking 
subject capable of desire. 
This Symbolic position with respect to possession, enjoyment, 
and exchange of the Phallus is sexuality. Consequently, the mo-
ment .a person attains sexuality is simultaneously the moment of 
32. I use the masculine pronoun because the sexual position of the speaking subject is the 
masculine. As I have discussed elsewhere, many feminists reject Lacan on the grounds of his 
misogyny, whereas other feminists who are influenced by Lacan feel compelled to defend 
him from this charge. In contradistinction, I turn to Lacan precisely because I believe the 
misogyny of his theory offers possible insight into the deeply misogynistic nature of contem-
porary masculine and feminine psychology and of our culture. See Schroeder, Virgin Terri-
tory, supra note 5, at 154-55. 
33. LACAN, The signification of the phallus, supra note 30, at 289. For a different transla-
tion, see LACAN, The Meaning of the Phallus, supra note 30, at 83-84. I discuss Lacan's 
theory extensively in Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12. See generally FEMI-
NINE SEXUALITY, supra note 28; GRosz, supra note 28. As is the case of the development of 
so much of Lacan's thought, Lacan's theory of the phallus and feminine sexuality moved ever 
further away from the naturalistic and biological over time. The earlier writings, with their 
examples of actual exchange of women - influenced by the structuralist anthropology of 
Claude Levi-Strauss - could be misinterpreted as suggesting that the regime of the Phallus 
succeeded. By increasingly emphasizing the symbolic aspect of the exchange, Lacan could 
more thoroughly explicate the hole, the lack, and the failure of human relationships, all of 
which are central to his thought. See Rose, supra note 28, at'48 ("For whereas in the earlier 
texts the emphasis was on the circulation of the phallus in the process of sexual exchange, in 
these texts [the late seminars reprinted in Feminine Sexuality] it is effectively stated that if it 
is the phallus that circulates, then there is no exchange (or relation)."). 
34. "If I have said that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other (with a capital 0), it 
is in order to indicate the beyond in which the recognition of desire is bound up with the 
desire for recognition." LACAN, The agency of the letter, supra note 30, at 172; see also 
LACAN, supra note 15, at 264 ("[M]an's desire is the desire of the Other."). 
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creation both of subjectivity as intersubjectivity and of law as prohi-
bition. Sexuality, subjectivity, and law are mutually constituting.3s 
Property in Hegelian philosophy, therefore, serves a function paral-
lel to that of the Phallus in Lacanian psychoanalysis.36 
Let me explain Lacan's intentionally ambiguous terminology in 
greater detail. The psychoanalytical term of art Phallus does not 
designate the male organ or any other Real thing. On one level, the 
Phallus exists in the Symbolic order of language, law, and sexuality, 
whereas anatomy exists in the Real realm of limitation.37 The Phal-
lus is the universal signifier of subjectivity and, therefore, cannot 
itself be signified.38 Consequently, the Phallus also has a position in 
the Real, in the technical sense that it stands for that which is be-
yond language. Thus, it is always lost, and we are always castrated 
from it. 
The Real includes our sense that a physical, natural world exists 
outside of human interpretation. Consequently, the Real is not 
identical to reality - in the sense of the actual natural world -
because to be aware of and to visualize or speak of our experience 
of reality is to reinterpret it through the veils of the Imaginary and 
the Symbolic. To speak of the Real is to lose touch with reality. 
Yet our sanity literally requires that we treat the Real as though it 
35. See, e.g., LACAN, supra note 31, at 89. 
36. Contemporary property terminology obscures the parallelism slightly. As I have dis-
cussed, in modem English the word property is used to describe both the legal regime -
what Grey calls the specialist definition of property - and the object of the legal regime -
what Grey calls the lay definition. Grey, supra note 3, at 69. C.B. Macpherson makes a 
similar point: 
One obvious difficulty is that the current common usage of the word "property" is at 
variance with the meaning which property has in all legal systems .••. In current com-
mon usage, property is things; in law and in the writers, property is not things but rights, 
rights in and to things. 
C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRmcAL Po. 
smoNs 2 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978). Macpherson overstates his point. Although perhaps 
most lawyers and law professors might say that "rights in and to things" is the technical legal 
definition of property, I believe that, in fact, they also frequently use the word colloquially to 
refer to the object of that right. Radin is one of the few contemporary legal scholars who use 
property to refer primarily to the object. See infra note 216; see also Schroeder, Virgin Terri· 
tory, supra note 5. 
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the regime of possession, enjoyment, and exchange of the 
object of desire is sexuality, or the realm of the Symbolic, while the object of desire is the 
Phallus. 
37. LACAN, The signification of the phallus, supra note 30, at 283-85; see also GRosz, 
supra note 28, at 116-17; Mitchell, supra note 31, at 6-7; Rose, supra note 28, at 42. 
38. Because Lacan,'s subject is the subject of language, his psychoanalytic theory is also a 
linguistic theory very heavily influenced by Ferdinand de Saussure. Lacan's most sustained 
work explaining his linguistic theory is The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason 
since Freud. See LAcAN, The agency of the letter, supra note 30. I introduce Lacan's linguistic 
theory in Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12; see infra text accompanying 
notes 41-44. 
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were reality.39 We necessarily insist on a piece of the Real in our 
Symbolic and Imaginary experience.40 
According to Lacan, we conflate the Symbolic concept of the 
Phallus with Real analogs. Why? The achievement of subjectivity 
is a moment of great pain and loss, as well as gain. According to 
both Hegel and Lacan, in order to be an individual who can speak, 
we must experience ourselves as individuated subjects separate 
from other individuals and the world. All relations are mecUated 
through the Symbolic exchange of the object of desire. Subjectivity 
is intersubjectivity mediated through objectivity. Consequently, 
when we experience ourselves as speaking beings, we lose our sense 
of being one with the world which we Imagine we must have had as 
infants. This sense of loss is castration.41 Specifically, we long for 
immediate relations and union with the Other. In order to do this, 
we want to destroy mediation and reduce the Symbolic back to the 
Real. But to do so risks loss of subjectivity, freedom, and sanity. 
The injunction not to merge with the Other who enables the subject 
to come into being is the incest taboo - law as prohibition. 
We retroactively identify the Symbolic Phallus with something 
we identify as Real that one of the anatomical sexes physically has 
and that the other physically is. Masculinist societies, such as our 
own, identify the "superior" position of subjectivity - having and 
exchanging the Phallus - with the masculine, and the "inferior" 
position of objectivity - being and enjoying the Phallus - with 
the feminine. Consequently, the penis (what males have) and the 
female body (what females are) are identified in the Imaginary as 
the Real correlates to the Phallus. 42 Therefore, the Symbolic -
39. Indeed, in Lacanian theory, psychosis consists in large yart of a subject's inability to 
maintain the barrier between the Real and reality. See, e.g., ZIZEK, supra note 28, at 20. 
40. Id. at 17, 33. 
41. As I discuss in Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12, Lacan sought to 
remove any lingering traces of biologicalism or naturalism in Freud's theory. Sexuality is not 
a Real concept, it is a Symbolic one. See infra note 43 and text accompanying notes 43-48. 
42. GRosz, supra note 28, at 133. 
This phallocentrism does not reflect any essential superiority of the masculine. Nor is it 
caused, as Freud sometimes suggests, by the judgment of actual human infants of the suppos-
edly obvious impressiveness of the male organ when compared with the pathetic female 
counterpart. Rather, it reflects the existing masculinistic-Inisogynistic power relation in our 
society. That is, in language one must identify the supplemental positions of to have and to 
be (lack). This is reflected in the predicate forms of all European - and perhaps other -
languages. Id. at 103-05. Our society identifies superiority with men. Consequently, we 
identify the seeiningly superior position of having to the masculine and the inferior position 
of being to the feininine. We then look to what men anatoinically have but women do not -
the penis. The penis can stand in for the Phallus - the lost object - precisely because the 
biological differences between the sexes suggests the possibility of not having - or losing -
the penis. 
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that is, legal and linguistic - concepts of sexuality are imagined as 
anatomy.43 As I have discussed extensively elsewhere44 and shall 
return to below, the Symbolic Phallus is paradoxically the signifier 
of male subjectivity and the Feminine. 
Lacan designed this ambiguous terminology to reflect this con-
flation: the Symbolic concept is vividly but inadequately called by 
the name of the Real analog. In this article I designate the Sym-
bolic concept Phallus through the use of capitalization and italics. 
The everyday anatomical noun, phallus, is printed in small Roman 
type. 
C. The Significance for Law 
The Imaginary collapse of the Symbolic and the Real that Lacan 
noted at the psychic level is reflected in a similar conflation at the 
legal level. Under both Lacanian psychoanalytical and Hegelian 
philosophical theory, property is a legal concept. It exists at the 
linguistic-legal level of the Symbolic in the sense that property, sub-
jectivity, and law are mutually constituting. It cannot, therefore, 
belong in the animalistic, physical, impossible, prelegal realm of the 
Real and does not exist primarily to satisfy our physical, limiting, 
Real needs. 45 In Lacanian and Hegelian terms, property is the ob-
Freud sometimes seems to suggest that the little girl looks at the male body and says, 
"Gee that's great, I want one," and suffers from penis envy the rest of her life. To put it 
overly simplistically, Lacan suggests that boys and girls look at men and women and see that 
men are treated better. They then look to what he has that she does not and conflate the 
physical and natural {Real) difference with the social, legal, and linguistic {Symbolic) differ-
ence of status. 
This is totally arbitrary; in a different hypothetical society the position of having the Phal-
lus could be identified with some part of women's anatomy; in that case, the Lacan 
equivalent in this hypothetical society would not use the term Phallus for this concept. But 
the seeming inevitability of these gender roles in our society exists, not despite of, but just 
because of its arbitrariness. That is, it exists only because we insist that it exists. Cf. Mitchell, 
supra note 31, at 20-24. 
In other words, Lacan neither argues that phallocentrism is inevitable nor purports to 
show how phallocentrism came about. At most, one might read him as illustrating how phal-
locentrism - once in place - replicates itself. 
43. To Lacan, sexuality is fictional in that it is a linguistic {Symbolic) concept, not an 
anatomical {Real) one. This is not a denial of anatomical sex differences. It is a recognition 
that conscious egos have no direct contact with the physical - that is, the Real - but always 
reinterpret it through the Symbolic. 
44. See Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, 
supra note 5. 
45. Nor does it relate to "demand" - the category of longing that corresponds to the 
suppressed, unconscious realm of the Imaginary. For discussions of the three categories of 
human longing that correspond to the three psychic orders, see GRosz, supra note 28, at 59-
67; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12; and Schroeder, Virgin Territory, 
supra note 5. Need differs from demand in that the unconscious infant has no awareness of 
what it wants; it only experiences its body's needs. Consequently, the need that can be satis-
fied is always empty or full. 
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ject of insatiable Symbolic desire, not of satiable Real need. Desire, 
in this context, refers to the desperate erotic drive to be recognized 
as a desiring subject by another subject. "[M]an's desire is the de-
sire of the Other."46 For both Hegel and Lacan, it is only through 
such intersubjective recognition that we can achieve subjectivity, 
psychoanalytic consciousness, and, eventually, Hegelian freedom. 
Because desire can only be played out through intersubjectivity me-
diated through objectivity, desire and its objects are Symbolic 
categories. 
We conflate the legal, Symbolic concept of property with the 
Real concept of sensuously grasping physical things through pre-
cisely the same psychoanalytic process through which we Imagine 
that we collapse the legal Symbolic concept of the Phallus with the 
Real concepts of the penis and the female body. The Imagery of 
the phallic metaphor for property reflects this conflation. 
According to Lacan, we sublimate our desires and identify the 
Symbolic object of desire with a specific object that Lacan called 
the objet petit a,41 or "little other." Although this little other is an 
Imaginary - in the technical sense - substitute for the Symbolic 
As soon as the infant starts becoming aware of its needs, it becomes conscious and leaves 
the realm of the Real. At the next or mirror stage, the infant becomes aware of itself as 
separate from the world - it begins to experience the Mother as Other. At this point it can 
direct its experience of need or want toward another - it demands. Demand differs from 
need in that it carries the possibility that it will not be satisfied. The fact that one must 
demand from another contains within it the possibility that the other may refuse the demand. 
See LACAN, The signification of the phallus, supra note 30, at 285-86; ZI~K, supra note 28, 
d~ . 
At the level of the Symbolic, the subject no longer experiences itself as merely separate 
from or other than the world. Now he seeks to be a person - a subject. He desires that he 
be desired so that he can desire in return. Because the subject has no essential existence and 
only exists in this realm of desire, this desire can never be satisfied. If a subject's desire was 
ever fulfilled, he would cease to be a subject. Achieving one's desire is madness or death. 
46. LACAN, supra note 15, at 264; see also LACAN, The agency of the letter, supra note 30, 
at 172. 
47. JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 17, 62, 
76-77, 103-04 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & Alan Sheridan trans., Hogarth Press 1977); 
LACAN, God and the Jouissance of q:/ie Woman, supra note 29, at 143; LACAN, A Love Letter, 
supra note 29, at 153-54; JACQUES LACAN, Seminar of21January,1975, in FEMININE SEXU-
ALITY, supra note 28, at 162, 164, 167-68; Alain Sheridan, Translator's Note to EcRITS, supra 
note 15, at xi; BICE BENVENUTO & ROGER KENNEDY, THE WoRKS OF JACQUES LACAN: AN 
INTRODUCTION 175-76 {1986); GROSZ, supra note 28, at 75-78. Through the psychoanalytical 
process called sublimation, the Imaginary objet petit a stands in for the Other - the Phallus 
or Thing - and thereby functions as the cause of our desire. This object can conventionally 
take the form of a woman, or more fetishistically, a body part such as a breast. But, an 
infinite number of objects can so function to put the chain of desire into motion. The Imagi-
nary object need not be sublime in the conventional sense of beautiful or nonsexual. It often 
takes the form of the disgusting, obscene object of morbid fascination. See GRosz, supra 
note 28, at 75-77, 80-81; LACAN, supra note 31, at 82; JACQUES LACAN, Television, in TELEVI-
SION, supra note 31, at 3, 21; SLA voJ ZI2:EK, For They Know Not What They Do 148, 231, 255 
(1991 ); Rose, supra note 28, at 48. In literature, the smell of madeleines that inspired Marcel 
Proust's recollections provides an excellent example of how objet petit a puts the chain of 
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object of desire, we make it function retroactively in our Imagina-
tion as the cause of the desire. We insist that it is actually the desire 
for her body, his penis, my house, your car, her wedding ring, that 
drives us on. Although we look for a substitute object because we 
desire, we pretend that we desire because of the desirability of the 
object. We do this because it seems to hold out the hope that if we 
obtain the object, we will then fulfill our desire. But, by definition, 
we cannot fulfill desire; merging with the Other in an unmediated 
relation destroys subjectivity, consciousness, and speech. Because 
Need can be met, through sublimation we identify the Symbolic ob-
ject of our desire with a Real object we can Imagine as the little 
other. 
In the realm of property, as opposed to love, we try to reduce 
property to physical objects we control. While this accurately rec-
ognizes that a property interest in a physical object may include the 
right sensuously to see, grasp, and enter, property cannot be re-
duced to the sensuous contact or the physical thing itself. Nor does 
the sensuousness of the contact nor the physicality of the object 
epitomize the property relation. This seems to be self-evident, and 
yet we continue to identify property with physicality - the Sym-
bolic with the Real. So, the alternate approach of legal discourse is 
to insist that property is an unmediated legal relationship between 
subjects - a relationship that does not require a mediating res or 
object. 
If we view property theory in terms of the psychoanalytic ten-
dency to collapse the Symbolic into the Real, we gain insight into 
the Imaginary tendency to picture property concepts in terms of 
phallic metaphor. We envision property in terms of the archetype 
of the penis and the female body. In the former manifestation, we 
desire into motion. See MARCEL PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST (C.K. Scott 
Moncrieff & Terence Kilmartin trans., 1981) (1954). 
The French term means the "object spelled with a little a." This is a reference to the 
French word for the Other, Autre. Because this subtlety is lost if the word is translated 
literally and directly into English - object and other being spelled with an "o" - and be· 
cause Lacan and many of his followers are virulently Anglo-Amerophobic, most Lacanians 
. persist in using the French even when writing in English. 
ZiZek refreshingly flouts this snobbery and struggles to coin English equivalents. One of 
his English names for the objet petit a is the "little other," to distinguish it from the big Other. 
On the one hand, this has the advantage of reflecting French and German psychoanalytical 
practice, which emphasizes the use of common colloquial terminology that has rich, complex, 
and contradictory connotations, rather than the English practice of using foreign words as 
precise technical terms of art. Freud and Lacan spoke of the soul (See/e, ame), the I or me 
(Ich, moi), and the it (es, ra), whereas Anglo-American psychoanalysts speak of the psyche, 
the ego, and the id. On the other hand, ZiZek loses Lacan's pun that reflects the arbitrary 
and empty nature of sublimation - the object is abject. See LACAN, Television, supra, at 21 
n.9; see also infra note 221. 
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imagine property as a physical object we see, hold, and wield. In 
the latter manifestation, we imagine it as a physical object we either 
protect from invasion or occupy and enjoy. When men speak of 
possessing a woman in sexual intercourse, they do not make an 
analogy to the possession of real property as the right to enter and 
the power to prevent others from entering. The two are not merely 
similar; they are psychoanalytically identical.48 
If the conflation of the Symbolic Phallic concept of property 
with Real phallic concepts of physicality reflects our psychic 
makeup, its recurrence no longer seems merely surprising. It risks 
seeming inevitable. It suggests that it may be virtually impossible 
for people situated in our society to speak about property without 
descending to phallic imagery to describe Phallic concepts. Thus, 
on one level I mean to critique, but not to criticize, those legal writ-
ers who reinstate the phallic metaphor of property even as they 
purport to deny it. 
On the other hand, the goal of psychoanalytic theory, like Hege-
lian philosophical theory, is the increase of human freedom. La-
can's attempted identification of the structures of our conscious and 
unconscious mind and Hegel's identification of dialectical logic 
should not be confused with predestination. Rather, this knowl-
edge should enhance our ability to control our lives, to attain not 
merely negative liberty but positive freedom. Psychoanalytical the-
ory's exposure of the identification of the Symbolic and the Real as 
a conflation holds out the opportunity to rethink the relation and to 
try to imagine other, more adequate ways of thinking about prop-
erty. This will not be an easy task, however. The postmodern sub-
ject hypothesized by Lacan is paradoxically constrained by its own 
radical freedom. Unlike the modem subject - that is, the autono-
mous, free-standing individual posited by classical liberal theory -
the postmodern subject cannot step outside the linguistic-legal re-
gime and will the gender hierarchy to change. In Hegelian-
Lacanian thought, subjectivity, law-property, and language-sexual-
ity are mutually constituting. This means that the subject is not 
merely the subject of the Symbolic order; the subject is also subject 
to the Symbolic order. Because the Symbolic order in which we are 
currently located is not natural or inevitable, Lacanian thought 
holds out the theoretical possibility of creating radically different 
alternate orders. But changing the Symbolic order would entail si-
multaneously and radically changing the subject. 
48. See ERICH NEUMANN, THE GREAT MOTHER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARCHETYPE 98-
100 (Ralph Manheim trans., 2d ed. 1963). 
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IIJ. WALDRON AND THE EMBRACE OF PHALLIC METAPHOR 
A. Defining Property 
Jeremy Waldron is one of the few contemporary theorists who 
has tried to defend both the institution of private property as well 
as limitations on property within the rights tradition, without adopt-
ing the predominant "right wing" rights position - libertarian ab-
solutism.49 In his insightful book The Right to Private Property,50 
Waldron specifically examines a modified Lockean natural law lib-
eral philosophy or liberty justification, as well as a Hegelian specu-
lative philosophy or freedom justification.st 
Waldron's analysis is particularly illuminating because, on the 
one hand, he avoids the error that many defenders of property 
make in assuming that the core concept of property is self-evident 
and not in need of explication.52 Rather, he takes seriously the sub-
49. See generally Jeremy Paul, Can Rights Move Left?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1622 (1990) 
(reviewing JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY {1988)). In this article I 
will not consider Waldron's often insightful analysis of how to resolve the concept of an 
individual's rights to private property with the rights of the community to limit those rights. 
For present purposes, I am only interested in the imagery implicit in Waldron's definition of 
property, or what Paul calls "the somewhat tedious, early portions of the book." Id. at 1640. 
50. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY {1988). 
51. In this article I use the term liberty to refer to the negative freedoms - that is, free-
dom from - emphasized by classical liberal natural rights theories. I use the term freedom 
to refer to concepts of affirmative freedoms - that is, freedom to - emphasized by Hegel, 
among others. 
Of course, libertarianism also traces its origins to Locke. The differences between liberta-
rian absolutism and other Lockean liberty theories of property spring primarily from the 
greater emphasis given by the latter to the so-called Lockean proviso: One is entitled to 
property with which one has intermixed one's labor so long as there is "enough, and as good 
left in common for others." JoHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, § 27 
(Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1698, corrected by Locke). For an example of a 
Lockean liberty theory of property, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expres-
sion: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 
1533 (1993) (describing an evolving natural rights theory of copyright). The proviso can be 
read as permitting or requiring significant restrictions on the "right" to property. 
I disagree with much of Waldron's interpretation of Hegel's theory. An analysis of Wal-
dron's misinterpretation is beyond the scope of this article. I explain my interpretation of 
Hegel in Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12, in Schroeder, Virgin Territory, 
supra note 5, and, to a lesser extent, in this article infra in section III.B. 
52. Richard Epstein, in contrast, acknowledges Grey's critique but largely dismisses it: 
"The great vice in Grey's argument is that it fosters an unwarranted intellectual skepticism, if 
not despair. He rejects a term that has well-nigh universal usage in the English language 
because of some inevitable tensions in its meaning, but he suggests nothing of consequence to 
take its place." RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS! PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 21 (1985). 
Epstein thinks that Grey confuses the problem of applying a concept in various complex 
contexts with the vagueness of the concept itself. I agree. I distinguish Waldron from Ep-
stein, however, in that the former more directly recognizes his responsibility to grapple with 
and articulate the concept of property, whereas Epstein assumes that its meaning is relatively 
uncontroversial. Specifically, he believes that Blackstone's definition is more than adequate 
for most purposes. Those issues that seem vague should be kept in the proper perspective as 
belonging at the margins of property issues. Id. at 22-23. 
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stantial literature questioning the coherence of the concept of prop-
erty and acknowledges that he cannot purport to justify property 
without first defining it: 
Many writers have argued that it is, in fact, impossible to define pri-
vate property - that the concept itself defies definition .... If private 
property is indefinable, it cannot serve as a useful concept in political 
and economic thought: nor can it be a point of interesting debate in 
political philosophy. Instead of talking about property systems, we 
should focus perhaps on the detailed rights that particular people 
have to do certain things with certain objects, rights which vary con-
siderably from case to case, from object to object, and from legal sys-
tem to legal system.s3 · 
On the other hand, Waldron does not fall into the error committed 
by many leftist critics - including Grey, Vandevelde, and Hohfeld, 
all of whom I will discuss below - who assume that if a simple, 
sharp-edged analytic definition of property is not possible, then no 
definition of property is possible. Thus property ceases to exist as a 
meaningful legal and economic institution. 
A term which cannot be given a watertight definition in analytic juris-
prudence may nevertheless be useful and important for social and 
political theory; we must not assume in advance that the imprecision 
or indeterminacy which frustrates the legal technician is fatal to the 
concept in every context in which it is deployed.s4 
Waldron makes reference to modern and postmodern theories of 
fuzzy definitions: 
I want to consider whether any of the more interesting recent ac-
counts of the nature and meaning of political concepts - such as 
Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblance, the idea of persuasive defi-
nition, the distinction between concept and conception, or the idea of 
"essential contestability" - casts any light on the question of the def-
inition of private property.ss 
Waldron argues that "private property is a concept of which many 
different conceptions are possible, and that in each society the de-
tailed incidents of ownership amount to a particular concrete con-
ception of this abstract concept."S6 Waldron defines the "concept" 
of property as follows: 
Epstein also thinks that political considerations drive Grey's critique more than real diffi-
culties in definition do. I believe that there is some truth to Epstein's complaint. See infra 
section IV.C. 
53. WALDRON, supra note 50, at 26. 
54. Id. at 31. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. Waldron also writes: 
For one thing, private property is a concept of which there are many conceptions: legal 
systems recognize all sorts of constraints on the rights of owners, and the crucial ques-
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The concept of property is the concept of a system of rules governing 
access to and control of material resources. Something is to be re-
garded as a material resource if it is a material object capable of satis-
fying some human need or want. ... Scarcity, as philosophers from 
Hume to Rawls have pointed out, is a presupposition of all sensible 
talk about property.57 
He continues: 
The concept of property does not cover all rules governing the use of 
material resources, only those concerned with their allocation. Other-
wise the concept would include almost all general rules of beha-
viour .... As Nozick puts it, the rules of property determine for each 
object at any time which individuals are entitled to realize which of 
the constrained set of options socially available with respect to that 
object at that time.ss 
Although I do not necessarily agree with Waldron's specific de-
scription of the base concept of property, I concur with Waldron's 
conclusions as to both the need for and the possibility of defining 
property and distinguishing it from other legal relations. In particu-
lar, Waldron's approach toward definitions, his recognition that 
property is and will probably remain a flourishing legal and eco-
nomic institution in spite of - or because of - its open-ended and 
fluid nature, and his realization that the institution of private prop-
erty seems intuitively related to liberty and freedom considerations 
are much more successful than the analysis offered by critics such as 
Grey. Unfortunately, at the next stage Waldron's analysis devolves 
into precisely the unsophisticated thinking that Grey and Vande-
velde associate with - and criticize as - the rigid, unworkable, 
traditional, Blackstonian model of property. That is, Waldron 
adopts the paradigm of sensuous grasping as the norm or epitome 
of property against which all other forms of property must be anal-
ogized. Indeed, it is not even clear that he considers legal rights 
with respect to intangibles to be property at all. 
B. The Physicality of Property 
As we have seen, Waldron first defines property as the regime 
for the allocation of material resources. In tum, he defines the term 
material resources as those things that are possible objects of human 
wants and needs.59 In the following passage, however, he limits ma-
tion is not whether there should be constraints, but whether the particular constraints we 
need defeat the original aims of our right-based argument. 
Id. at 5. 
57. Id. at 31. 
58. Id. at 32. 
59. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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terial objects to physical things, which he contrasts with 
noncorporeal things: . 
I have defined property in terms of material resources, that is, re-
sources like minerals, forests, water, land, as well as manufactured 
objects of all sorts. But sometimes we talk about objects of property 
which are not corporeal: intellectual property in ideas and inventions, 
reputations, stocks and shares, choses in action, even positions of em-
ployment .... [T]his proliferation of different kinds of property object 
is one of the main reasons why jurists have despaired of giving a pre-
cise definition of ownership. I think there are good reasons for dis-
cussing property in material resources first before grappling with the 
complexities of incorporeal property.6° 
Note that Waldron has already taken an unacknowledged step to-
ward the identification of property with physicality that will color 
the rest of his argument. He defines human wants and needs, and 
therefore property, in terms of purely animal satisfaction of physi-
cal limitations. This is an odd choice from a philosopher like Wal-
dron who wishes to explore justifications of property from a 
Lockean and a Hegelian perspective. Neither Locke nor Hegel jus-
tify property in terms of the satisfaction of animalistic physical 
needs; rather, both justify property by reference to the most sub-
lime and most abstract notions of what makes humans truly human 
- liberty and freedom, respectively. 
In the psychoanalytic terminology of Jacques Lacan, Waldron 
locates property in the uninterpreted, preimaginary, prelinguistic 
realm of the Real in which humans experience "need." As I have 
stated above,61 the Hegelian conception of property is the regime of 
possession, enjoyment, and exchange of the object of desire, which 
creates both subjectivity as intersubjectivity and law as Abstract 
Right. In Lacanian psychoanalytic terms, the philosophical concept 
of property, therefore, performs a function parallel to the psycho-
analytic concept of sexuality as language and law - the regime of 
possession, enjoyment, and exchange of the object of desire (the 
Phallus), which creates subjectivity as intersubjectivity and law as 
language. Property, therefore, does not belong in the animalistic, 
physical realm of the Real, or the imagistic realm of the Imaginary, 
in which Waldron immures it. Rather, it constitutes a necessary 
building block in the creation of the uniquely human regimes of the 
Symbolic - law and language. 
In Lacanian and Hegelian theory, property is the object of 
human desire, not of human needs. Desire is the erotic drive to be 
60. WALDRON, supra note 50, at 33. 
61. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
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recognized and desired as a desiring subject by another subject. 
Waldron, however, presumes that property relates to physical wants 
- what Lacan would call "needs." He wants to find an Imaginary 
objet petit a that he can identify with some Real physical object to 
stand in for the Symbolic object of desire and function as the cause 
of desire. Consequently, Waldron wants to presume that property 
is originally a physical relationship. 
This may explain why Waldron cannot - as he refreshingly ad-
mits62 - follow Hegel's argument as to the necessary role of prop-
erty in the development of human personhood. Hegel insists that 
his analysis of property has nothing to do with physical require-
ments. 63 As I have discussed, Hegel's starting place for his political 
philosophy and analysis of property is the most immediate concept 
of the person imaginable: self-consciousness as pure negativity. 
This logical construct does not yet even have a body, let alone phys-
ical needs. 
In other words, Waldron makes precisely the phallic metaphoric 
conflation that Lacan locates as the identification of gender roles -
or sexuated positions - with anatomy. Waldron conflates the 
Phallic with the phallic and desire with need in an attempt to col-
lapse the Symbolic into the Real. 
C. Waldron's State of Nature 
Waldron defends his emphasis. on corporeal objects by an ap-
peal to something like a state of nature. Waldron argues: 
Frrst, we should recall that the question of how material resources are 
to be controlled and their use allocated is one that arises in every 
society .... The question of rights in relation to incorporeal objects 
cannot be regarded as primal and universal in the same way. In some 
societies, we may speculate, the question does not arise at all either 
because incorporeals do not figure in their ontology or, if they do, 
because human relations with them are not conceived in terms of ac-
cess and control. That is a point about incorporeals in general. Turn-
62. Waldron writes: "There are fewer difficulties with the Hegelian approach, though it 
has to be said that the link between private property and the ethical development of the 
person is rather obscure and, in any case, never established as an absolutely necessary con-
nection." WALDRON, supra note 50, at 4. If, however, one concludes that human nature is 
driven by the desire to be desired by another subject, and that subjectivity is intersubjectivity 
mediated by the exchange of the object of desire - as do both Hegel and Lacan - and if 
property is the regime of the exchange of objects, then by definition property is necessary for 
the development of subjectivity. 
63. "The rational aspect of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in 
the superseding of mere subjectivity of personality." HEGEL, supra note 20, § 41 (Addition); 
see also MERoLD WESTPHAL, Hegel, Human Rights, and the Hungry, in HEGEL, FREEDOM 
AND MODERNITY 19, 22 (1992). 
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ing to the incorporeal objects we are interested in, it is clear that 
questions about patents, reputations, positions of employment, etc. 
are far from being universal questions that confront every society. Ori 
the contrary, one suspects that these questions arise for us only be-
cause other and more elementary questions (including questions 
about the allocation of material objects) have been settled in certain 
complex ways.64 
In other words, Waldron tries to defend his analysis by hypothesiz-
ing an artificial anthropology of societies without incorporeals. 
Of course, liberal philosophers, including Locke, have tradition-
ally started their analysis from a hypothetical state of nature. At 
first blush, therefore, Waldron's approach might seem worthwhile 
for the consideration of a Lockean natural rights justification of 
property. On further reflection, however, Waldron's approach is in-
appropriate to an analysis of liberal philosophy. The state of nature 
posited by liberals such as Locke presupposes presocial individuals. 
Waldron starts with a hypothesized second stage of human develop-
ment in which individuals are already living in societies. An analy-
sis of property as it might exist in the artificial state of even such a 
primitive society is irrelevant to the Lockean search for a natural 
right of property. 
More important, despite Waldron's assertions to the contrary, I 
believe that it is not possible to hypothesize a society of entities 
identifiable as human beings in which incorporeal property - such 
as status, religious objects, artistic creations, crafts, objects of beau-
tification, and other Symbolic and Imaginary objects - do not play 
central roles. Creatures living together solely within the realm of 
physical needs and wants are not human subjects but only animals 
living in packs. The subject is the speaking subject of language in 
the Symbolic order. I can, on the other hand, hypothesize societies 
of human beings where incorporeals are the primary source of 
property. For example, such a society might exist on a hypothe-
sized tropical island where there are abundant fruit, vegetables, 
water, and space obviating scarcity for basic human needs and 
wants. That is to say, Waldron believes that tangible property is 
more fundamental to human personality than incorporeal property, 
but I argue that the opposite appears to be true. 
Waldron's approach poses even more difficulty when we move 
to the considerations of actual "primitive" or tribal societies. I am 
not an anthropologist, so I am wary of making empirical claims, but 
I do not believe that any contemporary societies exist solely in 'the 
64. WALDRON, supra note 50, at 34. 
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Real world of physical needs without rich and complex Symbolic 
objects of desire.6s 
In the passage quoted above, Waldron tries to suggest that those 
primitive societies that do have Symbolic objects - such as reli-
gious objects or status - do not allocate these objects through a 
recognizable property regime. This objection fails for at least two 
reasons. 
First, Waldron's own definition of property - a regime of ac-
cess and control of scarce resources - would apply on its face 
equally to incorporeals and corporeals. Even if we are squeamish 
about speaking of religious objects and worship in terms of prop-
erty, any society that recognizes a priesthood with special access to 
the divine, that recognizes the efficacy of ritual or taboo, or that 
requires initiation into religious mysteries or status - such as man-
hood - subjects incorporeals to a regime of access and control of 
the objects of human wants - that is, Waldron's definition of 
property. 
In contradistinction, the two philosophies on which Waldron 
supposedly relies - Hegelianism and Lockean liberalism - do not 
fl.inch from identifying religion with property. Hegel expressly rec-
ognized that our beliefs, religious positions, and liturgical objects 
65. Tue Tasadays are the only contemporary society I know of to approach this descrip-
tion. All other supposedly "primitive" contemporary tribes are, in fact, quite developed, 
having post-Stone-Age societal organization and technology. 
Tue Tasadays, a tribe of 26 people, caused a stir in 1971 when they were "discovered" in 
the Philippines as the only contemporary Stone-Age tribe. Supposedly the Tasadays had no 
pottery, woven cloth, metal, art, weapons, or domestic plants or animals. Tuey had a few 
crude tools. They only ate food they could gather by hand. Tue Tasadays were the subject of 
much interest in both popular culture and scholarship. See, e.g., FURTHER STUDIES ON THE 
TASADAY (D.E. Yen & John Nance eds., 1976); THE TASADAY CONTROVERSY: AssESSINO 
THE EVIDENCE (Thomas N. Headland ed., 1972); Kenneth Macleish, The Tasadays: Stone 
Age Cavemen of the Mindinao, NATL. GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 1972, at 219. Arguably, the 
Tasadays suggest the possibility of Waldron's model of a people having little or no intangible 
goods. 
Unfortunately, since the late 1980s suspicion has spread widely in the scientific commu-
nity that the Marcos regime invented the Tasadays as a crude hoax to gain control over tribal 
lands. For example, some scientists believe that it is biologically impossible for a group this 
small to perpetuate itself; the Tasadays' "tools" appeared to be fakes because they were so 
flimsy that they broke when used; their language seemed substantially the same as that of 
their neighbors; even though they supposedly did not have agriculture, their language con-
tained agricultural terminology; there was no garbage or other signs of continuous habitation 
around their supposed cave "home," and so on. Bruce Bower, 19-Year Debate Over 'Stone 
Age' Tasaday Thrives in Rain Forest, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1990, at B2. 
Tue Tasaday supporters - including the current Filipino government - in turn accuse 
the debunkers of coveting the rich mahogany groves in which the Tasadays live. But even the 
supporters contend that the Tasaday have existed as a separate group for a very short time -
probably being the debased survivors of a larger group that was devastated by disease a few 
hundred years ago. Id.; see also Shannon Brownlee, If Only Life Were So Simple, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., Feb. 19, 1990, at 54. 
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are every bit as much external Symbolic objects of desire and (po-
tentially) exchange as food and clothing.66 Similarly, the Framers 
of the U.S. Constitution, who were, of course, deeply influenced by 
Lockean liberalism, were not shy about analyzing religion in terms 
of property. As I discuss below,67 they sought to justify constitu-
tional freedoms of speech and religion precisely on the grounds that 
men have a natural property right in their opinions and beliefs. 
Second, if Waldron wishes to assert that primitive regimes of 
access to religious or other Symbolic objects significantly differs 
from the type of access and control that we associate with property, 
he has the burden of articulating that difference. Waldron recog-
nizes that his stated project of justifying property requires that he 
be able to define property and distinguish it from other interests, 
and he starts from the proposition that a philosophic project re-
quires careful definition.68 If he cannot identify the difference be-
tween the regime of access to religious and status objects and other 
regimes, his attempted definition of property fails on his own terms. 
Most important, there is a practical problem with Waldron's 
specific choice of the limited concept of property that serves as the 
starting point for his analysis. When one chooses to argue from a 
simple hypothetical, the ultimate issue is not whether there is any 
empirical society that matches the hypothetical. Rather, the ques-
tion is whether the hypothetical simplifies and epitomizes funda-
mental aspects of our society so as to serve as a useful analytical 
model. Indeed, Waldron is very sensitive to the idea that property 
exists not merely as an abstract philosophical concept but as a fun-
damental legal, economic, political, and social institution in our so-
ciety. Unfortunately, I believe that Waldron's hypothetical is so 
alien as to be misleading. 
As we have seen, Waldron has reduced the concepts of material 
resources and human wants to what I have referred to as Real 
needs. The problem with this should be obvious. By reducing these 
concepts in this fashion he has excluded from his starting analysis of 
66. See supra section II.A. Hegel did, however, argue that the logic of property de-
manded its own self-limitation with respect to some types of objects. That is, the purpose of 
property is the development of subjectivity through recognition by others. This requires that 
the abstract self take possession of external objects. Some of these objects are necessary for 
a recognizable personality and become internalized. It would defeat the logic of property if 
one alienated those internalized objects necessary for recognition. Consequently, some ob-
jects cannot be subjected to the complete property regime. Althouth we may possess and 
enjoy our bodies and beliefs, it is an abstract wrong to alienate them by selling ourselves into 
slavery or by denying our beliefs. HEGEL, supra note 20, §§ 65-67. 
67. See infra section IV.C. 
68. See supra section III.A. 
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property all interests beyond those necessary for subsistence. All 
property interests in the Symbolic economy - including in-
corporeals and luxury goods defined broadly as anything above the 
satisfaction of animal need - have already been identified as prob-
lematic. It is possible to take the position that no institution of 
property can be philosophically justified beyond the subsistence 
level. 69 By definition, that position would always lead to the con-
clusion that the property regime of a relatively wealthy, nonsubsis-
tence economy, such as contemporary American society, could 
never be justified. Waldron's goal, however, is not to take the radi-
cal neo-Prudhomian or Marxian position that property is theft. He 
wishes to justify at least a limited property regime in a modern soci-
ety. His choice as a starting point seems antithetical to his purpose. 
D. Waldron's Denial of Incorporeality 
1. Need or Desire? 
In his analysis of property, Waldron's rhetoric quickly falls into 
Phallic-phallic confusion and the related physicalist metaphor for 
property. Waldron states, for example, that "it is often illuminating 
to characterize the solutions [to questions concerning the allocation 
of incorporeals] in terms which bring out analogies with the way in 
which questions about property have been answered."70 Waldron 
continues, 
For example, once it is clear that individuals have rights not to be 
defamed, it may be helpful to describe that situation by drawing a 
parallel between the idea of owning a material object and the idea of 
having exclusive rights in a thing called one's "reputation." Such talk 
may take on a life of its own so that it becomes difficult to discuss the 
law of defamation except by using this analogy with property.71 
Let us recapitulate Waldron's reasoning. First, he argues that prop-
erty is a regime relating to the access and control of the objects of 
human wants and needs. Insofar as this definition refers to 
"wants," one does not necessarily have to limit property to the allo-
69. The alternate interpretations of the so-called Lockean proviso are variations on this 
argument. Locke's labor theory of property argued that one has a natural property right in 
those objects with which one commingles one's labor so long as one leaves "enough, and as 
good" for others. LocKE, supra note 51, § 27; see also supra note 51. The narrow libertarian 
reading of this theory justifies virtually all exclusive property rights this side of starvation of 
the poor. An expansive reading sharply limits property rights in favor of egalitarian and 
communitarian values. See John Stick, Turning Rawls into Nozick and Back Again, 81 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 363 (1987) (demonstrating that the difference between Rawlsian egalitarianism 
and Nozick's libertarianism can be explained in large part by reference to their different 
approaches to the Lockean proviso). 
70. WALDRON, supra note 50, at 34. 
71. Id. 
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cation of physical things. The colloquial term want could be read 
expansively to include the technical psychoanalytical concept of de-
sire. This would make the theory consistent with the Hegelian-
Lacanian concepts of objects of property as potentially being any-
thing external to abstract personality and of property as the regime 
of intersubjective exchange of the object of desire. 
Waldron rejects this interpretation in his second move. 
Although he purports merely to restate this definition, he in fact 
changes it by limiting the term want to the Lacanian concept of 
need for physical objects. That is, he tries to move property out of 
the Symbolic regime of law, into the preconscious, prelinguistic 
realm of the Real. I argue that this reflects the psychoanalytic ori-
gin of sexuated positions in the conflation of the Symbolic notion of 
the Phallus as object of desire with the Real phallus. 
Waldron's third move is to argue that by analogy we can apply 
to incorporeal objects legal principles developed by considering 
corporeal objects. In his fourth and final move, Waldron comes full 
circle to Grey's denial of noncorporeal property. Only corporeal 
object relations are property relations. Waldron no longer purports 
to apply principles developed in connection with corporeal objects 
by analogy to develop the property law of noncorporeals. Rather, 
he purports to apply property law concepts - which by implicit 
definition relate only to corporeal objects - by analogy in order to 
develop a new law of noncorporeal object relations. 
Waldron continues his argument by assertorially denying the 
noncorporeal nature of the objects of legal relations that are tradi-
tionally considered to epitomize property. It has often been noted 
that the most archetypical type of property - real property - is 
the right not to rocks and dirt and other physical things but to es-
tates in land. In psychoanalytic lingo, real property is not Real. 
Waldron counters: 
We might accept the argument but insist that spatial regions can still 
be regarded as material resources. Although they differ ontologically 
from cars and rocks they also seem to be in quite a different category 
from the complexes of rights that constitute familiar incorporeals -
patents, reputations, etc. It is philosophically naive to think that the 
fact that we have to regard regions as property objects adds anything 
to the case for regarding, say, choses in action in that way. The sec-
ond response is more subtle. We may concede that land, as conceived 
in law, is too abstract to be described as a material resource. But we 
may still insist that the primary objects of real property are the actual 
material resources like arable soil and solid surfaces which are located 
in the regions in question. Until recently, these resources have been 
effectively immovable and so there has been no reason to distinguish 
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"land as material" from "land as site." But developments like mod-
em earth-moving and high-rise building necessitate a more complex 
and sophisticated packaging of rights over these resources. Thus the 
concept of land as site has now had to be detached from its associa-
tion with immovable resources and employed on its own as an ab-
stract idea for characterizing these more complicated packages of 
rights. Still, in the last analysis, the system of property in land is a set 
of rules about material resources and nothing more.72 
These arguments evidence Waldron's deep ambivalence concerning 
corporeality and property. He provides these arguments to support 
his assertion that, first, we should start by analyzing corporeal ob-
jects because they are more basic and, second, that real property 
interests are corporeal. His actual statement, however, seems to be 
an unacknowledged shift in position. After saying that he will start 
with the property of material objects because they are most basic, 
he makes an implicit admission that even though the most basic 
property rights concern realty, and realty is not a physical object, he 
finds it useful to analogize land to physical objects. Because it is 
convenient to think of realty interests as physical objects, we will say 
that realty interests are physical objects without considering 
whether or not this is actually the case. In other words, on one level 
Waldron seems to recognize that he starts with material objects, not 
because they are the most basic objects of property, but because 
they seem simpler to think about. 
2. Empirical Arguments for the Phallic Metaphor 
Waldron wants to suggest that only modern technology has 
made the identification of realty interests with the underlying land 
problematic. I question both the historical and empirical accuracy 
of his statement. 
As any first-year law student knows, the concept of realty as a 
specific plot of land occupied and exploited by a single owner is a 
relatively modern development in Anglo-American culture. His-
torically, real property consisted of the system of estates.73 Estates 
72. Id. at 36-37 {footnote omitted). 
73. Indeed, to be precise, when the word property started to come into legal parlance in 
the seventeenth century, it may have more accurately referred only to personal property 
rights of private citizens. This is because the word property was defined as the "highest right 
that a man hath or can have to any thing." G.E. Aylmer, The Meaning and Definition of 
"Property" in Seventeenth Century England, PAST & PRESENT, Feb. 1980, at 87, 89-94. In 
seventeenth-century England - and technically in the contemporary United States - only 
the sovereign can have property in land in the sense of the highest alodial right. Conse-
quently, legal discussion concerning the interests in land of ordinary citizens involved not 
property in land but only estates. In contradistinction, anyone can have a full property in 
personalty. Despite this, according to Aylmer, some seventeenth-century lawyers tended to 
refer sloppily to property in estates owned by citizens. Id. 
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did not consist merely in the right to occupy, farm, mine, or other-
wise physically exploit specific pieces of royalties; they included a 
complex network of rights, responsibilities, and status. Numerous 
persons held different property rights with respect to a given piece 
of realty. Although some of these were merely temporal divisions 
of the right to occupy the land - such as life estates, reversions, 
and so on - many others were not. Not only social status but also 
what we would call governmental and ecclesiastical positions and 
functions were tied to estates. Other real property interests in-
cluded, among others, banalities - which included the right to op-
erate certain utilities such as a mill, oil press, or bake-oven located 
in a village - and advowsons, or the right to name clerics to a 
specific church and income.74 Indeed, the traditional dichotomy be-
tween real and personal property may originally have been in large 
part jurisdictional rather than substantive. Real property rights re-
ferred not to property interests relating to land per se but to those 
causes of action for specific relief that could be brought in the 
king's court.75 
Although many of these medieval estates exist only as vestigial 
organs in late-twentieth-century America, other partial estates have 
taken their place. Let us look at a very simple example of residen-
tial real estate in New York City- my apartment. A corporation 
named Hudson Mews Apartment Corporation owns the equity in 
74. See Macpherson, supra note 36, at 7. 
75. As an empirical matter, however, such real causes of action may have related primar-
ily, but not exclusively, to claims concerning rights in land. 
The name "real property" itself is taken from the procedures, the real actions, through 
which landowners' rights were specifically enforced. The dominant status of real prop-
erty law, early established, long persisted, and in Blackstone's time that body of law, 
viewed as the mechanism either for the resolution of land disputes, or, as it was used by 
the expert conveyancers for the cooperative, consensual organization of land ownership, 
remained the most important and intellectually developed branch of the common law. 
A.W. Brian Simpson, Introduction to 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND at v (A.W. Brian Simpson ed., 1979). That is, real property actions con-
cerned the enforcement of manorial rights, not all of which would be considered tied to land 
by modern standards. 
Duncan Kennedy criticizes Blackstone's categorization of certain rights as real property. 
See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 205, 
344-46 (1979). Simpson's point is that Blackstone's characterization was not an idiosyncratic 
choice but a reflection of the legal practice of his time. 
It is tempting to suspect that the terminology real property comes from its original en-
forcement in the royal courts. Indeed, the word realty can also mean "royal" and "realm." 
Unfortunately, these two meanings of realty seem to derive from entirely different roots. 
The former, referring to property, originates from the Latin res, which means "thing" or 
"matter." The latter refers back to rex or "king," which in turn relates to a root meaning "to 
straighten or put in line." 13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 272, 279 (2d ed. 1989); see 
also Eruc PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS, A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENG-
LISH 553, 561 (1966). Perhaps the development of such similar English words for these differ-
ent concepts originating in different roots is a folk etymology. 
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the building and land where I live. A bank holds a mortgage 
granted by the corporation. Various parties including Tune-Warner 
Cable Television, New York Telephone, ConEdison, and the U.S. 
Postal Service have easements to enter and keep objects - such as 
coaxial cables and telephone and power lines - on the premises. 
The corporation owns rights of access to hook up to the water 
mains and pipelines that run under the street in front of the apart-
ment. The use of the land and building is subject to extensive regu-
lation by the City and State of New York. As the building is located 
in an unusual (for Manhattan) location behind a private courtyard, 
the corporation also owns a right of way across a narrow strip of 
land - owned in fee by someone else - which separates our gar-
den from the street. I, as tenant in the entirety with my husband, 
own the equity in 625 common shares of the corporation and are 
lessees of a proprietary lease granted by the corporation for the 
apartment in which I live. A savings and loan owns an Article 9 
security interest in the shares and the lease. Although the terms of 
my lease are coterminous with my ownership of the shares, both my 
occupancy of the lease and my ownership of the shares are subject 
to my performance of certain obligations under the bylaws of the 
corporation - including paying an amount equivalent to my pro 
rata share of the corporation's mortgage debt and operating ex-
penses - and under the terms of the agreement with my S & L. 
The corporation also has a security interest in my rights to secure 
my obligations and an intercreditor agreement with my S & L gov-
erning its respective property rights as a secured creditor. My right 
to alienate my shares and my lease is restricted by the terms of the 
bylaws of the corporation and my security agreement with the S & 
L. Although shareholders occupy most of the other apartments in 
my building - sometimes individually and sometimes through vari-
ous forms of joint tenancy - some shareholders sublet their apart-
ments to unrelated tenants. The corporation has granted the 
shareholders and lessees limited rights to use the common areas of 
the building and the garden, as well as the right of way. Each ten-
ant has the exclusive privilege to use a portion of the basement for 
storage. The corporation leases the basement apartment to our su-
perintendent, whose lease is coterminous with his employment, and 
so on. 
Commenting on modern-day estates in land, Waldron ends his 
argument with the following non sequitur: 
Thus, the concept of land as site has now had to be detached from its 
association with immovable resources and employed on its own as an 
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abstract idea for characterizing these more complicated packages of 
rights. Still, in the last analysis, the system of property in land is a set 
of rules about material resources and nothing more.76 
Thus, Waldron would conclude that ultimately all the interests 
concerning my apartment building are concerned with "material re-
sources" in his definition of physical things. He might try to argue 
that my ownership interest primarily concerns my sensuous ex-
ploitation of physical walls, floors, ceilings, fixtures, and so on. But 
the interests of the financial institutions, the telephone company, 
the cable TV company, the electric company, the postal service, the 
laundry company, and Sal the Super are not primarily related to the 
physical location. Rather, they are rights to receive income and are 
not, as Waldron suggests, substantially different from the rights to 
income from the exploitation of any other form of noncorporeal 
property. Mor~over, even my apartment's value to me is not pri-
marily based on my physical needs. The value consists of a combi-
nation of its objective exchange value - the market price - and 
its subjective use value to me. The use value relates to a variety of 
Symbolic and Imaginary concerns, as well as my Real needs. Ex-
amples include the apartment's physical attractiveness, its relative 
quietness, its proximity to both my office and a wide variety of res-
taurants and entertainment, the artsy population of the neighbor-
hood, and so on. Indeed, when one compares the cramped quarters 
in which we New Yorkers tend to live with the housing occupied by 
people of comparable economic resources in other parts of the 
country, it is obvious that we value our property despite its failure 
to meet our Real physical wants. 
Waldron admits that if ownership is defined in terms of wealth, 
then 
we will certainly have to conjure up incorporeal things to correspond 
to the complex legal relations that in fact define their economic posi-
tion. But if we say instead that property is a matter of rules about 
access to and control of material resources, but not necessarily about 
private ownership, then we may still say that a man's wealth is consti-
tuted for the most part by his property relations. He may not be the 
owner of very many resources; but the shares he holds, the funds he 
has claims on, and the options and goodwill he has acquired, together 
define his position so far as access and control of material resources is 
concerned.77 
Once again, Waldron distinguishes between relations concerning 
noncorporeals and "property" - that is, access to material re-
76. WALDRON, supra note 50, at 36-37. 
77. Id. at 37. 
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sources. The only true property is what he sees and holds. His ar-
gument seems to be based on the agrarian myth that all wealth 
ultimately comes down to physical things - the land, gold, and so 
on. Everything else is merely an indirect interest in the physical. 
To Waldron, all our creations - art, music, medicine, technology, 
knowledge - ultimately relate to satisfaction of our physical, 
animal needs and wants. Like the infant, we remain preconscious 
in the domain of the Real. 
But even if one accepts Waldron's assertions as to the source of 
wealth, it does not follow from this that property relations are pri-
marily or even archetypically relations affecting the access to and 
control of physical things. His very discussion indicates that access 
to and control of wealth - even if defined narrowly as physical 
things - are legal, Symbolic relations, not the mere immediate sen-
suous contact with, and physical exploitation of, tangible things. I 
argue that property, as a legal relation, is precisely the way we as 
human beings move away from mere sensuous experience of the 
outside world to Symbolic and social relations among human beings 
with respect to the outside world. 
Indeed, as human beings, even our needs are not purely animal-
istic or natural. In the words of Renata Salecl, 
For Lacan the concept of need is linked to the natural or biological 
requirements of human beings {food, for example). But for human 
beings it is essential that these needs are never manifest as purely 
natural needs. Needs are always defined by a symbolic context: if we 
are hungry, for example, we do not simply grab the first available 
food, but rather we think about what we shall eat and then prepare 
food in a special way. 
When put into words, a need becomes articulated in the symbolic 
order .... [D]esire arises as the excess of demand over need, as some-
thing in every demand that cannot be reduced to a need.78 
When I eat food, my property in the food is not the animal act of 
consumption and digestion but the legal recognition of my right to 
possess and use or alienate the food. In our society, property rights 
are these indirect, mediated relations among people through our re-
lationship with the external world. It is meaningless to speak of 
property without speaking of our relation to these noncorporeal 
things, even if they ultimately indirectly lead to the access to and 
control of corporeal things. 
78. RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AFTER 
THE FALL OF SOCIALISM 124 (1994). 
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IV. THE AITEMPTED NEGATION OF PHYSICALITY 
A. Prophesies 
The most eloquent prophet of the death of property is Thomas 
Grey. In his justly famous 1980 essay, The Disintegration of Prop-
erty, 79 Grey argued that property's reconceptualization as a bundle 
of sticks undermined property's very foundation. Consequently, 
property is doomed to disappear as an important category of law. 
Unfortunately, despite the undeniable elegance, insight, and influ-
ence of this essay, Grey's analysis could not be more erroneous and 
his conclusions more wrong. In the name of rejecting the physical-
ist, phallic metaphor for property as object, Grey restates it 
apophatically through simple negation. He cannot withstand the 
temptation of falling into this seemingly irresistible conceptual con-
fusion. He tries to collapse the Symbolic into the Real and to deny 
the role of the object as the mediator of intersubjective relations. 
Moreover, one reason for this confusion and failed negation is that 
Grey and other progressives fail to distinguish the traditional liberal 
philosophical theory of the role of property in the state from other 
philosophical accounts of property or from an analysis of property 
as a social, econmnic, and legal practice. 
Grey claims to recognize a dichotomy between the idea of prop-
erty held by the public and the idea held by "specialists" such as 
lawyers and econoinists. The former, according to Grey, thinks of 
property as "things that are owned by persons. "80 The latter "tends 
both to dissolve the notion of ownership and to eliminate any nec-
essary connection between property and things. . . . The specialist 
fragments the robust unitary conception of ownership into a more 
shadowy 'bundle of rights.' "81 Grey concludes that "[t]he substitu-
tion of a bundle-of-rights for a thing-ownership conception of prop-
erty has the ultimate consequence that property ceases to be an 
important category in legal and political theory."82 Moreover, the 
79. See Grey, supra note 3; see also supra note 5. 
80. Grey, supra note 3, at 69. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 81. A variation of this analytical approach is Bruce Ackerman's dichotomy 
between the conception of property held by the "Ordinary Observer" and that held by the 
"Scientific Policymaker." Ackerman argues that the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence 
often seems incoherent to the Scientific Policymaker because it does not use sharp definitions 
or follow a rigid logic. It becomes quite comprehensible, however, if viewed from the per-
spective of the Ordinary Observer who applies more fluid concepts of practical reasoning and 
cultural understandings. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 26-29, 100-16. 
272 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:239 
concept of property is incoherent as evidenced by the many differ-
ent ways the word is used in both legal and colloquial discourse. 83 
The clear implication of Grey's description is that the specialist 
definition is more sophisticated and more accurate than the lay per-
son's definition. The former will, therefore, eventually supplant the 
latter. The specialist definition, by deemphasizing the objective as-
pect of property and emphasizing the intersubjective aspect, breaks 
down the traditionally recognized distinction between property and 
other forms of legal relations. Accordingly, as property is shorn of 
its uniqueness, it will cease to play its traditional inspirational and 
political role in American society. 
Grey gives a historical gloss to his analysis. He argues that the 
lay definition of property as "thing-ownership" is consistent with 
the eighteenth-century concept of property both as expressed by 
Blackstone and, presumably, as adopted by the Framers of the 
Constitution. 84 
The conception of property held by the legal and political theorists 
of classical liberalism coincided precisely with the present popular 
idea, the notion of thing-ownership .... 
83. Inconsistent uses of the word property identified by Grey include: (i) the rules of 
conveyancing of real property taught as a first-year course in Jaw school; (ii) the legal and 
economic distinction between in rem rights as opposed to in personam rights; (iii) the econo-
mist's notion of property as those entitlements that should be recognized for the sake of 
efficiency; (iv) the contemporary legal theory whereby property is a means to protect certain 
public Jaw entitlement, as with the "new property" identified by Charles A. Reich; (v) the 
constitutional concept of what may not be taken by the government without a public purpose 
and just compensation - a concept often reified as things or pieces of property, as opposed 
to other rights (as in the Ackerman "Ordinary Observer's" view); and (vi) the Guido Cala-
bresi and Douglas Melamed's concept of property remedies, as opposed to liability remedies. 
See Grey, supra note 3, at 71-72 (citing Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 
733 (1964); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972)). 
· Unfortunately, Grey's list shows neither that property has no meaning or inconsistent 
meanings or that any of these views of property reflect a break from the objective view of 
property. Rather, these different uses of the word merely reflect discussion of the scope of 
property in the sense of identifying the proper objects of property - for example, whether 
property rights should be identified with respect to all conceivable external objects, including 
entitlement against the government, or merely certain traditionally recognized objects, such 
as parcels of real property - and the different functions that property can or should serve -
as in the economic efficiency argument, the new property argument, and the Calabresi-
Melamed remedies argument. 
84. Id. at 73-74. I will argue that Blackstone's definition of property does not, in fact, 
correspond with the crude description ascribed to him by Grey. See infra text accompanying 
notes 99-121. In addition, as discussed infra in text accompanying notes 173-76, Nedelsky 
shows through examination of the Federalists' property writings that the Framers of the Con-
stitution also Jacked such a crude conceptualization. Moreover, I argue that the supposedly 
more sophisticated "bundle-of-rights" or specialist analysis favored by Grey, in fact, suffers 
from the very conceptual difficulties Grey ascribes to the Jay definition. See supra text ac-
companying notes 10-13 and infra section IV.B3. 
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It is not difficult to see how the idea of simple ownership came to 
dominate classical liberal legal and political thought. First, this con-
ception of property mirrored economic reality to a much greater ex-
tent than it did before or has since. . . . 
Second, the concept of property as thing-ownership served impor-
tant ideological functions .... A central feature of feudalism was its 
complex and hierarchical system of land tenure. . . . On the other 
hand, property conceived as the control of a piece of the material 
world by a single individual meant freedom and equality of status .... 
Third, ownership of things by individuals fitted the principal justi-
fications for treating property as a natural right.SS 
In other words, Grey argues that the lay-traditional concept of 
property might have, in fact, cohered with the economic reality of 
property practice in the early capitalist period. The feudal period 
was characterized by highly complex, overlapping, and interrelated 
ownership rules, whereby the same object was subject to the prop-
erty rights of numerous persons. These rights were themselves in-
tertwined with a complex system of mutual obligation and social, 
political, and religious status. The early capitalist era was, in con-
tradistinction, characterized by the consolidation and simplification 
of property interests and the separation of property interests from 
obligation and status. Consequently, when compared to feudal 
property, capitalistic property seemed to be characterized by uni-
tary interests in physical objects epitomized by sensuous contact.86 
According to Grey, 
We have gone, then, in less than two centuries, from a world in 
which property was a central idea mirroring a clearly understood in- . 
stitution, to one in which it is no longer a coherent or crucial category 
in our conceptual scheme. The concept of property an!f the institu-
tion of property have disintegrated. . . . . 
My explanatory point is that the collapse of the idea of property 
can best be understood as a process internal to the development of 
capitalism itself .... [I]t is intrinsic to the development of a free-mar-
ket economy into an industrial phase .... The decline of capitalism 
may also contribute to the breakdown of the idea of private property, 
so that the two phenomena mutually reinforce each other .... 87 
How does Grey leap from the observation that contemporary 
legal scholarship tends to describe property as a bundle of rights to 
the conclusions that the connection between property and things 
has disappeared and that the concept of property is losing its signifi-
cance in our economy? He does so by repeating an error made by 
85. Grey, supra note 3, at 73-74. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 74-75. 
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Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld: he conflates the concept of the object 
of property and tangibility. He states, for example: 
What, then, of the idea that property rights must be rights in 
things? Perhaps we no longer need a notion of ownership, but surely 
property rights are a distinct category from other legal rights in that 
they pertain to things. But this suggestion cannot withstand analysis 
either; most property in a modern capitalist economy is intangible.SS 
That is, Grey cannot grasp the concept of a thing that he cannot 
grasp.s9 But the concept of the object of property always included, 
and continues to include, intangible things. Neither the concept of 
property as an interrelationship between subjects nor the concept 
of intangibility implies the elimination of the object from property 
jurisprudence. Grey's confusion does illustrate, however, how the 
archetypical image of property as physical possession of a physical 
object is a misleading starting point for analyzing property interests 
generally. Yet it is this image that Grey implicitly keeps in his mind 
and that leads him to believe that modern concepts of property are 
becoming incoherent. 
In support of this so-called lay-traditionalist/specialist-modern 
dichotomy of property, Grey contrasts the definitions of property 
expounded by Blackstone and Hohfeld. In order to analyze this 
dichotomy, it will be useful to take an extended side trip through a 
lesser-known article - published the same year as Grey's - that 
88. Id. at 70. 
89. This is a very common move in American legal scholarship. For example, Felix Co-
hen assumed that because Blackstone and Hegel referred to external objects of property, 
they had to be referring to the physical relations between men and tangible things. See Felix 
S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 361-63 (1954). To do so, 
Cohen had to ignore both the definitions and examples of external things expressly provided 
by both writers. 
Kennedy tars the conceptualization of intangibles as objects of property with the pejora-
tive term reification. See Kennedy, supra note 75, at 335. Kennedy's approach presupposes 
that tangibles are naturally, essentially, prelegal, Real things and that intangibles have some 
sort of preexisting, prelegal, unthinglike essence, so that thinghood is inauthentically and 
illegitimately thrust upon them. As I discuss below, see infra text accompanying notes 159-
62, in Hegelian and other philosophies, the concept of "thing" or object is merely the logical 
correlate of the definition of subjectivity as self-consciousness. Everything that is not a sub-
ject is, by definition, an object or thing. Consequently, intangibles do not have to be "thingi-
fied" but merely fall within a definition of object. Kennedy seems to be using the word thing 
to refer to the object of property rights - that is, a res. In this context, a thing is not a 
natural, Real object but a Symbolic one. The declaration that an object can serve as a res is 
reification. In other words, by recognizing property, we reify tangible as well as intangible 
objects. 
I believe Kennedy has a good point that gets Jost because of unacknowledged acceptance 
of the phallic metaphor for property. The good point is that it is not necessary, and is per-
haps misleading, to analyze property interests in intangibles by analogy to the properties of 
tangibles. Because Kennedy implicitly thinks, however, that the only real things are tangible 
things one can see and hold - the phallic metaphor - he incorrectly conflates comparing 
intangibles and tangibles with making intangibles into things - a process he incorrectly calls 
reification. 
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more thoroughly, but succinctly, sets forth many of the assumptions 
about property theory that underlie Grey's work. I will then con- . 
sider certain other examples Grey identifies of simplistic "thing-
ownership" theories. Finally, I will explore the political context in 
which Grey's analysis is located. I will argue in contradistinction to 
Grey that the laity are not less sophisticated about property. 
Rather, they are much more sophisticated than the so-called experts 
of academia, easily adopting and inventing fluid concepts of multi-
ple and intangible property concepts.90 • Property doctrine and 
scholarship lags far behind property practice. 
B. Vandevelde's Analysis 
Back in the heady days of critical legal studies, a recent law-
school graduate published an ambitious article that cogently 
presented the common contemporary account - or, as I would ar-
gue, misconception - of the differences between the property ju-
risprudence of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In The New 
Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Mod-
ern Concept of Property, 91 Kenneth Vandevelde argued that certain 
common assumptions of property law are not universal but reflect a 
paradigm that developed with early capitalism and peaked in the 
nineteenth century. The nineteenth-century paradigm - exclusive, 
unitary, objective property expressed through the sensuous grasp of 
tangible things - was arguably appropriate to the early capitalist 
economy, according to Vandevelde, but this paradigm began degen-
erating in the twentieth century, as the capitalist economy became 
more complex. This demonstrates that in our current "information 
age" the old paradigm is ripe for replacement with a new paradigm 
that better explains contemporary property relations.92 
90. In companions to this article, Liquid Property and Perfection as Possession, I explore 
in more detail the property concepts actually practiced by the laity in the market and com-
pare them to property law doctrine. See Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 9; Schroe-
der, Perfection as Possession, supra note 9. 
91. Vandevelde, supra note 3. 
92. Vandevelde does not use my Kuhnian-Lakatosian terminology, but I believe that it is 
useful to translate his analysis in those terms. 
Throughout this article I will modulate between Thomas Kuhn's familiar "paradigm" ter-
minology and the variation of Kuhn's theory adopted by his colleague at the London School 
of Economics, Imre Lakatos. I explain Kuhn's and Lakatos's schema more thoroughly in 
Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio, supra note 18, at 165-71. Briefly, Lakatos attempted 
to reconcile Kuhn's theory of incommensurate scientific paradigms with Karl Popper's theory 
of sophisticated falsification by proposing a logical method of choosing between competing 
paradigms. See Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes, in Crun:CisM AND nm GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (Imre Lakatos & Alan Mus-
grave eds., 1970). According to Popper, scientific truth is defined as that which is developed 
through a methodology adopted by a consensus of a professional community. See KARL 
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POPPER, THE Lome OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 44 {1972). Popper thought that this method-
ology was sophisticated falsification. Kuhn agreed with Popper's theory of objective truth as 
consensus but argued that the scientific community adopts different consensuses - or para-
digms - over time. See THOMAS s. KuHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
{2d ed. 1970). During periods of "normal science," scientists refine hypotheses within an 
existing paradigm. But occasionally, a normal paradigm reaches a crisis and is overthrown by 
a new "revolutionary" paradigm. Id. at 92. 
These different Kuhnian paradigms are incommensurable. This is true by definition be-
cause each paradigm contains its own methodology and standards of validity. There can, 
therefore, be no metamethodology or metastandard that can logically determine which para-
digm to choose. This does not mean that there cannot be imperfect but usable translations 
between paradigms or that there are not good and rational reasons to prefer the revolution-
ary paradigm over the normal paradigm. It is just that these choices are not logically man-
dated in the sense of mathematical algorithm. 
Popper rejected Kuhn's theory of occasional large revolutions partially on the grounds 
that normal science does not exist as a descriptive matter, and partly because it should not 
exist as a normative matter. Karl Popper, Normal Science and its Dangers, in CRmCISM AND 
THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra, at 51, 52-53. Kuhn quotes Popper as calling his theory 
"revolutions in permanence" in Thomas Kuhn, Reflections on my Critics, in CRmCISM AND 
THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra, at 231, 242-43. 
Although Popper considered Kuhn, his former pupil, to be an apostate, Lakatos agreed 
with Kuhn's contention that his theory was a necessary corollary to Popper's. Nevertheless, 
Lakatos tried to develop a metamethodology to choose between Kuhnian paradigms - that 
is, a way to make paradigms commensurable. He gave his concept of commensurable para-
digms the more modest name "research programmes." See Lakatos, supra, at 131-32. Pop-
per's theory of sophisticated falsification does not mean that scientists reject a hypothesis 
immediately upon encountering apparently inconsistent data. Indeed, Lakatos argues that 
one cannot reject a hypothesis until one formulates a more satisfactory alternate. Id. at 119-
20. Rather, one tries to formulate "auxiliaries" to the original theory in order to explain the 
apparent inconsistency. This is necessary because scientific theory is abstract and elegant, 
whereas the empirical reality science tries to describe can be very sloppy. 
Eventually, according to Lakatos, the original hypothesis becomes so encrusted with a 
"protective belt" of auxiliaries that it actually starts to lose explanatory power. It becomes a 
"degenerating" research program. But one abandons the degenerate research program only 
when one discovers a "progressive" research program that has "excess empirical content" -
that is, it explains everything the degenerate program explained and more. Id. at 116-59. 
I use Lakatos's concepts of sophisticated falsification, protective belts, and degenerating 
research programs because I believe they have great intuitive appeal. However, as Popper's 
third ex-student Paul Feyerabend argued, Lakatos's theory of excess empirical content as the 
one and only logical method of adoption of new research programs is both theoretically un-
tenable and empirically unworkable. See Paul Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, in 
CRmCISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra, at 197, 218-20. Theoretically, it is in-
consistent with the central Popperian-Kuhnian tenet of objectivity as consensus because it 
posits a methodology that is beyond consensus. Empirically, it is just not true that all new 
paradigms explain everything the paradigms they replace explained, and then some. Some-
times they explain less but explain it "better." 
Under the analyses of both Kuhn and Lakatos, we cannot escape a paradigm or research 
program until a new paradigm-program is developed that seems to explain the observed phe-
nomena in a "better" way. This is not the same as the old saw of legal scholarship that "it 
takes a theory to beat a theory." This adage views scholarship as litigation with burdens of 
proof. The lazy or disingenuous scholar tries to declare his theory unscathed regardless of 
the factual or other criticism of his rivals on the grounds that they have not come up with a 
better explanation. 
The Kuhn-Lakatos proposition is, in contradiction, a variation on the concept that simple 
negation is identity. A paradigm or research program does not consist only of a scientific or 
other hypothesis. It includes the consensus as to methodology that led to the development of 
the hypothesis. When empirical evidence that seems anomalous with a hypothesis is ob-
served, the scientific community may either adopt auxiliaries to the hypothesis to explain the 
apparent anomaly or conclude that the specific hypothesis has been falsified, but the para-
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Unfortunately, the material Vandevelde presents does not sup-
port the dichotomy he and Grey wish to set up. Vandevelde insists 
on a radical purist version of the nineteenth-century paradigm of 
property, which he attributes to Blackstone, and contrasts it with an 
equally radical purist negation, which he attributes to Hohfeld. 
This is precisely the same move which Grey makes in his article, 
albeit in lesser detail. 
My point is not to criticize Vandevelde or Grey for using ab-
stract, simplified models as tools for analyzing messy empirical real-
ity. Rather, I will argue that their specific models do not serve the 
purpose for which they were invented. In the name of burying 
Blackstone and praising Hohfeld, Grey and Vandevelde actually 
conclude that the Blackstonian paradigm is correct and that the 
Hohfeldian paradigm is not property! 
Indeed, neither Hohfeld, Grey, nor Vandevelde can even imag-
ine property other than as an ultra-"Blackstonian" phallic con-
struct. Whereas Grey and Hohfeld present Blackstone as seeing 
only the object of property, Hohfeld and his progeny see only its 
subjects. Yet it is the Hohfeldians who are obsessed with the phallic 
physical object itself; their primary concern is its presence or ab-
sence in the discourse of property. In their insistence on denying 
castration by trying to forget the Phallic barrier to intersubjective 
relations, they not only seek to deny the mediating object - they 
deny all sophistication to Blackstone. 
I wish to emphasize that I am not making a historical argument 
denying that there has been evolution in the dominant legal concep-
tion of property. Indeed, I have suggested that the current concep-
tion of property may be a classic Lakatosian degenerate research 
program so encrusted with its protective belt of auxiliaries that it is 
in danger of losing its explanatory power.93 It is arguably ripe for 
replacement by a new "progressive" research program. Also, an 
exhaustive analysis of the theories of Blackstone and Hohfeld is be-
yond the scope of this article. I am limiting myself primarily, but 
not exclusively, to the material that Vandevelde himself present~ in 
favor of his argument. What I argue is that the Hohfeldians have 
not made the paradigm shift they claim. At most they identify a 
crisis in the existing paradigm. Consequently, in order to make 
their argument, they must repress and deny those aspects of Black-
stone's theory that either implicitly or explicitly recognize the inter-
digm or research program leading to the hypothesis is not itself rejected unless a new consen-
sus as to methodology is reached. 
93. See supra note 92. 
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subjective nature of property. They then conversely repeat 
Hohfeld's confusion as to the objective aspect of property rights. 
· i. The Attribution of the Phallic Metaphor to Blackstone 
The contrast Vandevelde sets up is as follows: "[A]t the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, property was ideally defined as ab-
solute dominion over things."94 Vandevelde calls this the absolutist 
and physicalist conception of property and names Blackstone as its 
spokesman.95 This conceptualization became more and more un-
workable throughout the nineteenth century as more and more in-
tangible assets became subject to the property law regime and as 
more and more exceptions to the absolutist nature of property 
rights were recognized. Fmally, in the early twentieth century, 
Hohfeld created a new vocabulary to describe the new property in-
terest: "This new property was defined as a set of legal relations 
among persons. Property was no longer defined as dominion over 
things. Moreover, property was no longer absolute, but limited, 
with the meaning of the term varying from case to case."96 This 
disaggregation of property, according to Vandevelde, threatens to 
undermine the traditional legal regime: 
Once property was reconceived to include potentially any valuable 
interest, there was no logical stopping point. Property could include 
all legal relations .... 
Such an explosion of the concept of property threatened to render 
the term absolutely meaningless in two ways. First, if property in-
cluded all legal relations, then it could no longer serve to distinguish 
one set of legal relations from another. It would lose its meaning as a 
category of law. Second, the greater the variety of interests that were 
protected as property, the more difficult it would be to assert that all 
property should be protected to the same degree.97 
At first blush, there seems to be great power in this argument so 
far. Unfortunately, it rests on a misreading of Blackstone. 
Vandevelde starts by quoting Blackstone's well-known defini-
tion of property as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. "98 
According to Vandevelde, "Blackstone's definition contained es-
sentially two elements: (1) the physicalist conception of property 
94. Vandevelde, supra note 3, at 328. 
95. See id. at 329. 
96. Id. at 330. 
97. Id. at 362. 
98. BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at 2, cited in Vandevelde, supra note 3, at 331. 
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that required some 'external thing' to serve as the object of prop-
erty rights, and (2) the absolutist conception which gave the owner 
'sole and despotic dominion' over the thing."99 Vandevelde, of 
course, considers this to be a notion of "property" as sensuous own-
ership of a thing, with thing meaning "physical thing." But Black-
stone's own language, standing on its own, does not support this 
analysis. 
First, note that Blackstone's own definition of property empha-
sizes its intersubjective nature in addition to its objective nature. 
Blackstone not only is aware but expressly states that the concept 
of dominion can only be understood as the right of one individual in 
relation to other individuals. Blackstone recognizes property as ob-
jective, not only in the sense of relating to an object, but also in the 
sense of being generally enforceable against the relevant commu-
nity of legal subjects.100 That is, Blackstone does not merely de-
scribe property as power over a thing, as Vandevelde suggests; this 
is reflected in Blackstone's very careful language. Rather, he 
speaks of property as a claim to dominion and of the exercise of that 
claim vis-a-vis any other individual in the universe. As we shall see, 
"a claim enforceable against the world" will be precisely Hohfeld's 
definition of in rem (that is, property) rights.101 Blackstone is 
scrupulous in his Commentaries to refer to "property" only in the 
sense of the legal right and never in the sense of the object with 
respect to which the right exists.102 He speaks of having "a prop-
erty in" certain things but does not refer to owned objects as 
"property." 
Second, although it is true that Blackstone recognizes that prop-
erty is objective in that property rights among subjects always relate 
99. Vandevelde, supra note 3, at 331. David Frisch similarly misreads Blackstone: "If the 
world were inhabited by one person, Blackstone's description of property ... might make 
sense." David Frisch, Remedies as Property: A Different Perspective on Specific Performance 
Clauses, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1691, 1702 (1994). 
100. As I discuss infra in text accompanying notes 146-57, Hohfeld similarly recognizes 
what I have called the "Community Objective" nature of property but does not recognize the 
"Philosophical Objective" nature. I set forth my taxonomy of objectivity in Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Subject: Object, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1972). 
101. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. 
102. Blackstone does occasionally speak of a person's property, but I believe that in each 
case the context makes it clear that by this he is referring to the person's rights and not to the 
underlying thing to which the rights relate. 
Kennedy criticizes Blackstone for not discussing the ambiguity of property as rights and 
property as thing. See Kennedy, supra note 75, at 318-19. This criticism is anachronistic. The 
use of property to denote the underlying thing was novel at the time Blackstone was writing. 
Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from Its Past, in XXII 
NoMos, supra note 3, at 28, 34. Macpherson gives a similar account of the development of 
the meaning of the word property. See Macpherson, supra note 36, at 6-9. 
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to an external object, nothing indicates that Blackstone's definition 
of property is necessarily limited to rights to physical things. He 
merely speaks of "external things."103 
Indeed, Blackstone makes it very clear that he uses the word 
things not in the sense of physical things but as the objects of prop-
erty. Such objects are defined in the negative - as that which is 
not human. Blackstone defines the things that are the objects of 
property as follows: "The objects of dominion or property are 
things, as contradistinguished from persons .... "104 This is the 
traditional definition of object or thing used in philosophical dis-
course - including the discourse of Blackstone's day. This is also 
the definition of the object of property adopted by Hegel, who 
wrote a little over fifty years later.105 An "object" is external to -
in the sense of other than - the "subject."106 
Moreover, Blackstone not only is aware but absolutely insists 
that "things," as so defined, are not limited to the corporeal and the 
tangible. As Vandevelde admits, Blackstone divides the class of the 
types of realty that could serve as the objects of property into "cor-
poreal hereditaments - things which could be detected by the 
senses, and incorporeal hereditaments - things which existed only 
'in contemplation.' "107 Blackstone expressly tries to wean his read-
ers away from the physicalist notion of the objects of property: 
An incorporeal hereditament is a right issuing out of a thing corpo-
rate (whether real or personal) or concerning, or annexed to, or ex-
ercisible within, the same. It is not the thing corporate itself, which 
may consist in lands, houses, jewels, or the like; but something collat-
eral thereto, as a rent issuing out of those lands or houses, or an office 
relating to those jewels. In short, as the logicians speak, corporeal 
hereditaments are the substance, which may be always seen, always 
handled: incorporeal hereditaments are but a sort of accidents, which 
inhere in and are supported by that substance; and may belong, or not 
belong to it, without any visible alteration therein. Their existence is 
103. The title of the second volume of Blackstone's Commentaries may seem curious to 
the contemporary American reader: The Rights of Things. Obviously, in this context the 
word of is being used in the sense of "concerning" rather than in the sense of "owned by." 
104. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at 16. 
105. See supra section II.A. 
106. See Schroeder, Subject: Object, supra note 100; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, 
supra note 12; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5. Nevertheless, not only do Grey and 
Vandevelde assertorially insist that Blackstone is wrong, but Felix Cohen went so far as to 
ignore Blackstone's own definitions and to assume that by "external thing" he must have 
meant "physical thing." See Cohen, supra note 89, at 362-63. Similarly, Frisch ignores Black-
stone's express language to the contrary and declares that according to Blackstone's concep-
tion of property, "[p]roperty can only exist in tangible things." Frisch, supra note 99, at 1702 
n.38. 
107. Vandevelde, supra note 3, at 331 {footnotes omitted). 
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merely an idea and abstracted contemplation; though their effects and 
profits may be frequently objects of our bodily senses. And indeed, if 
we would fix a clear notion of an incorporeal hereditament, we must 
be careful not to confound together the profits produced, and the 
thing, or hereditament, which produces them. An annuity, for in-
stance, is an incorporeal hereditament: for though the money, which 
is the fruit or product of this annuity, is doubtless of a corporeal na-
ture, yet the annuity itself, which produces that money, is a thing in-
visible, has only a mental existence, and cannot be delivered over 
from hand to hand.10s 
Similarly, the types of personalty that could serve as the objects of 
property 
also [were] divided into two categories: in possession and in action. 
Chattels personal in possession consisted of actual possession of some 
thing while chattels personal in action, or choses in action, consisted 
only of the right to hold the thing in possession at some future time. 
As Blackstone put it, a chose in action was a "thing rather in potential 
than in esse. "109 
As I shall point out when I discuss Vandevelde's reading of 
Hohfeld, Vandevelde - and, as we shall see, Hohfeld - not Black-
stone, assumes that the word thing means physical thing.110 In so 
doing, he ignores not only Blackstone's own express definition but 
hundreds of years of western tradition. As we will see, in making 
this error, Vandevelde is in good company. 
2. The Argument for Locating the Phallic Metaphor in 
Blackstone 
Although I criticize Vandevelde for misinterpreting Black-
stone's own statement of his theory, we might glimpse some truth in 
108. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at 20. Blackstone wrote, of course, when money was 
usually represented by coins. Even the concept of paper money was new. The case of Miller 
v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (King's Bench, 1758), which established the rule of 
negotiability by which promissory notes issued by the Bank of England could freely circulate 
as currency, had only recently been decided when the Commentaries were published. Conse-
quently, from the perspective of the late eighteenth century, there was little reason to distin-
guish the concept of money from the coins that are money's token, so money itself seemed to 
be a tangible thing. 
Today, of course, most money is not represented by any physical token - whether metal 
or paper. Rather, it consists of unsecured debt obligations of banks to their customers evi-
denced by entries on the banks' books. Even the expression book entry adds an inaccurate 
tangible aura to the transaction, as most of these records are, in fact, maintained in electronic 
form. Consequently, from the perspective of the late twentieth century, money seems to 
epitomize incorporeality. 
109. Vandevelde, supra note 3, at 332 {footnotes omitted). 
110. See, e.g., id. at 332 {"Blackstone's conception of property as dominion over things 
was maintained only at th·e expense of intellectual integrity. Calling a right a thing did not 
make it one."). 
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Vandevelde's analysis if we tum to Blackstone's application of his 
theory. 
Blackstone's treatment of personal property, generally, and in-
tangible property, specifically, is sketchy when compared to his 
treatment of real property. This reflects the fact that this "branch 
of the law ... was, in Blackstone's time, relatively less developed 
than that of real property .... "111 As A.W.B. Simpson notes in his 
excellent introduction, the Commentaries "smells of the country-
side; the law is the law of the country gentry, not Cheapside. The 
Commentaries reflects the essentially rural character of the high civ-
ilization of the eighteenth century."112 Blackstone does include 
among the forms of choses in action a few of the most important 
objects of modem intangible property: insurance, copyrights, and 
debts. But many, or most, of the forms of intangible personal prop-
erty that constitute a significant proportion of the wealth in contem-
porary society are "essentially emanations of the urban commercial 
world of merchants, principally though not exclusively taking the 
form of offshoots of commercial contract law."113 They were, 
therefore, still relatively new and exotic - or perhaps even not yet 
invented - in Blackstone's time and, therefore, are not discussed. 
Moreover, Blackstone's discussions of the modem forms of in-
tangible objects of property are hardly satisfactory. Simpson notes 
in particular that Blackstone's attempt, reflecting the custom of his 
time, to distinguish intangibles from tangibles as those things that 
are "recoverable by legal action, as opposed to being in the actual 
possession of the owner," and his proposition that all tangibles are 
created by contract seem particularly defective.114 Following eight-
eenth-century taxonomy, Blackstone does include in his discussion 
of real property several of the incorporeal hereditaments that are 
forms of intangible property and might even be considered forms of 
personal property in contemporary parlance: advowsons, tithes, of-
fices, dignities, some types of franchises, pensions, and annuities.us 
These discussions are quite well developed but arguably are only of 
passing interest to the modem commercial lawyer concerned with 
problems of contemporary forms of intangible property. 
In other words, although Blackstone understood as a matter of 
theory that property rights were not limited to rights concerning 
111. Simpson, supra note 75, at xii. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at xii·xiii. 
114. Id. at xiii. 
115. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at 20·43. 
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those objects that can be seen and sensuously possessed, as a matter 
of practice he might have been.unable to derive a convincing ac-
count of property rights in modem intangibles. Of course, as both 
Grey and Vandevelde suggest, this may have been because during 
the early capitalist era, when Blackstone was writing, absolutist, 
possessory rights in corporeal objects had become relatively more 
important than divided rights in incorporeal objects, which charac-
terized the previous feudal system of societal organization. Conse-
quently, it was analytically convenient to view this newly developed 
form of property as the epitome of liberal legal and political rights. 
Blackstone's vocabulary was, arguably, sufficient for his time. In 
other words, although the physical, unitary paradigm of property is 
technically inaccurate, it may have been adequate to the task of 
analyzing most eighteenth-century property issues in precisely the 
same way that the eighteenth-century paradigm of Newtonian phys-
ics seemed adequate to describe the macroworld it measured, de-
spite its inaccuracy. 
To restate this argument in my Lacanian terminology, Black-
stone might have recognized that the phallic paradigm of property 
was not accurate, but he was not able to construct an adequate sub-
stitute paradigm. Although on one level he recognized that prop-
erty was a Symbolic function, he could not resist trying to collapse 
the Symbolic into the Real. 
3. The Bundle of Sticks 
a. Atoms v. Molecules. Vandevelde also accused Blackstone of 
adopting a unitary picture of property, as contrasted to the modem 
"bundle of sticks" approach. This is, once again, not strictly accu-
rate. On the one hand, one might argue that although Blackstone 
recognized that property interests may be owned separately or in 
common,116 in practice he tended to presume that a property right, 
whether owned jointly or severally, was a unitary, inseparable 
whole.111 This contrasts with the contemporary approach whereby 
we describe property as a bundle of severable rights, privileges, du-
ties, and other Hohfeldian correlates. 
On the other hand, this apparent distinction may be largely ex-
plained as a difference in terminology and characterization. That is, 
Blackstone does not by any stretch of the imagination argue that 
ownership always consists of the complete and inviolable rights to 
116. See, e.g., 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at 179-94. 
117. Frisch similarly declares that according to Blackstone's conception of property, "all 
property is absolute." Frisch, supra note 99, at 1702 n.38. 
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possess, use, and alienate the object of the right. Indeed, the com-
mon law concept of estates in land that Blackstone explicates in 
excruciating detail is an elaborate system of dividing and limiting 
these rights. The majority of Blackstone's volume on property con-
centrates precisely on the myriad ways in which these estates may 
be transferred and on the different limitations inherent in different 
property rights. 
The difference is that Hohfeldian analysis focuses on the indi-
vidual component rights, duties, and liabilities of property, rather 
than on the various ways these components combine to form recog-
nizable property interests. In contradistinction, Blackstone's com-
mon law approach concentrates on identifiable combinations of 
property rights - with each combination given a specific name as a 
different estate or hereditament - rather than on the individual 
constituent components. Therefore, although in the Blackstonian 
paradigm the owner of each estate has all the unfettered rights, du-
ties, and liabilities of that estate, the various estates themselves con-
tain a wide variety of combinations of rights and liabilities. To put 
it another way, the Hohfeldian vocabulary describes the atoms of 
property; the Blackstonian vocabulary describes the molecules 
formed from these atoms. 
This interpretation suggests that the Blackstonian unitary ap-
proach is neither less sophisticated than, nor necessarily inconsis-
tent with, the Hohfeldian disaggregated approach toward property 
in theory. It might, however, suggest that application of the two 
approaches might be likely to lead to different results in practice. 
The Hohfeldian atomic analysis might have an advantage in 
flexibility and creativity in that it highlights the possibility of craft-
ing a seemingly infinite combination of legal rights in response to 
changing market needs. The Blackstonian molecular approach, 
highlighting specific, traditional combinations of rights, might not 
encourage the same degree of experimentation and adaption to 
changing circumstances. To switch metaphors, Hohfeldian property 
is made to order; Blackstonian property is off the rack. It might not 
be possible to alter Blackstonian property to "fit" all legal situa-
tions as well as Hohfeldian property could. 
Duncan Kennedy has identified another disadvantage of what I 
call the Blackstonian approach.118 The identification of molecules 
of property, rather than atoms, can make the identified molecules 
look natural or inevitable and thus hide the political choices inher-
118. See Kennedy, supra note 75, at 335-37, 348. 
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ent in any property regime. As such, the molecular approach can 
be used as a tool of the status quo.119 
But Blackstonian property might have relative advantages that 
could outweigh these disadvantages. Pret a porter is considerably 
cheaper than couture and may fit well, if not perfectly, and look 
good enough. As I have already suggested, and as I shall explore at 
greater length below, the Hohfeldian analysis risks losing sight of 
the necessity of an object of property120 and the coinmon elements 
of property,121 as well as the significance of specific combinations of 
seemingly disparate property rights. It may, therefore, lack not 
only intuitive attractiveness but analytical strength when used as a 
tool for describing existing social and economic institutions and 
legal practices. 
Leaving fashion and returning to chemistry, the Hohfeldian con-
clusion that property is merely a bundle of sticks and is indistin-
guishable from other types of legal rights is a non sequitur similar to 
concluding from the identification of elements that either there are 
no such things as compounds, or that the distinction between differ-
ent compounds is inessential. It may be technically correct, and an-
alytically useful for some purposes, to recognize that both glucose 
and petroleum are made of oxygen, carbon, and hydrogen atoms 
and to understand that new combinations of these atoms could be 
identified or created. When I bake a cake or drive a car, however, I 
care little about the similarity and separability of the component 
atoms and a lot about being able to tell a sugar bowl from a gas 
tank. 
b. Constraints. In other words, one advantage of the molecu-
lar approach to property over the atomic approach is that it helps to 
avoid a common non sequitur adopted in much modem legal schol-
arship. Many scholars, including not only Grey and Vandevelde but 
also Singer, Beermann, Balkin, and Kennedy, expressly or implic-
itly assume that Hohfeld's identification of the elements of jural re-
lationships is equivalent to the conclusion that the elements may be 
119. See id. Kennedy. reaches this conclusion but does not use my molecular-atomic 
vocabulary. 
120. See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text. 
121. As I discuss infra in section IV.B.5, the Hohfeldian approach, which concentrates on 
specific detail, will tend to reveal differences between different cases. Property will appear 
disaggregated - a hodgepodge of unrelated rights and liabilities. The Blackstonian ap-
proach, which concentrates on aggregates, will tend to reveal commonalities between differ-
ent cases. Property will appear as a coherent unity of closely related ideas. 
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freely combined and recombined in any of an infinite number of 
combinations.122 
For example, Jack Balkin argues that Hohfeld's theory of jural 
correlatives and opposites closely parallels Ferdinand de Saussure's 
semiotic theory of the arbitrary nature of signification in language. 
A Hohfeldian legal semiotic, according to Balkin, logically leads to 
the deobjectification of property and the disaggregation of legal 
concepts into a bundle of sticks that can be freely arranged and 
rearranged to suit any purpose.123 But Balkin assumes this is the 
case because he is a classical liberal sheep in postmodern wolf's 
clothing.124 He implicitly presupposes an autonomous subject that 
creates, and therefore exists outside of, law and language. Law and 
language are, therefore, merely tools that can be freely changed and 
manipulated at will. 
As I have discussed, Lacan's psychoanalytic theory is also by 
necessity a theory of linguistics, because he thought that the subject 
was always the subject of language. His linguistic theory relies 
heavily on Saussure.125 Lacan shows, in contradistinction to 
Balkin's suggestion, that the logical implications of Saussure's lin-
guistic theory are totally antagonistic to Hohfeld's - and Balkin's 
- jurisprudential project. The postmodern subject is not an exter-
nal creator of language. Language and the subject are mutually 
constituting. This means that the subject is not only the subject of 
language. He is also subject to language.126 
Hohfeld's theory is what my colleague Arthur Jacobson calls a 
"correlating jurisprudence."127 It assumes a closed legal universe in 
which all possible legal relationships are already captured in a com-
plementary system of rights and obligations. This idea has been ac-
curately conceptualized by Duncan Kennedy and Frank Michelman 
as a "Law of Conservation of Exposures"128 - the only way I can 
increase my rights is by decreasing your rights in an equivalent 
manner. In contradistinction, the Lacanian-Saussurian system is a 
noncorrelative one. 
122. See, e.g., Singer & Beermann, supra note 5; J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach 
to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1119, 1120-26 (1990); Kennedy, supra note 75. 
123. Balkin, supra note 122, at 1120-26. 
124. See David Gray Carlson, Derrida's Justice (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). 
125. See LACAN, The agency of the letter, supra note 30, at 149-59. 
126. See supra note 31. 
127. Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 877, 881 (1989). 
128. Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOF· 
STRA L. REv. 711, 759 (1980). 
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In a Lacanian-Saussurian linguistic system, the arbitrary nature 
of significance means that meaning is always slipping; all language 
is metaphor and metonymy.129 Consequently, true correlatives and 
negations of the type supposedly identified by Hohfeld are impossi-
ble or illusory. Postmodern thought, as exemplified by Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, is precisely the denial of fit and complementarity; 
something is always missing, and something is always spilling 
over.13° For example, although the feminine is positioned as the 
negation of the masculine, this cannot mean that if the masculine is 
the positive then the feminine is the negative, or that woman is the 
complement to man. Rather, to Lacan, while the masculine is the 
claim to be all, the feminine is not nothing. She is the not-all (pas-
toute), as in not all things are Phallic.131 She is the denial of the 
fictional hegemony of the Phallus, which is the very foundation of 
subjectivity. Woman is not the complement to man but a supple-
ment.132 The Phallus is the forever-lost object from which we are 
castrated - the lack or hole that exists at the core of subjectivity.133 
There is always something more and something lacking that make 
true relationships impossible. Mediation is always necessary be-
cause they are impossible. 
Moreover, the arbitrariness of significance does not mean that 
meaning or legal concepts can be freely manipulated. We do not 
bind ourselves to fixed linguistic and legal concepts despite the arbi-
129. LACAN, The agency of the letter, supra note 30, at 156-57. Lacan identifies his con-
cepts of metaphor and metonymy with Freud's concepts of "condensation" and "displace-
ment." Id. at 160. 
130. For an excellent description of the concepts of lack and supplement that lie at the 
heart of Lacanian postmodemism, see generally ZIZEK, supra note 47, and ZIZEK, supra note 
28. See also Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Subject is Nothing, 5 LAW & 
CRITIQUE (forthcoming 1994) (reviewing Zit.EK, supra note 47). 
131. "Her being not all in the phallic function does not mean that she is not in it at all. 
She is in it not not at all. She is right in it. But there is something more." LACAN, God and 
the Jouissance of !:Fite Woman, supra note 29, at 138, 145; see also Rose, supra note 28, at 49-
50; Zit.EK, supra note 28, at 44-45. 
132. "Note that I said supplementary. Had I said complementary, where would we be!" 
LACAN, God and the Jouissance of !:Fite Woman, supra note 29, at 144; see also Rose, supra 
note 28, at 51. As so clearly explained by Salee!: 
Lacan thus moves as far as possible from the notion of sexual difference as the relation-
ship of two opposite poles which complement each other, together forming the whole of 
"Man." "Masculine" and "feminine" are not the two species of the genus Man but 
rather the two modes of the subject's failure to achieve the full identity of Man. "Man" 
and "Woman" together do not form a whole, since each of them is already in itself a 
failed whole. 
SALECL, supra note 78, at 116. 
133. JACQUES LACAN, The Phallic Phase and the Subjective Import of the Castration 
Complex, in FEMININE SEXUALITY, supra note 28, at 99, 116-17 [hereinafter, LACAN, The 
Phallic Phase]; LACAN, supra note 15, at 265; LACAN, The signification of the phallus, supra 
note 30, at 288; Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 130. 
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trariness of signification, but just because of its arbitrariness and 
slippage. Meaning and language, and subjectivity itself, consist pre-
cisely of this fiction of static significance.134 Consequently, subjec-
tivity is a dialectic concept that is both free in that it is a fiction and 
bound because it is a fiction. If we change the fiction, we change 
ourselves. Because Lacanianism denies the naturalness or inevita-
bility of not only the legal regime but subjectivity itself, it holds out 
the possibility of the truly radical change of creating alternate socio-
linguistic-legal universes. But a new alien species of subject will 
necessarily inhabit such new universes. The postmodern subject, 
unlike his liberal modern counterpart, who is at some level autono-
mous from the legal regime, cannot, therefore, merely "will" 
changes in the fundamental aspects of the legal and linguistic re-
gime, which is the gender hierarchy. Such changes require a dialec-
tical and simultaneous change in every aspect of our subjectivity 
and society. The problem for those of us who are both Lacanians 
and progressives is how to start this chicken-and-egg process in 
motion. 
Slavoj ZiZek gives a wonderful illustration of the difference be-
tween the modern (Hohfeldian-Balkinian) and postmodern (La-
canian-Saussurian) concept of the subject. Near the end of the 
movie Blow Up, 135 the protagonist passes a group of people miming 
a game of tennis without a ball. One of the players pretends to hit 
the ball out of bounds. The protagonist plays along and pretends to 
retrieve the ball and toss it back into the court. Modernism con-
cludes from the observation that the "game" of society is not inevi-
table or natural, it has no content; content resides solely in the 
subject itself. Postmodernism, in contradistinction, does not deny 
the necessity of the object merely because it is arbitrary. Rather, it 
shows us the object in all its "indifferent and arbitrary character."136 
In other words, the modern subject is conceived of as autonomous 
from, and therefore in control of, the game. He not only can 
change the game or leave the game but does not even need a ball or 
other external object to play the game. The postmodern subject, 
however, is not autonomous with respect to the game of law and 
language. He exists as a subject only insofar as he plays the game. 
Consequently, there must always be a mediating object of desire. 
134. See infra text accompanying notes 222-36. 
135. Bww UP (Premier 1966). 
136. ZIZEK, supra note 28, at 143. Another example of the modem work of art given by 
ZiZek is Waiting for Godot, in which, of course, Godot never arrives. Id. at 145 (discussing 
Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot). In a postmodern play, Godot is always there, although 
he may not be what you expected. Id. 
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Thus, insofar as legal concepts serve functions - social, eco-
nomic, psychic, or philosophical - the combinations of jural ele-
ments cannot be random or arbitrary and cannot be freely altered 
at will. I suggest that Hegelian philosophic theory, combined with 
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, indicates that the possession, 
enjoyment, and alienation of external objects serve a necessary role 
in the development of subjectivity in this society.137 Consequently, 
it is meaningful and not random for a legal regime to recognize a 
distinctive category of legal rights called "property" that contains 
all three of these elements.138 This does not mean that all legal re-
lationships need be full property relations. Nor does it mean that 
all property relations must be absolute; we may want to recognize 
limitations on any or all of the three general categories of property 
rights. Indeed, as Hegel himself argued, the logic of the concept of 
property is both self-limiting - unlimited property rights of differ-
ent subjects would be mutually inconsistent - as well as limited by 
other, more developed concerns of human development, such as 
morality and ethics.139 
137. Both Hegel's and Lacan's dialectic logic is retroactive. When they say that some-
thing is logically necessary, they are not saying that the result was inevitable when viewed ex 
ante. Rather, they are saying that when we view something ex post, we can logically derive 
what must have happened - and, perhaps in the case of Hegel, we can project somewhat 
into the future as to what should happen based on the logical structure of the process that is 
already in place. See ZIZEK, supra note 47, at 129-31; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, 
supra note 12. 
138. Hegel can identify three elements of property precisely because he speaks at the 
highest levels of abstraction. A Hegelian would argue that so many discussions of property, 
including Grey's, wind up concluding that property is incoherent or infinitely variable pre-
cisely because they confuse the general concept of property with specific applications of posi-
tive law. For example, Lawrence C. Becker {following Honore) identifies at least thirteen -
or ten, depending on how one subdivides the rights - possible elements of property rights, 
not all of which need be present for a right to be considered property. These rights are: (i) 
the right (claim) to possess; (ii) the right (liberty) to use; (iii) the right (power) to manage; 
(iv) the right (claim) to the income; (v) the right (liberty) to consume or destroy; (vi) the 
right (liberty) to modify; (vii) the right (power) to alienate; (viii) the right (power) to trans-
mit; (ix) the right {claim) to security; (x) the absence of term; (xi) the prohibition of harmful 
use; (xii) liability to execution; and (xiii) residuary rules. Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral 
Basis of Property Rights, in XXII NoMos, supra note 3, at 187, 190-91 (citing A.M. Honore, 
Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107-47 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961)). -
A Hegelian would argue that these thirteen "elements" are more accurately described as 
specific empirical manifestations of the three more general elements of property, or of limita-
tions of the three elements imposed by positive law. For example, rights i, vi, ix, and x are 
aspects of the Hegelian concept of possession. 
I define Hegel's three elements of property more thoroughly in Schroeder, The Vestal and 
the Fasces, supra note 12, and Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5. I try to illustrate the 
power of the Hegelian triune conception of property in analysis of commercial law theory 
and practice in Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 9, and Schroeder, Perfection as Pos-
session, supra note 9. 
139. See Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5. 
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Nevertheless, the Hegelian-Lacanian approach only defines the 
parameters of property at the most abstract level and has little or 
no practical use in prescribing specific property regimes. The spe-
cific limitations and applications of the broad and abstract concept 
of property to meet the needs of any given society are properly to 
be determined by practical reasoning and adopted into positive law 
- precisely as pragmatists such as Grey, Singer, and Radin argue. 
This is why the Hegelian idealist philosophic tradition is the precur-
sor not only of Continental postmodern philosophy but also of 
American pragmatic philosophy. The flexibility of Hohfeldian 
atomic analysis arguably gives it an advantage over a molecular ap-
proach in the pragmatic enterprise of promulgating the positive law 
of property. But it has the danger of making us think that by fid-
dling with the niggling details of the positive law of property, we 
undermine the crushing hegemony of the regimes of property and 
gender, rather than merely replicate them. 
4. Hohfeld's Attempt to Deny the Phallic Object 
If Grey and Vandevelde do not acknowledge Blackstone's insis-
tence on the intersubjective aspect of property, it may be because 
they too quickly accept Hohfeld's dismissal of the objective aspect 
of property rights. They thereby attribute to Blackstone a lack of 
philosophical sophistication that is more properly attributable to 
Hohfeld. According to Vandevelde, one of the distinctions between 
Blackstone and Hohfeld was 
[w]hether property was the thing or the right over the thing[.] Black-
stone had made clear that property could exist only in relation to 
some thing. Hohfeld rejected even this minimal association with tan-
gible objects, arguing that property could exist whether or not there 
was any tangible thing to serve as the object of the rights.140 
As we have seen, this statement is not just misleading but outright 
erroneous. Vandevelde assumes that because Blackstone insisted 
that property rights must relate to an object, Blackstone believed 
that (i) the object of property must be tangible and (ii) property 
rights are not also intersubjective. Vandevelde assertorially denies 
Blackstone's recognition of intangibles through the extraordinary 
means of denying the existence of intangible things. Despite hun-
dreds of years of western philosophical and jurisprudential under-
standing to the contrary, Vandevelde denies the possibility of any 
type of thing except physical things. 
140. Vandevelde, supra note 3, at 360. 
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Calling a right a thing did not make it one. Furthermore, if rights 
were things, then all legal rights could be considered property and 
Blackstone's fundamental distinction between rights over persons and 
rights over things was destined to evaporate.141 
Thus, with a stroke of a key, Vandevelde repeals virtually all of 
commercial law! He does not recognize that a right can be, and is 
on a regular basis recognized as, a thing and the object of property 
when it is a right against a third party to a transaction. 
That is, if X buys a good from Y on credit, X's obligation to pay 
Y is called an "account."142 If we are only concerned with the two-
party relationship between X and Y, we call this "contract" rather 
than "property," even though the account can be analogized as an 
"object," in the philosophical sense of something external to the 
two legal subjects. This is because the property aspect adds nothing 
to the legal analysis of the two-party relationship between X and Y 
at this point.143 If, however, Y sells the X account to Z, it becomes 
meaningful to recognize the object nature of the account and to 
conceptualize the assignment of the account as a transfer of a prop-
erty interest in an object - that is, the X account - from Y to Z 
pursuant to personal property conveyancing principles. Indeed, it is 
in precisely this sense that Blackstone correctly included debts 
within the category of choses in action that can serve as the object 
of personal property. Moreover, it is the approach to debt taken in 
Article 9 of the U.C.C.144 This characterization does not, as Vande-
velde suggests, break down the distinction between rights over per-
sons - contract- and rights over things -property. Y's contract 
rights against X to enforce the account remain distinguishable from 
Y's property rights vis-a-vis Z and the rest of the world to transfer 
Y's rights in the account to others. Consequently, modem commer-
141. Id. at 332. 
142. u.c.c. § 9-106 (1990). 
143. It may be relevant to the philosophical analysis, however. For example, because 
Hegel wants to distinguish the concepts of abstract personality and objects, he analyzes all 
contracts as involving property. See HEGEL, supra note 20, § 40, at 71-72. 
144. Under the U.C.C., debts can take the form of general intangibles, accounts, chattel 
paper, instruments, or investment securities. U.C.C. §§ 8-102(1)(c), 9-105(1)(b), 9-105(1)(i), 
9-106 (1990). All forms of debt can be conveyed as property and can serve as collateral for 
Article 9 or 8 security interests. Such intangibles are also property of the debtor for the 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (1988). Indeed, bankruptcy law 
reflects the traditional philosophic and jurisprudential understanding that things are not lim-
ited to intangibles but potentially include all external objects. Bankruptcy cases are customa-
rily denominated by the heading "In Re .•.. " This is frequently translated as "in the matter 
of .... " But the word res is also used in law to designate the object of a property right in the 
sense of the object in which the property right is asserted. This is because the original Latin 
word res means both "the matter in dispute" and "thing," or what I have been calling the 
object. 
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cial law and economic practice correctly recognize debts as objects 
of property.145 
Vandevelde and Grey come by their misconception honestly in 
that Hohfeld makes a similar conceptual error. Hohfeld may have 
been a great jurisprude, but he was an indifferent philosopher and 
no psychoanalyst. In his zeal to emphasize the intersubjective na-
ture of legal rights, he adopted a radically physicalist conception of 
the object. In his attempt to identify intersubjective relations, he 
tried to deny that all relations are mediated. 
Hohfeld's precise taxonomy of legal rights and liabilities was 
motivated by two closely related goals: (i) to avoid ambiguity and 
(ii) to differentiate between "legal relations [and] the physical and 
mental facts that call such relations into being."146 One of the areas 
that he thought particularly exhibited latent ambiguities is the con-
cept of property.147 He specifically criticized Blackstone's division 
of hereditaments into the corporeal and the incorporeal. 
Since all legal interests are "incorporeal" - consisting, as they do, of 
more or less limited aggregates of abstract legal relations - such a 
supposed contrast as that sought to be drawn by Blackstone can but 
serve to mislead the unwary. The legal interest of the fee simple 
owner of land and the comparatively limited interest of the owner of a 
"right of way" over such land are alike so far as "incorporeality" is 
concerned; the true contrast consists, of course, primarily in the fact 
that the fee simple owner's aggregate of legal relations is far more 
extensive than the aggregate of the easement owner.148 
Hohfeld's general proposition that all legal relations - including 
property - are relations among subjects and not relations between 
a subject and an object seems self-evidently correct today. Unfor-
tunately, he missed the point that property is a relationship be-
tween subjects that is mediated through an object. This is because 
the only way he could conceive of objectivity was through the phal-
lic sensuous grasping metaphor. Hohfeld's ostensible rejection of 
145. Kennedy criticizes Blackstone's treatment of debt as property in a way that is similar 
to Vandevelde's criticism of Blackstone. See Kennedy, supra note 75, at 338-39. Like Vande-
velde, Kennedy correctly identifies the contract aspect of the two·party debt relationship, but 
he fails to see that debt also takes on a property aspect when the obligee's rights against the 
obligor become the object of a legal relationship or dispute with a third party. 
146. WESLEY NEWCOMB HoHFELD, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, I, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REA· 
soNING AND OTiiER LEGAL EssA YS 23, 27 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923) [hereinafter 
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS AND OTiiER ESSAYS]. For a particularly useful exege-
sis on how Hohfeld's taxonomy fits into a specific jurisdictional tradition analyzing the nature 
of legal rights, see Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurispru-
dence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975. 
147. HoHFELD, supra note 146, at 29. 
148. Id. at 30. 
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the phallic metaphor was a reflection and reinstatement of tangibil-
ity as the only possible way of thinking about the object. Simple 
negation is restatement. 
The Hohfeldian approach seems attractive because at first blush 
it appears to offer a way of satisfying the insatiable human desire to 
achieve impossible immediate intersubjective relations. If we can 
collapse the Symbolic Phallus into the Real and then recognize that 
the Real cannot adequately serve as a mediator between subjects, it 
seems for a moment that we have denied the necessity for, and the 
fact of, mediation. Yet Hegel and Lacan argue that mediation al-
ways remains necessary for the creation of subjectivity and inter-
subjective relations. The inadequacy of the Real objects chosen to 
stand in for the mediating Phallic object of desire does not mean 
that the necessity for mediation disappears. Rather, it makes it all 
the more necessary. 
Hohfeld's denial of the objective mediating aspect of property 
can be seen in his discussion of the related subject of the distinction 
between in personam and in rem rights. First, Hohfeld warns that a 
simplistic, literal translation of the Latin terms implies that 
if a right in personam is simply a right against a person, a right in rem 
must be a right that is not against a person, but against a thing. That 
is, the expression right in personam, standing alone, seems to en-
courage the impression that there must be rights that are not against 
persons .... Such a notion of rights in rem is, as already intimated, 
crude and fallacious; and it can but serve as a stumbling-block to clear 
thinking and exact expression.149 
So far, so good. At this point however, Hohfeld makes a move that 
his argument does not require. He continues: 
A man may indeed sustain close and beneficial physical relations to a 
given physical thing: he may physically control and use such thing, 
and he may physically exclude others from any similar control or en-
joyment. But, obviously, such purely physical relations could as well 
exist quite apart from, or occasionally in spite of, the law of organized 
society: physical relations are wholly distinct from jural relations.150 
Even now, Hohfeld goes too far. His strong point is that legal rela-
tions are by definition social relations, which only exist among sub-
jects. The legal Symbolic relationship of property is not identical to 
the Real physical relation that exists between an owning subject 
and an owned object. It does not follow from this, however, that 
"physical relations are wholly distinct from jural relations." The 
149. WESLEY NEWCOMB HoHFELD, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, II, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AND OniER EssAYS, supra note 
146, at 65, 75. 
150. Id. 
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different orders of experience overlap to form a Borromean Knot 
so that the same object can simultaneously perform functions in 
more than one order.151 Jural relations with respect to tangible ob-
jects, for instance, govern, among other things, who of a number of 
rival subjects is entitled to enjoy physical relations with the objects. 
This physicalist confusion also leads Hohfeld to make the un-
necessary assertion that not only are rights in rem rights against 
subjects as opposed to rights against objects, but they are not even 
rights among subjects with respect to objects - or, to put it in 
Hohfeld's vocabulary, rights "to a thing": "[Limiting in rem rights 
to rights to a thing] would exclude not only many rights in rem, or 
multital rights, relating to persons, but also those constituting ele-
ments of patent interests, copyright interests, etc."152 Elsewhere, he 
writes: 
[I]t must now be reasonably clear that the attempt to conceive of a 
right in rem as a right against a thing should be abandoned as intrinsi-
cally unsound, as thoroughly discredited according to good usage, 
and, finally, as all too likely to confuse and mislead. It is desirable, 
next, to emphasize, in more specific and direct form, another impor-
tant point which has already been incidently noticed: that a right in 
rem is not necessarily one relating to, or concerning, a thing, i.e., a 
tangible object. Such an assumption, although made by Leake and by 
many others who have given little or no attention to fundamental 
legal conceptions, is clearly erroneous.153 
That is, to Hohfeld the word thing can only mean "tangible thing." 
This seems at first blush to contradict his and Vandevelde's conten-
tion that Blackstone was wrong to divide hereditaments between 
the corporeal and the incorporeal because they are in fact all incor-
poreal.154 I believe, however, that these passages are merely con-
fusing, not contradictory. 
Hohfeld tries to identify the minimum, distinguishable elements 
of property rights. He argues that Blackstone's insistence on distin-
guishing between tangible and intangible property - that is, here-
ditaments - is not only unnecessary or irrelevant to scrutiny at the 
atomic level but actually pernicious insofar as it complicates the 
analysis. Hohfeld also tries to wean lawyers away from what I call 
the phallic sensuous grasping metaphor for property and other legal 
relations. As I discuss elsewhere, the attempt to locate the ele-
ments of property through the use of a tangible archetype must be 
151. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
152. HoHFELD, supra note 149, at 78. 
153. Id. at 85. 
154. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
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ultimately unsuccessful in that it requires the use of legal fictions 
that intangible objects constructively have characteristics that they 
could not possibly have.155 I also agree that not only in colloquial 
speech but also in judicial opinions and jurisprudential discussions, 
many lawyers conflate the word thing with physicality, despite a 
long intellectual history to the contrary. 
It does not follow from any of this that property relations be-
tween subjects do not relate to an external object. 
5. Subjectivity, Objectivity, Intersubjectivity 
Hohfeld himself instinctively recognizes the need to identify an 
objective aspect of property or in rem rights to contrast to the sub-
jective aspect of contract and tort or in personam rights. As I dis-
cuss elsewhere,156 the word objectivity has many different meanings. 
In this article I have generally used it in the sense I have termed 
"Philosophical Objectivity" - that is, the relationship of subjects 
(conscious legal actors) with respect to objects (everything else). 
Another nonessentialist way of defining objectivity is to contrast it 
with its negative of subjectivity conceived as the viewpoint of a sin-
gle individual subject; I term this "Individualistic Subjectivity." 
Consequently, what I have named "Community Objectivity" refers 
to the intersubjective agreement of a community of subjects.157 
To Hohfeld, in personam rights are rights that are Individualisti-
cally Subjectively enforceable. In Hohfeld's terminology: 
A paucital right, or claim (right in personam), is either a unique right 
residing in a person (or group of persons) and availing against a single 
person (or ~ingle group of persons); or else it is one of a few funda-
mentally similar, yet separate, rights availing respectively against a 
few definite persons.15s 
Conversely, in rem rights are rights that are Community Objectively 
enforceable: "A multital right, or claim (right in rem), is always one 
of a large class of fundamentally similar yet separate rights, actual 
and potential, residing in a single person (or single group of per-
sons) but availing respectively against persons constituting a very 
large and indefinite class of people."159 In other words, a contract 
right is in personam because in most cases I can only enforce the 
155. For a discussion of this use of constructive physicality in commercial law, see Schroe-
der, Liquid Property, supra note 9, and Schroeder, Perfection as Possession, supra note 9. 
156. Schroeder, Subject: Object, supra note 100. 
157. This is the definition of objectivity accepted by many philosophers of science includ-
ing Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos. See id. at 17-24. 
158. HoHFELD, supra note 149, at 72. 
159. Id. 
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contract against the specific person or persons who are parties to 
the contract. My property right in my apartment is in rem because I 
have the right to exclude not only specific persons from my apart-
ment but the whole world. 
Notice that despite his denial, Hohfeld has come full circle to 
Blackstone's definition of property - a right is a property if it is 
dominion enforceable against the world. In explicating his theory of 
multital rights, Hohfeld by illustration tries to show that they do not 
all necessarily involve a thing. He lists five categories of multital 
rights: 
1. Multital rights, or claims, relating to a definite tangible object .... 
2. Multital rights (or claims) relating neither to definite tangible ob-
ject nor to (tangible) person [such as patentee's rights] ... 3. Multital 
rights, or claims, relating to the holder's own person [in the sense of 
one's body] ... 4. Multital rights residing in a given person and relat-
ing to another person, e.g., the right of a father that his daughter shall 
not be seduced, or the right of a husband that harm shall not be in-
flicted on his wife so as to deprive him of her company and assistance; 
5. Multital rights, or claims, not relating directly to either a (tangible) 
person or a tangible object, e.g., a person's right that another shall not 
publish a libel of him, or a person's right that another shall not pub-
lish his picture, - the so-called "right of privacy" existing in some 
states, but not in all.160 
On one level, one could try to argue that all of these are examples 
of rights with respect to things. For example, in Hegelian philo-
sophical vocabulary, anything external to the abstract subject -
that is, self-consciousness as free will - can potentially serve as the 
object of property.161 This includes our bodies (Hohfeld's third ex-
ample), other persons (Hohfeld's fourth example), and our talents, 
160. Id. at 85. 
161. 
(W]hen contrasted with the person (as distinct from the particular subject}, the 
thing is the opposite of the substantial: it is that which, by definition ... is purely 
external. - What is external for the free spirit (which must be clearly distinguished 
from mere consciousness) is external in and for itself; and for this reason, the defini-
tion ... of the concept of nature is that it is the external in itself. 
Addition (H). Since a thing ... has no subjectivity, it is external not only to the subject, 
but also to itself .... 
Intellectual ... accomplishments, sciences, arts, even religious observances (such 
as sermons, masses, prayers, and blessings at consecrations}, inventions, and the 
like, become objects ... of contract; in the way in which they are bought and sold, 
etc., they are treated as equivalent to acknowledged things • .•. We hesitate to call 
such accomplishments, knowledge ... abilities, etc. things; for on the one hand, such 
possessions are the object of commercial negotiations and agreements, yet on the 
other, they are of an inward and spiritual nature. Consequently, the understanding 
may find it difficult to define their legal status, for it thinks only in terms of the 
alternative that something is either a thing or not a thing (just as it must be either 
infinite or finite). Knowledge, sciences, talents, etc. are of course attributes of the 
free spirit, and are internal rather than external to it; but the spirit is equally capa· 
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qualities, and reputation (Hohfeld's fifth example). But even for 
Hegel, this is only true at the level of Abstract Right and may not 
be the case in the more developed realms of human relations: Mo-
rality and Ethical Life. Moreover, even at the level of Abstract 
Right, Hegel argues that it is a legal wrong (Unrecht) to analyze our 
relations to objects that become part of a person's personality in 
terms of property.162 For example, slavery is an abstract wrong be-
cause it treats a person as an object and thereby denies him recogni-
tion as a subject. In any event, whatever its philosophical integrity, 
I think that such a characterization has little specific utility in a dis-
cussion of American law. Rather, I would argue that Hohfeld's 
very examples reveal the weakness of his decision to reject the ob-
ject. It also explains why, despite Hohfeld's influence over legal 
scholarship, his paucital-multital terminology has never been 
adopted and sounds as awkward today as it no doubt sounded in 
1918. 
The first two examples Hohfeld gives fall within the generally 
understood rubric of property law. Both of these relate to objects 
- tangible and intangible. But the last three examples fall within 
the generally understood rubrics of tort and civil rights law. As we 
have seen, Vandevelde accepts Hohfeld's contention that there is 
no meaningful distinction at face value between property and other 
rights good against the world, and he concludes that property analy-
sis has, therefore, lost its meaning.163 As we shall see, Grey also 
agrees with the Hohfeldian analysis and suggests that, accordingly, 
property will lose its inspirational role in political theory.164 Jen-
nifer Nedelsky concludes from a Hohfeldian analysis that property 
is a myth that cannot fulfill its constitutional function of serving as 
ble, through expressing them, of giving them an external existence ... and disposing 
of them ... so that they come under the definition ... of things. 
HEGEL, supra note 20, §§ 42-43. 
Rather, "thing," like personality, refers to a mode of being and, more specifically, to one 
that is defined in contrast to the self-relatedness of personality. A thing is anything 
determinate - whether a capacity, an action, or an object in the external environment 
- insofar as it can be conceived as immediately different from free personality. Be-
cause a thing is essentially external, its notion is not contradicted if it is given a purpose 
from the outside. In other words, what is essentially external can be used merely as a 
means: its end can be given to it by something that is other than it. 
Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: 
Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1077, 1164 (1989); see also 
Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5. 
162. For example, even though our bodies are objects, Hegel argued that our relations to 
our bodies cannot be adequately defined in terms of property Jaw. Property includes the 
right of alienation, but we do not have an unlimited right to alienate our bodies or personal-
ity in suicide. HEGEL, supra note 20, § 70. 
163. See supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text. 
164. See infra section IV.D.1. 
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the barrier between the private realm of individual freedom, and 
oppression from the state.165 I would argue to the contrary. The 
fact that Hohfeld cannot distinguish between property and tort sug-
gests more about the weakness of Hohfeld's analysis than it does 
about the incoherence of property. 
Hohfeld asserts more than argues his conclusion that these tra-
ditionally disparate areas of law do not differ from each other. As 
an empirical matter, American legal discourse recognizes a distinc-
tion between property and tort. This distinction is so familiar as to 
seem natural to most Americans. Hohfeld may be correct that both 
property and tort differ from contract in that the former two are 
rights against the world and the latter consists of rights against an 
individual. It does not follow from this, however, that no relevant 
distinction exists between the concepts of property and tort. This 
may be true even if the empirical reality of legal practice in prop-
erty and tort does not display the sharp lines of the theoretical, ana-
lytical distinctions, and even if certain rights are hybrids containing 
elements of both property and tort. Hohfeld at most points out a 
common element between property and tort, but two things that 
share a common element are not necessarily the same. In order to 
make a convincing case that it is not meaningful to distinguish be-
tween rights among persons with respect to an external object and 
other types of rights enforceable generally against the world, one 
must identify the perceived difference and the function it serves and 
then argue why this is misleading or useless.166 
For example, a significant jurisprudential question concerns 
whether Hohfeld's third example of multital rights - one's rights 
vis-a-vis one's body - should be analyzed in terms of property law, 
tort law, or otherwise. Much of the law-and-economics analysis of 
tort law is an attempt to reconceptualize tort law in terms of prop-
erty and contract doctrines. Those who take this point of view to its 
logical extreme, including Richard Posner, argue that because we 
have a property right in our bodies, we should be able to buy and 
sell our body and body parts, as well as our infants.167 On the other 
165. See infra section IV.D.1. 
166. As I discuss infra in sections IV.D.3 and IV.D.4, at some level of generality, every-
thing is the same, and at some level of specificity, no two things are the same. Legal argu-
ment consists in large part in establishing consensus as to the correct level of generality in 
specific situations: Is this case distinguishable from another? If a distinction can be drawn, is 
it relevant, or is it a distinction that makes no difference? 
167. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 151-54 (4th ed. 1992) (describ-
ing the extreme version of this point of view); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 409-
17 (1992); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 
J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 344 {1978). 
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side of the political spectrum, Margaret Radin agrees that we have 
a property right in our bodies, but she comes to the opposite con-
clusion as to the permissibility of rights of market alienation.168 To 
Radin, although the body may be property, market alienability of 
female sexuality, in the form of either prostitution or surrogate 
motherhood, should be restricted as destructive of human fiourish-
ing.169 A neo-Hegelian might agree with Radin's policy recommen-
dations on specific issues such as prostitution, but on the grounds 
that it is a category mistake to analyze body relations in terms of 
property relations. 
6. The Reinstatement of "Blackstonian" Property 
Now it should be apparent why I said that the Grey-Vande-
velde-Hohfeldian ostensible denial of traditional Blackstonian 
property is, in fact, a reinscription. Their "denial" of Blackstone is, 
in effect, a "super-Blackstonian" approach that insists more firmly 
on a physical, unitary concept of property than the historical Black-
stone ever did.no 
The Hohfeldian analysis of property does not, in fact, offer an 
alternate paradigm· to the physicalist, phallic paradigm. It accepts 
the notion that the only possible definition of property is a unitary 
notion based on the sensuous grasping of physical things. Hohfeld, 
Grey, and Vandevelde believe that their analysis shows that the uni-
tary, physical paradigm does not adequately describe actual jural 
relations. They observe anomalies that the paradigm does not ex-
plain. One possible response to these observations would be the 
approach of the historical Blackstone - to develop enough auxilia-
ries to the core paradigm of property to explain away apparent 
168. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1921-36 
(1987); Radin, supra note 8, at 965-67. 
169. I analyze Radin's theory at great length in Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5. 
I congratulate her for arguing forcibly that it is intuitively and philosophically inappropriate, 
and perhaps morally and ethically wrong, to analyze body and sexual relations in terms of 
market considerations. But I also question her choice to analyze these relations in terms of 
property. This approach not only confuses her argument but weakens it. Radin's approach 
concedes to Jaw-and-economic utilitarian theory one of its primary tenets: that body rela-
tions are fundamentally the same as other object relations. Radin's critique can degenerate, 
therefore, into quibbling about the positive Jaw of property rights. 
I suggest that Radin's analysis would gain strength if it were restated, not as an analysis of 
property Jaw, but as an attempt to develop an alternate body of Jaw to analyze legal relations 
with the human body and other objects that are in some way body-like. Traditional property 
Jaw would continue to govern other forms of object relations. I call this alternative to prop-
erty Jaw a jurisprudence of expanded bodily integrity. 
170. We shall see that Hohfeld's legal progeny - the legal realists - similarly imposed a 
radically physicalist, sensuous grasping paradigm in the Uniform Commercial Code. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 190-209. 
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anomalies. Consequently, whether or not Blackstone implicitly as-
sumes that the sensuous grasping of physical things is the norm, he 
does not ignore the existence of divisions of and limitations on 
property rights or deny property rights in intangibles. Rather, he 
tries to account for them. 
An alternative response would be to conclude that the old para-
digm is a "degenerative research program" so encrusted by its pro-
tective belt of auxiliary theories that its explanatory power 
diminishes.171 The theory, then, would say that sensuous grasping 
epitomizes property, except for in these special cases. But empiri-
cally, there are more exceptions than there are examples of the so-
called general rule. One, then, would try to formulate a new para-
digm that would either explain more than the existing paradigm or 
explain part of it "better." This new paradigm would presumably 
have to account for intangibility and fluid concepts of property 
rights as essential aspects of property, rather than as exceptions. 
Hohfeld, Grey, and Vandevelde take yet a third approach. As 
the theory of sophisticated falsifiability reminds us, we cannot as a 
psychological or logical matter reject a paradigm merely because 
we find that it is inconsistent with empirical observations. Rather, 
it remains as the paradigm until a new paradigm is developed. Van-
develde and Hohfeld are left with the existing paradigm in its most 
pure form, without its protective belt, and argue that it is the only 
paradigm of property. Because this paradigm does not accurately 
describe our empirical legal world, they conclude that no examples 
of property in fact exist. The definition of property remains, but 
examples of property form a null set. The old paradigm remains, 
but is declared moribund. 
Unfortunately for this approach, property as an economic and 
legal practice continues to fioµrish. Property concepts have not 
come crashing down in the face of this arcane, arid, and aeon.textual 
legal argument. The Hohfeldian approach refuses to analyze con-
temporary property qua property on the grounds that property is 
dead as an atialytical category. The marketplace, however, needs to 
account for property and continues to build the protective belt of 
auxiliaries. 
C. Physicality and the Federalists 
In addition to Blackstone, Grey also describes the Framers of 
the U.S. Constitution as holding the so-called traditionalist-lay con-
171. See supra note 92. 
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ception of property as "thing ownership." As we shall see, this 
relates to Grey's political agenda.172 Grey fears that over-
solicitousness toward the Takings Clause of the Constitution may 
hinder progressive legislation, which he favors. He thinks that if he 
can show that the definition of property used in traditional takings 
jurisprudence is so untenable as to be completely meaningless and 
unworkable in our modern economy, then even originalist Supreme 
Court Justices would be forced to adopt an alternate interpretation 
of the Fifth Amendment. I believe Grey hopes that the new ap-
proach might be more amenable to liberal political goals. 
A scholarly exegesis of the property jurisprudence of the Fram-
ers, let alone a complete discussion of Supreme Court takings cases, 
is far beyond my interests and the scope of this article. I suggest, 
however, that even a cursory analysis of the theories of the Framers 
suggests that the vision of property reflected in the language of the 
Constitution is far more sophisticated than the crude view attrib-
uted to them by Grey. Moreover, Grey's proposed disaggregated 
"bundle of sticks" concept of property, which covertly reinstates the 
phallic metaphor, actually leads to a stricter, less progressive read-
ing of the Constitution. 
In her illuminating book Private Property and the Limits of 
American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its 
Legacy, 173 Jennifer Nedelsky parses the writings of the Federalists 
in order to explicate their theory of property and the fundamental 
role it played in their notion of political freedom. She emphasizes, 
as Grey does, that for the most part, the Federalists thought the 
concept of property was so self-evident that it did not need defin-
ing.114 Nevertheless, the ex~ples they used of the potential op-
pression of property rights by an unjust political system provide 
strong evidence that their concept of property was not limited to 
the physical thing-sensuous grasping model Grey posits. They 
spoke of property rights not only in connection with land and the 
means of production - that is, stock in trade, manufacturing 
plants, and so on - as one would expect in a thing-possession re-
gime. They also spoke frequently of property rights in terms of 
money lending and investment.11s The types of "takings" with 
which they were concerned were not limited to the state's wresting 
of physical things from their owners' grasp. They were concerned 
172. See infra section IV.D.1. 
173. NEDELSKY, supra note 4. 
174. See, e.g., id. at 36·37. 
175. See, e.g., id. at 30. 
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with those more subtle "takings" that destroyed the value of intan-
gible property in the forms of investment: the adoption of mone-
tary policies, such as the printing of paper money, which can cause 
inflation, as well as bankruptcy and other debtors' rights 
legislation.176 
My colleague, John 0. McGinnis, who explores the natural law 
aspects of the Framers' political theory, goes even further.177 Ac-
cording to McGinnis, both the Federalists and the anti-Federalists 
recognized property as the natural right of man.178 Related to this, 
other essential rights necessary for human liberty were justified pre-
cisely because they were forms of property rights. For example, 
James Madison argued for the freedoms of speech and religion on 
the express ground that each man has a natural property in "his 
opinions and the free communication of them" and in "the free use 
of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ 
them."179 
The Framers of the Constitution were not Hegelians, let alone 
Lacanians. They were firmly located within classical liberal polit-
ical theory. Their writings, however, clearly reflect the Western . 
philosophical tradition, which does not limit the potential objects of 
property to physical objects or property relations to the satisfaction 
of physical, or Real, needs. Rather, the objects of property include 
everything other than the self. In the words of John Lilly, an eight-
eenth-century popularizer of Locke, "Every Man ... hath a Prop-
erty and Right which the Law allows him to defend his Life, 
Liberty, and Estate .... "180 And, property relations are necessary 
in order for humans to constitute themselves as subjects who can 
seek to actualize their freedom. In other words, property relates to 
all that is proper to mankind.181 
176. See, e.g., id. at 71-75. 
177. See John 0. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1751 
(1994) (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CoNSTITIITION (1993)). 
178. Id. at 1758-66. 
179. Id. at 1760 (quoting Madison). For a further discussion of the broad way in which 
property rights were conceived in the eighteenth century, see Macpherson, supra note 36, at 
7-8. 
180. Aylmer, supra note 73, at 95 (quoting JoHN LILLY, THE PRACTICAL REGISTER: OR, 
A GENERAL .ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAw (London, Eliz. Nutt & R. Gosling for T. Ward 
1719)). 
181. This is reflected in the etymology of the English word property, which derives from 
the Latin proprius, which means "proper," or "that which is peculiar to a person or thing." 
12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 639 (2d ed. 1989); D.P. SIMPSON, CASSELL's NE\v 
LATIN DICTIONARY 482 (1968). 
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D. Property in Private Law 
1. Property as the Public-Private Distinction 
I have suggested that Grey and Vandevelde feel the need to 
adopt such sharp, either-or, clear, visible, and absolute distinctions 
between property and nonproperty in large part because they ana-
lyze property primarily for the instrumental purposes of public law. 
That is, as Grey and Vandevelde emphasize, it is traditional in legal 
political and jurisprudential theory to view property as one of the 
barriers between the individual and the state. 
Property and its counterpart, sovereignty, have been understood as 
generic terms for, respectively, the collection of freedoms held by the 
individual and the collection of powers held by the state. In very real 
terms, the concept of property has marked the boundaries of individ-
ual freedom and the limits of state power.182 
Liberalism has traditionally required a sharp distinction between 
the private and the public. Vandevelde and Grey argue that the 
drafters of the Takings Clause, writing in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, based it on the rigid, unitary, sensuously possessory paradigm 
they attribute to the drafters' contemporary - Blackstone.183 I 
have already argued extensively above that this is a misstatement of 
eighteenth-century property theory. Nevertheless, Grey and Van-
develde may be correct in their proposition that a fluid, expanded, 
flexible, ever-changing, intangible notion of property serves this 
political function poorly. If everything arguably can be property, 
then nothing is property; the constitutional protections of property 
become unworkable. This is a version of the familiar critique of 
liberal theory on the grounds that its traditional notion of the pub-
lic-private distinction may be untenable at best, and irretrievably 
alienating and oppressive at worst, at least in the late capitalistic 
era.184 
But the judgment that the notion of property no longer can -
or more accurately, in Jennifer Nedelsky's analysis, never could185 
182. Vandevelde, supra note 3, at 328; see also NEDELSKY, supra note 4, at 8-9, 91, 248. 
This notion is, of course, reflected in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
183. As I discuss supra in text accompanying notes 79-110, even this may be a 
misconception. 
184. This critique of the public-private distinction in this country is associated primarily, 
although not exclusively, with various schools of feminism. This seems particularly appropri-
ate to me in so far as I see the unitary, physical, and possessory notion of property to be a 
phallic metaphor. The problem, of course, is that one only reinstates this metaphor by simple 
denial. The question is how to rewrite the concept of property to reflect the "not-all" of the 
feminine. 
185. Nedelsky's argument is somewhat more sophisticated. She speaks of changes in 
property law analysis since the New Deal disintegrated "property as a constitutional barrier." 
NEDELSKY, supra note 4, at 9. As I read the overall tenor of her book, it contains an implicit 
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- serve the barrier function assigned to it by the Founders for the 
purposes of political theory carries no necessary implication for the 
continued validity of property notions generally. Most property re-
lations take place in the context of so-called private law - com-
mercial and real property transactions between legal actors. In the 
fluid and intersubjective world of the market, fluid and intersubjec-
tive notions of property arguably function more, not less, ade-
quately than rigid and absolutist notions. Indeed, that is probably 
why they have developed. Thus, one of the problems with contem-
porary property scholarship may be precisely that we still try to use 
one concept - property - for at least two very different functions: 
first, to allow legal actors to relate with each other as subjects in the 
marketplace, and second, to serve as the line between the public 
and the private. Whether or not property ever successfully fulfilled 
this dual function in the past, it may no longer be able to do so if 
the market moment of property requires fluidity and the political 
moment of property requires rigidity. 
Moreover, our legal system continues to place great importance 
on the property-personal rights distinction the neo-Hohfeldians 
deny. Of course, most individuals in our society hold a strong intui-
tive belief that property significantly differs from other legal rights. 
Let us not forget that since the "fall" of Communism in Eastern 
Europe and the recent official encouragement of private markets in 
China, the international belief that private property is necessary for 
economic development - and, at least in the West, for political 
freedom - is probably stronger now than it has been in at least a 
century. Yet many legal academics who study the situation con-
tinue to argue either that property is dying186 or that the concept is 
incoherent, a mere mythic presence, a contentless rhetorical trope 
or political tool.187 I fear that they risk sounding very foolish -
saying that because they cannot understand the phenomenon, it 
does not exist and the rest of the world is delusional or suffering 
from false consciousness.188 
suggestion that property has always been a fluid concept poorly suited to act as a barrier. 
See, e.g., id. at 223-25. 
186. For a discussion of the property theory of Grey and Vandevelde, see infra section 
N.D.4. 
187. NEDELSKY, supra note 4, at 8-9, 223-25, 239, 243, 247, 254. 
188. Alan Brudner makes a similar point in his Editor's Introduction to a recent law re-
view volume dedicated to property: 
So far from reflecting on the nature of property in light of 1989, many of the contributors 
· have attempted to reveal a conceptual dynamic in private property that moves in a direc-
tion diametrically opposed to the momentum revealed in history. At a time when pub-
licly-owned enterprises and resources are being massively transformed into private 
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In arguing that property law can no longer - and indeed proba-
bly never did189 - bear the full weight of serving as the constitu-
tional public-private boundary between citizen and state, Grey 
makes another brief, but clever, argument. Grey tries to claim that 
property died for commercial law and, therefore, it is doubly dead 
for constitutional law purposes. Property's murder in private law 
was supposedly the work of the legal realists. 
I disagree with Grey's assumption that the legal realists' "bun-
dle of sticks" imagery challenges the phallic metaphor of property 
as thing ownership. I argue that despite its reputation, that great 
monument to legal realism, the Uniform Commercial Code, in fact 
adopts an ultraphysicalist, phallic, unitary conception of property 
that out-Blackstones Blackstone. 
2. Musings on the Property Myth of the Uniform Commercial 
Code 
a. Myths. The term myth has both affirmative and pejorative 
meanings. A myth is simultaneously true and false. In its affirma-
tive guise, a myth is a story a people tell to understand themselves 
by giving meaning and structure to their lives. In this sense myths 
claim a type of truth that is beyond their literal truth. In the pejora-
tive sense, myths are delusions, fairy tales, or even outright lies. 
There are several approaches to the study of myths. One ap-
proach concentrates on the structural similarities190 or thematic 
commonalities191 of myths told in different cultures in order to re-
tell ostensibly different stories as variations on the same story. This 
is an attempt to identify universal or essential aspects of human na-
ture. Private law doctrinalists, like public law theorists, tell a myth 
about the death of property. In studying this myth, Grey takes the 
structuralist approach. He asserts that the theory and doctrine 
myths are fundamentally the same. They both speak of an evil de-
mon who was worshiped by our ancestors - unitary physical prop-
erty - being slain by academic demigods who then bring about a 
property; at a time when socialist law is being overthrown in favour of the legal catego-
ries of private law, our theorists disclose the inherent instability, indeed the conceptual 
impossibility, of private property. 
Alan Brudner, Editor's Introduction, 6 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 183, 183 (1993). 
189. See NEDELSKY, supra note 4, at 8-9; see generally id. at 223-31. 
190. See, e.g., CLAUDE L:E.vx-STRAuss, THE RA.w AND THE CooKEo: INTRODUCTION TO 
A SCIENCE OF MYTHOLOGY (John Weightman & Doreen Weightman trans., 1975). 
191. Examples include Jungian analysis of psychological archetypes reflected in myths, 
see, e.g., NEUMANN, supra note 48, as well as the pop culture theory of universal myths associ-
ated with Joseph Campbell, see, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 14. 
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new age of truth and justice. Grey seeks to convince us that the 
concept of property should fade away in constitutional discourse 
because it has already been killed off in private law doctrine. 
Although I agree that there are structural similarities between the 
two myths, the lessons that can be drawn from the parallel are not 
those drawn by Grey. Rather, the doctrinal myth of property turns 
out to be mythic in the pejorative sense of illusory and misleading. 
Private law only claims to have killed off unitary physicalist prop-
erty. In fact, unitary, physicalist, phallic property remains at the 
heart of the property concepts enshrined in the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.192 
b. The Private Law Myth. 
Before the High and Far-Off Tunes, 0 My Best Beloved, came the 
Tune of the Very Beginnings; and that was in the days when the Eld-
est Magician was getting Things ready.193 
The creation myth, or "just-so" story, of commercial law doc-
trine is that the lionlike Llewellyn and his fellow legal realists re-
jected the common law approach to personal property and 
substituted the modem "bundle of sticks" theory into the Uniform 
Commercial Code.194 In the bad old days, our benighted legal an-
192. I explore the phallic metaphor in commercial law doctrine in greater detail in 
Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 9 (manuscript at text accompanying notes 124-38), 
and in Schroeder, Perfection as Possession, supra note 9. 
193. RUDYARD KIPLING, The Crab that Played with the Sea, in JuST So STORJES 155 (Al-
fred A. Knopf 1992) (1902). 
194. This myth pervades E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & JoHN HONNOLD, CASES AND 
MATEruALS ON CoMMERCIAL LAW (4th ed. 1985). (The reorganization of the Fifth Edition, 
which is also edited by Steven L. Harris, Charles W. Mooney, Jr., and Curtis R. Reitz, has 
dropped some, but not all, of these references.) For example, Farnsworth and Honnold laud 
the revolutionary nature of the U.C.C.'s "virtual abandonment of 'property' (or 'title') as a 
vehicle for deciding sales controversies." Id. at 480. They quote Prof. Williston who said that 
this step was "the most objectionable and irreparable feature" of the new Code. Id. (quoting 
Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales in the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REv. 561, 
569-71 (1950)). Farnsworth and Honnold also praise the drafters for "exorcising 'title' from 
sales controversies and banish[ing] the 'lien' " in favor of "down-to-earth language." Id. at 
720. 
Notice that in their rush to praise the code drafters, they fail to mention that this replace-
ment of legal terminology with "down-to-earth" language does not exclude using many other 
words in their technical legal sense as opposed to their familiar colloquial meanings. For 
example, purchaser is given a technical meaning as a transferee in any voluntary transaction, 
rather than its colloquial meaning as "buyer.'' See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32)·(33) (1987). 
Farnsworth and Honnold defend the provisions of § 2-501, which gives a buyer a "special 
property" in goods identified to a contract: 
The Code (with good reason) discarded the traditional concepts of 'property' and 'title' 
as tools for deciding a wide variety of issues ..•• Nevertheless, to cope with problems 
posed by claims against third persons it seems necessary to follow a line of thought that 
resembles the 'property' concept. Happily, this process is not subject to the vice that led 
to the rejection of 'property' as a general solvent, for we are taking on only one problem 
at a time - as contrasted with the confused, cross-eyed pre-Code approach of using one 
general concept for a wide variety of different problems. 
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cestors thought that property resided in some mysterious whole 
known as "title." A range of legal disputes relating to the owner-
ship of "goods," or objects of property governed by Article 2 of the 
U.C.C. - including who has the right of possession, who has the 
risk of loss, and so on - was resolved by identifying the location of 
this "metaphysical"19S concept. 
The enlightened realists killed title by shattering it. Shattered 
property was disaggregated into a bundle of sticks. The code draft-
ers realized that the different legal questions supposedly answered 
by a title inquiry were just that - different legal questions. These 
differences had been obscured by the fact that the term title did not 
designate one right, as had been previously thought, but was short-
hand for a bundle of separate rights. That is, common lawyers were 
legal idealists who assumed that unity of terminology reflected a 
unitary essence. The legal realists took the nominalist approach 
that words are only words and sought to examine the reality of 
practice that the words obscured. Consequently, they boldly re-
jected the ancient fossil of title law and reanalyzed separately each 
issue formerly covered by title law to determine what rules reason-
able merchants would have bargained for based on business prac-
tice. Title, they declared, was a chimera, initially frightening until 
FARNSWORTII & HoNNOLD, supra, at 718. This statement, unfortunately, begs the question 
as to what "is" a property interest at all. If, as Hohfeld suggests, a property right is what he 
calls a multital right - that is, a right against the world - then problems posed by claims 
against third persons do not resemble property but are property by definition. See supra note 
160 and accompanying text. Conversely, Farnsworth and Honnold seem to be assuming that 
the issues our legal ancestors decided under the rubric of "property" were a "wide variety of 
different problems." FARNswoRTII & HONNOLD, supra, at 718. 
I suspect that the differences between pre-Code sales law and Article 2 seem especially 
revolutionary to older scholars such as Farnsworth and Honnold who were steeped in the 
detail of the old law, participated in or witnessed the debates concerning its change, and then 
taught during a transition period when students needed to know both the old law and new 
and the differences between them. Lawyers of my and subsequent generations who have 
lived our entire legal careers under the current regime may not perceive the same revolution-
ary character. Indeed, I remember hearing this myth told rather breathlessly by my commer-
cial law professor who had some role in the Article 2 drafting process. But there were 
agnostics even back then. Perhaps my conclusion that the drafters of the U.C.C. did not 
successfully break out of the pre-Code property paradigm originally arose from the cynicism 
of my contracts professor, whose principle area of expertise was labor law, rather than com-
mercial law. He rolled his eyes at claims of the revolutionary nature of Article 2 and main-
tained that the law of sales contract had remained essentially the same in its most basic 
principles, and most of the differences from pre-Code law were highly technical matters that 
would only excite Jaw professors. 
195. Metaphysica~ of course, is the ultimate insult from realists who, after all, are "practi-
cal men." It is still frequently used in commercial Jaw scholarship as a pejorative for compet-
ing viewpoints. 
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one realizes that it is an illusion or, in the words of Llewellyn, an 
"intangible something. "196 
3. Practical Men and Their Tangible Things 
The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between practical men 
tum upon the location of an intangible something, the passing of 
which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such ab-
stractions proof of words and actions of a tangible character.197 
While I do not wish to take away from the credit due to the 
drafters of the U.C.C., a revisionist view of this history is both less 
and potentially more earthshaking. The drafters did not abandon 
or disaggregate property. The very concept of a sale presupposes 
that there is such a thing as a saleable property right in a good and 
that property rights in that good can be conveyed from the seller to 
the buyer. Rather, the U.C.C. drafters denied title; they tried to 
wish it away. Article 2 boldly claims that "[e]ach provision of this 
Article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies ... ap-
plies irrespective of title."198 It then immediately loses the courage 
of its convictions and adds "except where the provision refers to 
such title."199 Indeed, the concept and the terminology of title con-
tinue in the U.C.C. Article 2 defines a sale as "the passing of title 
from the seller to the buyer for a price."200 Sections 2-401, 402, and 
403 tell one when title passes, how title can be divested, when title 
is voidable, and so on. 
Nor did the drafters abandon the concept that a full property 
contains a unity of certain minimal rights. They might, for example, 
in certain cases, have decided that certain rights and obligations are 
not essential elements of property. For example, the party who 
bears the risk of casualty loss in a good is no longer determined by 
title. This is frequently explained as an example of the disaggrega-
tion - risk of loss is only one stick in the property bundle, which 
196. In his casebook Karl Llewellyn uses the term mystical something. KARL N. LLEWEL-
LYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TiiE LAW OF SALES 561 {1930). 
197. U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt. (1962). This comment, probably penned by Llewellyn, bears a 
family relationship to his scholarly writings: 
They want law to deal, they themselves want to deal, with things, with people, with 
tangibles, with definite tangibles, and observable relations between definite tangibles -
not with words alone; when law deals with words, they want the words to represent 
tangibles which can be got at beneath the words, and observable relations between those 
tangibles. 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. 
REv. 1222, 1223 {1931). 
198. u.c.c. § 2-401 {1962). 
199. u.c.c. § 2-401 (1962). 
200. u.c.c. § 2-106(1) (1962). 
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can be "disaggregated" at will.201 An alternate analysis might sug-
gest that there was no disaggregation after all. Whether or not pre-
Code law usually allocated risk of loss in a good to the person hold-
ing title, it does not follow that risk of loss is an essential element of 
property any more than it follows from the existence of positive law 
that assesses real property taxes against owners that such taxes are 
an essential element of property. The three traditional elements of 
property are rights of possession, enjoyment, and alienation.202 Un-
less one considers risk of loss to be the dark side of enjoyment, it is 
not included in the traditional definition of unitary property. The 
fact that the risk-of-loss rules of Article 2 are merely "default rules" 
that only apply if the buyer and seller fail to resolve the issue by 
contract certainly suggests that it is not. Indeed, if one looks at 
Llewellyn's writings on title, one will find that he objected, not to 
the concept of title per se, but to the tendency of the common law 
to use the location of title to govern any and all issues arising under 
the law of sales.203 Specifically, Llewellyn criticized the common 
law for treating all of sales as a subcategory of property law and not 
recognizing that some aspects, including risk of loss, are more ap-
propriately analyzed in terms of contract.204 
Moreover, and most significantly for the purposes of this article, 
although they ostensibly adopted the "bundle of sticks" approach 
through their denial of title, the drafters did not even try to replace 
the common law phallic paradigm, which identified property with 
sensuous grasping of physical things. Rather, they embraced it 
wholeheartedly. As the quote at the head of this section indicates, 
201. This is the traditional rationale. In the language of Farnsworth and Honnold, risk of 
loss is a different question from other traditional property questions and should be separately 
analyzed. See infra text accompanying notes 203-04. 
202. For a Lacanian-Hegelian analysis of the function of these three traditional elements, 
see Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12. See also infra text accompanying 
notes 218-36. 
203. See, e.g., K.N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. 
L.Q. REv. 159 (1938). 
204. Id. at 191, 202. Llewellyn argued that analyzing risk of loss as an attribute of prop-
erty governed by conveyancing rules rather than as a contractual aspect of sales leads to 
peculiarly convoluted reasoning. The common lawyer argued that risk of loss followed title. 
When title passes is determined by the conveyancing contract. When the contract is silent, 
the courts will look to other provisions in the contract as evidence of when the parties in-
tended title to pass. A contractual provision purporting to govern the allocation of risk of 
loss can serve as evidence of such an implied intent as to the timing of passage of title. The 
common law courts would, therefore, look to contractual risk-of-loss clauses, not to find the 
parties' intent as to risk of loss, but to determine whether title passed, which would, in turn, 
affect the allocation of the risk of loss. (Of course, this determination of the location of title 
would have other effects unrelated to risk of loss.) Id. at 182-83. 
Llewellyn's approach, adopted in the U.C.C., is simply to analyze risk of loss as a contract 
matter. Id. at 183-84. 
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the legal realists rejected the notion of title, not because it was uni-
tary or objective, but precisely because it was insufficiently physical. 
These self-proclaimed "practical men" found elusive, feminine in-
tangibility to be seductive, but also dangerous because elusive. In-
tangibility is metaphysical and flaccid. They longed for that 
determinate masculine firmness that is so hard to achieve and easy 
to lose.205 So they demanded that not only goods - which are by 
definition physical things - but also acts and words must become 
tangible. Not only property but the entire Symbolic realm of lan-
guage and law is collapsed into the Real. Like Odysseus, they 
heard the Sirens' song, but in order to prevent their own destruc-
tion, they bound themselves to the mast of tangibility - binding 
themselves like a bundle of sticks. The realists turn out to have 
been "Real-ists." 
Goods themselves are, of course, physical things that can be 
seen and held and can satisfy the tangible longings of practical men. 
Property is a legal concept that only exists in the minds and actions 
of people. In Lacanian terminology, goods are Real, but property is 
Symbolic. In order to make property tangible, the drafters identi-
fied property in the good with the good itself. Property interests in 
the good are made, as nearly as possible, equivalent to sensuous 
contact with the good. Severing the several rights and obligations 
of property from title supposedly disaggregated them, but in fact, 
these sticks are now bound to the good itself: legal issues concern-
ing goods tend to be determined by reference to the party who has 
sensuous contact with the goods.206 Although the U.C.C. never de-
205. Llewellyn called title in chattel "mythical" or "mystical" and complained that it can-
not be seen - unlike title in real property, which can be seen in the form of a chain of 
recording documents. See id. at 165. He called for a "firm, objective basis for allocating 
title." Id. at 166. 
206. The concept of physical possession also crops up repeatedly in the U.C.C. in the 
various rules of derivation and bona fide purchaser. The bona fide purchaser rules of the 
U.C.C. place a premium on physical possession. This is most obvious in the case of negotia-
ble instruments and negotiable documents of title, which expressly require the person seek-
ing to enforce negotiation rights to be a possessor - as clearly indicated by the terminology: 
she is called a "holder." See Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 9 (manuscript at n.145). 
On my contention that we should begin our analysis of property by looking at the most 
generalized rules rather than concentrating on the most idiosyncratic, negotiable instruments 
and documents are a poor place to start. The very purpose of these curious devices is to 
transform intangible interests - debts in the case of instruments, nonpossessory interests in 
goods in the case of documents - into tangible form so that the intangible can now be seen 
and held. As I discuss elsewhere, James Rogers has even argued that negotiable instruments 
and the law of negotiability are archaic anachronisms that should be done away with. 
Schroeder, Perfection as Possession, supra note 9 (manuscript at text accompanying notes 78-
94) (citing James Steven Rogers, Negotiability, Property and Identity, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 
471, 501-08 (1990)). Perhaps the market agrees, relying on nonnegotiable functional 
equivalents such as wire transfers and credit cards for payments and nonnegotiable docu-
ments of title for delivery and storage. 
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fines the word possession, it seems quite clear from the context in 
which the word is used that it is intended to mean immediate physi-
cal custody epitomized by one's literally grasping it in his hand.207 
In other words, the drafters of Article 2 started from the 
Hohfeldian position that property is not an object or a right with 
respect to an object but a set of legal relations among subjects. This 
is why the elements of property can be identified and separated. 
Nevertheless, they ended up by equating property with the object 
itself. They conflated the Symbolic (law) with the Real (the physi-
cal world) and applied the phallic metaphor of grasping to the Phal-
lic concept of property. Thus, on the one hand, my analysis 
suggests that rather than a radical escape from the past, Article 2 of 
the U.C.C. can be seen as a reactionary embrace of its most simplis-
tic, physicalist aspects. 
That is, the adoption of the bundle of sticks metaphor in private 
law did not challenge the phallic property paradigm. It replicated 
and strengthened it. Moreover, despite Grey and Vandevelde's 
hopes to the contrary, this might have precisely the parallel result in 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
On the other hand, as I discuss in a companion to this article,208 
certain aspects of the language in Article 2 may indicate a possible 
207. The U.C.C. adopts this physicalist notion of possession as opposed to the Symbolic 
notion of possession adopted by Hegel. I discuss the meaning of the word possession in Part 
V, infra. 
208. See Schroeder, Liquid Property, supra note 9 (manuscript at text accompanying 
notes 67-89). As I argue in that article, Llewellyn did not object to property but to the 
imagery of the archetypical sale implicit in the concept of title. According to Llewellyn, the 
common law treated the "farmer's transaction" as the norm and accounted for the 
"merchant's transaction" as an exception. This was appropriate for an agrarian economy but 
is troublesome in a modem commercial economy in which merchant's transactions are the 
norm as an empirical matter. 
A typical farmer's transaction is an isolated, face-to-face, cash sale of one identifiable 
object, such as a horse, for personal use. The sale occurs between two individuals, the seller 
and the buyer. A sale in a farmer's transaction is a discrete event. Because all aspects of the 
sales event occur substantially simultaneously, it is convenient to speak of an instant when 
property in the form of title passes. 
In contradistinction, merchants' transactions tend to be repetitive, long-distance, credit 
transactions involving wares - that is, multiple, often fungible goods that are purchased not 
for use but for commercial purposes such as resale. Although a merchant's transaction is also 
fundamentally a two-party transaction, it also often includes numerous go-betweens such as 
banks and other financiers, carriers, warehouses, consignors, and sales representatives. In 
other words, to a merchant, a sale is not an event but a process that takes place over time. 
Consequently, the common law notion of title passing instantaneously is inadequate for the 
analysis. 
Or, to put it in Llewellyn's language, in the simple farmer's transaction imagined by the 
common law, "the whole transaction can be accomplished at one stroke, shifting possession 
along with title, no strings being left behind." Llewellyn, supra note 203, at 167. Merchants' 
transactions "involve a period, often an extended period, during which matters are in tempo-
rary suspension or are in active flux between the parties: over considerable periods of time 
there is not such Title in either party." Id. 
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opening for a property paradigm shift. That is, the realists thought 
that they found property a solid but brittle concept - any change 
would shatter it into separable shards. The former phallic unity of 
title could only be replaced by the phallic fasces - a bundle of 
many little phallic sticks awkwardly and contingently tied together. 
I suggest that alternate metaphors can be drawn from the language 
of Article 2 that can simultaneously reflect both the malleability 
and separability of property, without abandoning the integrity of 
the whole of property. For example, rather than shattering solid 
property through disaggregation, Article 2 may have allowed us to 
melt it; we may now have liquid property.209 
4. Conceptual Severance 
As other left-leaning critics of the Rehnquist Supreme Court 
have lamented, the disaggregation of property may not be relent-
lessly leading toward a diminution of constitutional property pro-
tection. Rather, as Margaret Radin has argued, the trend under the 
Rehnquist Court has been a strengthening, not a withering, of what 
she calls the traditional liberal view of property - the exclusive 
right to possess, enjoy, and alienate objects - in constitutional ju-
risprudence.210 Moreover, this strengthening of constitutional 
property has been helped, not hindered, by the disaggregation of 
property. Radin believes that she has identified in a number of 
cases a tendency of certain Justices to find that governmental inter-
ference with any one of the many disaggregated rights associated 
with property may be a "taking."211 This approach, which Radin 
labels "conceptual severance," 
consists of delineating a property interest consisting of just what the 
government action has removed from the owner, and then asserting 
Llewellyn develops his critique of the imagery of property in K.N. Llewellyn, Across Sales 
on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REv. 725 (1939), and K.N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Un-
horse Sales, 52 HARv. L. REv. 873 (1939). 
209. In Liquid Property, I argue that despite the failure of the Code drafters successfully 
to avoid the phallic metaphor of property, their drafting approach did leave open the possi-
bility of developing new, alternate metaphors for property. Schroeder, Liquid Property, 
supra note 9 (manuscript at text accompanying notes 124-64). I present as the alternative 
view that the rules of Article 2 need not necessarily be seen as the shattering of solid prop-
erty; instead, they could be seen as its liquification. Id. (manuscript at section I.E). Property 
may now be viscous. My point is not simplistically to replace one physicalist metaphor with a 
new one but to show how the uses of different metaphors to describe the same statute can 
lead to different results. 
210. Radin, supra note 5, at 1671-85. 
211. Radin presents her analysis in Cross Currents. Id. at 1674-78. The cases she particu-
larly discusses are Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commn., 483 U.S. 825 (1987); and First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
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that that particular whole thing has been permanently taken. Thus, 
this strategy hypothetically or conceptually "severs" from the whole 
bundle of rights just those strands that are interfered with by the regu-
lation, and then hypothetically or conceptually construes those 
strands in the aggregate as a separate whole thing.212 
Radin condemns this approach for several reasons. She expressly 
challenges it as incorporating a conservative political and jurispru-
dential philosophy.213 Specifically, she believes that this trend puts 
governmental regulation she deems progressive at risk of being in-
validated as unconstitutional under the Takings Clause.214 Implic-
itly, she criticizes the Court precisely for not maintaining a unitary 
notion of property.215 She seems to realize intuitively - and Grey 
and Vandevelde seem to fear intuitively - that the legal realists' 
assumptions were incorrect. Disaggregation of property may not 
lead to a more expansive view of governmental regulation. Rather, 
a right-leaning Supreme Court can use a disaggregated notion of 
property to restrict appropriate government regulation in much the 
same way that a previous, conservative Court used unitary, absolute 
property. Consequently, as I argue elsewhere, Radin implicitly re-
jects the Hohfeldian intersubjective account of property in favor of 
a radically objective account.216 
If one recognizes for constitutional law purposes that property 
consists of a bundle of severable sticks, "[i]t is 'an easy slippery 
slope' to the radical position that 'every regulation of any portion of 
an owner's "bundle of sticks" is a taking of the whole of that partic-
ular portion considered separately.' "217 In other words, Grey ar-
gues that Hohfeld's revelation that property rights are severable 
and indistinguishable from other legal rights meant that property 
212. Radin, supra note 5, at 1676. 
213. Id. at 1674-78. 
214. Id. at 1676-78. 
215. To date, Radin argues, this risk is more potential than actual. This is because the 
Court has concentrated primarily on the "exclusive occupation" element of property. Id. at 
1678. She believes, however, that the Court has been moving closer toward the constitution-
alization of what she sees as the full, traditional liberal trinity of possession, use, and aliena-
tion. It is the constitutionalization of alienation that could have a devastating effect on 
regulation. Id. at 1686. 
216. See Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 5. Radin's dichotomy of the favored 
form of property (personal property) and the disfavored form of property (fungible prop-
erty) is based on the owner's relationship with various categories of things. She generally 
uses the word property to refer to the thing itself, rather than to the intersubjective rights and 
obligations of subjects with respect to the thing. An object is personal property to the extent 
that the object relationship is necessary for the development of the owner's personality - as 
with, for example, one's primary residence, a wedding ring, or a woman's sexuality. 
217. NEDELSKY, supra note 4, at 236 (quoting Radin, supra note 5, at 1678). 
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does not exist. If property is everything, then property is nothing. 
Radin shows how a libertarian can come to the opposite conclusion. 
The problem that Grey and Vandevelde may really see is not 
that the disaggregation of property is killing property but that it is 
giving property new life. Disaggregated property, like the dismem-
bered god Osiris, threatens to fill the world with its power. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE DENIAL OF THE FEMININE 
Waldron's attempt to epitomize property as the sensuous grasp-
ing of physical things is self-defeating. It denies property its very 
nature as a legal relation - Symbolic, abstract, social, and medi-
ated - in favor of an imagined, infantile, immediate, Real union of 
the subject and the object. 
Hohfeld, Grey, and Vandevelde make an error that is the mirror 
image of Waldron's and is, consequently, also self-defeating. In 
their desire to capture the Symbolic aspect of property as human 
interrelationships, they deny the mediating object that permits the 
development of subjectivity as intersubjectivity. 
According to Lacan, the Symbolic Phallus is the object of desire. 
Our ultimate desire is the Imaginary, forever-lost union with the 
Other Imagined as the Mother,218 which we place in the Real world 
beyond interpretation. Consequently, the Phallus - what men 
want to have and women try to be - is paradoxically both the 
Feminine and the signifier of masculine subjectivity. 
Men try to attain subjectivity and hold the Phallus, not only by 
having the Real penis, but also by trying to control women's bodies. 
Of course this is unsatisfactory. They can never attain the Phallic 
Woman. To do so would be to submerge themselves into the prel-
inguistic, preinterpreted order of the Real and to lose their subjec-
tivity - the ability to speak. So, in frustration, they also try to 
deny the existence of the lost Feminine. They try to pretend that 
they achieve unmediated relationships by denying the existence of 
the mediator. In Lacan's terms, "+lw Woman does not exist."219 
218. During the Mirror Stage, when the child realizes that he is other than the M{O)ther, 
he Imagines that he was once one with her in the Real. Because this M{O)ther is everything 
the purely negative child is not, she must have everything including the Phallus. See GRosz, 
supra note 28, at 31-47; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12. Consequently, 
even though the realization of the Mother's existence does not occur until the development 
of the Imaginary, and the originary moment of the concept of the Phallus is the originary 
moment of the realm of the Symbolic, in the Borromean knot of the psyche, the concept of 
the Feminine as the Phallic Mother functions in the Real. 
219. 
The woman can only be written with The crossed through. There is no such thing as The 
woman, where the definite article stands for the universal. There is no such thing as The 
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She is Real in the technical sense that she cannot be adequately 
described in Symbolic language but she cannot be reduced to or 
grasped as a Real object. The Woman - the Feminine - becomes 
purely the Imaginary object of men's fantasy; woman becomes a 
symptom of man.220 
We Imagine an Imaginary object, an objet petit a, to stand in for 
the Symbolic object of desire and to function as the cause of our 
desire. We then try to identify this Imaginary little other with 
something that is actually biological, natural - that is, Real. This is 
in the vain hope that if we can attain the Real object, then our de-
sire will be fulfilled.221 Or, we deny mediation entirely. 
Waldron insists that property is archetypically sensuous on the 
grounds that because sensuous things exist, he can see them and 
they are easier to identify and think about. He continues to do so 
even though property interests as a legal matter are abstract and 
Symbolic and as an empirical matter are often concerned with 
noncorporeal objects. Consequently, sensuous grasping is inade-
quate to the role of the archetypical relation of the subject with the 
object of desire of property in precisely the same way as the penis 
and the female body are inadequate to serve the psychoanalytic 
role of the Phallus. This is the psychoanalytic position of the mas-
culine - the deluded, split, and despairing Lacanian subject who 
continues to repeat the lie that he is not castrated: he has the Phal-
lus merely because he has a penis and controls women. 
woman since of her essence - having already risked the term, why think twice about it? 
- of her essence, she is not all. 
LACAN, God and the Jouissance of :i:he Woman, supra note 29, at 144; see also LACAN, Televi-
sion, supra note 47, at 38. 
220. See Rose, supra note 28, at 48-51. 
221. This strategy is, of course, always unsuccessful because the Real object is neither the 
Imaginary ob jet petit a nor the Symbolic Phallus. Once the Real object is obtained, the sub-
ject merely identifies the ob jet petit a with another Real object. As soon as one gets that new 
car, one always wants a new car, a new dress, a bigger house, and so on. 
In his late work, Lacan defined the objective of psychoanalysis as breaking the confusion 
behind this mystification, a rupture between the objet a and the Other, whose conflation 
he saw as the elevation of fantasy into the order of truth. The objet a, cause of desire 
and support of male fantasy gets transposed onto the image of the woman as Other who 
then acts as its guarantee. The absolute "Otherness" of the woman, therefore, serves to 
secure for the man his own self-knowledge and truth. 
Rose, supra note 28, at 50. 
Probably the best literary example of this in an overtly sexual context is Leporello's fa-
mous catalogue aria in Mozart's opera Don Giovanni. Leporello reels off a seemingly end-
less string of women his master has seduced. The women are of every possible description -
beautiful and ugly, young and old, rich and poor. Each Real woman had stood for an instant 
in the place of the Don's fantasy image of woman, which served as his objet petit a. Upon 
being captured in the Real, however, she proved an inadequate substitute for the Phallic 
Mother as the object of Symbolic desire and was subsequently rejected and a new Real 
woman was positioned in the place of the Imaginary object. Z1zEK, supra note 47, at 112-15. 
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Noncorporeal property, like feminine sexuality, is at once hid-
den and ubiquitous, lack and surplus. We try to deny the Feminine 
her role as Phallus precisely because she cannot be easily seen and 
held. Feminine sexuality must be tamed by defining her as the fe-
male body that is occupied - possessed - by the penis in hetero-
sexual intercourse. Thus Waldron says that only the tangible, and 
no other form of property, exists. The noncorporeal can only be 
discussed if it can be analogized to the corporeal. In Lacanian 
terms, individuals who are located in the feminine position can 
never speak in the feminine voice; women must take on or mime 
the role of the masculine subject to be recognized by society as 
speaking persons. 
Because feminine intangibility is hard to identify and think 
about, it must be denied. The Feminine and property are identified 
with "lack."222 The Lacanian masculine subject insists that +.lw 
Woman does not exist. Thus Hohfeld, Grey, and Vandevelde mir-
ror back Waldron's psychoanalytically masculine position. They say 
that the res of property does not exist. 
The lie that lies at the bottom of our subjectivity is that we Im-
agine that immediate relationship - union with the Feminine - is 
a lost state. The subject is always castrated in that the Phallic 
Mother has been taken away. Men create their subjectivity through 
the myth that they have and exchange the Phallus and use women 
to stand in this position - Really,223 Imaginarily, and Symbolically. 
Accordingly, when we are positioned as masculine, we live in fear 
of castration in the sense of a morbid terror that our masquerade of 
having the Phallus will drop. When we are positioned as feminine, 
we suffer Peniseid, reinterpreted in the Symbolic sense of nostalgic 
mourning for a forever-lost state of wholeness.224 There can be no 
sexual relation,225 and subjectivity is nothing.226 
But Lacan's interpretation denies the very basis of his theory. 
We are not castrated, because we never in fact had unmediated re-
222. DRUCILLA CoRNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 173 (1992); LACAN, The Phal· 
lie Phase, supra note 133, at 116-17. 
223. The exchange of women is empirical in the context of the traditional kinship rein· 
tions explored by Claude Levi-Strauss. See, e.g., CLAUDE L~vI-STRAuss, STRUCTURAL AN-
THROPOLOGY 61 (Claire Jacobson & Brooke Grundfest Schoepf trans., Anchor Books 1967) 
(1963). Lacan's early discussions of sexuality were deeply influenced by Uvi-Strauss's work 
locating the origins of civilization in the actual exchange of women among groups of men. 
Lacan's later work moved away from the natural and empirical, emphasizing the impossible 
nature of the Symbolic exchange of the Phallus. See supra note 33. 
224. LACAN, The signification of the phallus, supra note 30, at 289. 
225. LACAN, God and the Jouissance of !Fite Woman, supra note 29, at 138-41. 
226. See generally Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 130. 
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lations. To be capable of relations we must first, by definition, be 
individuated subjects capable of being recognized as subjects by 
others. Property helps to serve this function. Consequently, rela-
tionship is not an Edenic state forever lost in our past. It is the 
impossible, inspirational goal that we glimpse j,n our_future. 
The Feminine is psychoanalytically positioned as the mediating 
object of relationships between masculine subjects. This Symbolic 
order has been played out in the Real, through traditional kinship 
structures that have revolved around the literal possession and ex-
change of actual women among actual men,227 and in the Imagi-
nary, where women desperately try to conform to and fulfill men's 
fantasies. Lacan is correct that in this structure there can be no true 
relation. But this is because the medium of mediation has been tra-
ditionally conceptualized as a passive object that stands between 
subjects. Property- the regime of possession, enjoyment, and ex-
change of objects that are not themselves persons - appropriately 
serves this purpose. Consequently, in Hegel's analysis, property is 
an abstract right that furthers human freedom. But abstract right is 
the most primitive, and therefore the most abstract and inadequate, 
form of human interrelationship. 
Moreover, the regime of sexuality is not only a Lacanian trag-
edy but a Hegelian abstract wrong. This is because the desired me-
diating object is not something external to personality; it is the 
Feminine. Subjectivity is, therefore, defined as masculinity in the 
depth of our very psyches. When people stand in the feminine posi-
tion, they are not accorded full subjectivity. When women228 speak, 
they do so derivatively, temporarily standing in the masculine posi-
tion and becoming honorary men.229 According to Lacan, it is liter-
ally impossible to speak in a feminine voice. Consequently, as I 
have argued extensively elsewhere,23° Carol Gilligan and her fol-
lowers are wrong in arguing that women speak in a different 
voice.231 The reason that the image of femininity promoted by dif-
227. See supra note 223. 
228. As I discuss above, see supra text accompanying notes 42-43, the positions of man 
and woman are Symbolic, not Real (biological). Nevertheless, biological female persons tend 
to be positioned in the feminine and biological males in the masculine. 
229. LACAN, A Love Letter, supra note 29, at.150; GRosz, supra note 28, at 71-72. 
230. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in 
Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 lowA L. REv. 1135 (1990) [hereinafter Schroeder, 
Feminism Historicized); Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio, supra note 18; Schroeder, 
The Vestal and the Fasces, supra note 12, at 120-47. 
231. For an example of this perspective among contemporary feminists, see CAROL GIL-
LIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 
(1982). 
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ferent-voice feminists seems so reminiscent of the traditional mas-
culinist stereotype is that the supposedly different "feminine" voice 
they listen to is not different at all.232 Psychoanalytically, it is the 
same voice, a weak echo of the voice of masculine subjectivity. By 
championing the role of women's supposed relationality, different-
voice feminists merely call on women once again to take on the 
impossible Imaginary role of conforming to and fulfilling the mas-
culine fantasy of The Woman. 
The unfulfilled dream of the true relationships necessary for 
human freedom requires the rewriting of the myth of the Feminine 
as an active mediatrix. This requires the creation of feminine sub-
jectivity. Lacan is right that The Woman does not exist, but not 
because she is lost. She does not exist because she is not yet. 
Hegel was no feminist. Yet, I argue that the logic of his philoso-
phy dictates that even at the minimum, cold, inadequate level of 
abstract right - let alone at the higher levels of morality or ethics 
- feminine objectivity is an abstract wrong that prevents the actu-
alization of freedom for all humans. 
Lacan's theory is virulently misogynist. Yet his psychoanalytic 
theory tells us that the objectification of women for the sake of the 
subjectivity of men is self-defeating. We can achieve subjectivity 
only through intersubjective desire. According to Lacan, man does 
not merely desire the recognition by and the desire of another, but 
the Other233 with a capital 0. In order to create masculine subjec-
tivity, the feminine is constituted as the object of desire and ex-
change. By doing so, we constitute not only the Feminine but 
women as the Other. Yet, as the object of desire, we simultane-
ously deny women in our position as the Feminine (the Other) the 
subjectivity that would enable us to desire as women and to have 
our Feminine desire recognizable to masculine subjects. Conse-
quently, the intersubjectivity of desire cannot be achieved. The 
subject is nothing. And the Feminine is positioned as lack. 
Lacan was finally able to answer the question that so perplexed 
Freud: "Was will das Weib? (What does woman want)?"234 She just 
wants. 235 When we stand in the feminine position, we experience 
ourselves as wanting in both senses of the term. Moreover, in our 
232. I set forth my critique of different-voice feminism in Schroeder, Feminism Histori-
cized, supra note 230, and in Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio, supra note 18. 
233. See supra note 47. 
234. 2 ERNEST JoNES, THE LIFE AND Woruc OF SIGMUND FREUD 421 (1955) (quoting a 
letter from Freud to Marie Bonaparte). 
235. LACAN, A Love Letter, supra note 29, at 151; Mitchell, supra note 31, at 24. 
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masculine aspect we live in despair and terror of the castration we 
secretly know has always already occurred. Women are left want-
ing because it is men who are wanting the thing we all want. Men 
need to insist that they have the Phallus, not despite their castra-
tion, but just because of their castration.236 
Hegel spent his life arguing that the actualization of freedom in 
the world is logically necessary. But that which is logically neces-
sary does not always occur as an empirical matter. Because human 
freedom requires human subjectivity, humans must take an active 
subjective role in the creation of their freedom. 
We cannot create a feminine subjectivity merely by giving em-
pirical women the legal right to act like empirical men - the goal 
of traditional liberal feminism and MacKinnonesque radical femi-
nism.237 Nor can empirical women attain feminine subjectivity by 
trying to speak in a supposedly "different voice," which is in fact 
only an echo of masculine fantasy. Lacan tells us that feminine sub-
jectivity is precisely the one thing that is impossible in this world. 
And yet, he also insists that despite the seemingly crushing power 
of this world to replicate itself, this world is neither natural nor 
inevitable. 
This is why we are called to the impossible task of simultane-
ously changing the world and ourselves. 
236. ZiZek wonderfully retells the story of The Emperor's New Clothes in this light. See 
Z!ZEK, supra note 47, at 11-12, 252. What the preoedipal child did not realize when he 
blurted out the fact of the emperor's nakedness was that adults do not insist that the emperor 
was clothed despite the fact he is naked. Rather, we need to insist on his clothes just because 
he is naked. It is this fiction that is subjectivity. Id.; see also Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 
130. 
237. Catharine MacKinnon would no doubt disagree with my characterization of her the-
ory. Nevertheless, I stand by my critique, which I have presented extensively elsewhere. See 
Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio, supra note 18; Schroeder, Feminism Historicized, 
supra note 230; Schroeder, Subject: Object, supra note 100; Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Taming 
of the Shrew: The Liberal Attempt to Mainstream Radical Feminist Theory, 5 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 123 (1992). 
